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Log signing is nice to have, but ultimately not that reliable. Systemd has quite a broad attack surface, and if the attacker has root, you're fucked anyway. It
by KaiserPro 12y ago
Log signing is nice to have, but ultimately not that reliable. Systemd has quite a broad attack surface, and if the attacker has root, you're fucked anyway. It might be a useful tool for poking local sysadmins.
compromising systemd, forcing it to re-sign the logs (assuming that practicable.)
Potentially you can have an alert that checks the signature, which might be useful. However you can do something similar now, but comparing log files (local vs remote) although its not that easy or elegant.
I've yet to use systemd in anger. I'm sure when we update all 25k machines to it next year we'll become intimately familiar with all its pains.
- Tuna-Fish 12y ago> compromising systemd, forcing it to re-sign the logs (assuming that practicable.) This is completely unfeasible. The point of FSS is that you sign the logs, create a new key using your old one, and then permanently throw away the old key. Once this is done, no matter what control you have on the system, you cannot re-sign the logs without the tampering being obvious.