4 ms·

> I remember you. You're the paranoid conspiracy theorist who shows up in every surveillance post making wildly inaccurate claims. I encourage anyone reading t

> I remember you. You're the paranoid conspiracy theorist who shows up in every surveillance post making wildly inaccurate claims. I encourage anyone reading this thread to look up lern_too_spel and my previous encounters and decide for yourself. I would suggest this one in particular (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8513528 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8513528). I would add the "Biden Bill" S.266 to the list of things in the top comment. "It is the sense of Congress that providers of electronic communications services and manufacturers of electronic communications service equipment shall ensure that communications systems permit the government to obtain the plain text contents of voice, data, and other communications when appropriately authorized by law." - http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c102:1:./temp/~c102y44iie:e30624 http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c102:1:./temp/~c102y44...: I would also add 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f): "Required disclosure of customer communications or records" - http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2703 http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2703 > I'll humor you again and stick to one of your stupendous claims How about replying to all of them? In previous threads it was very common for you to pick one fact and fixate on it ignoring the others. I would much rather have a discussion about all of these points. > All the released documents show that it is used to home in on the location of a targeted subscriber, which can be done without recording anybody else's data. Please link to said released documents. The Wall Street Journal, which broke the story: http://online.wsj.com/news/article_email/americans-cellphones-targeted-in-secret-u-s-spy-program-1415917533-lMyQjAxMTI0NTEwMzAxMTMwWj http://online.wsj.com/news/article_email/americans-cellphone... "The technology is aimed at locating cellphones linked to individuals under investigation by the government, including fugitives and drug dealers, but it collects information on cellphones belonging to people who aren’t criminal suspects, these people said. They said the device determines which phones belong to suspects and “lets go” of the non-suspect phones." "Also unknown are the steps taken to ensure data collected on innocent people isn’t kept for future examination by investigators." "Within the Marshals Service, some have questioned the legality of such operations and the internal safeguards, these people said. They say scooping up of large volumes of information, even for a short period, may not be properly understood by judges who approve requests for the government to locate a suspect’s phone. Some within the agency also question whether people scanning cellphone signals are doing enough to minimize intrusions into the phones of other citizens, and if there are effective procedures in place to safeguard the handling of that data."

lern_too_spel 12y ago
Thanks for pointing people to that thread. It shows another one of your crazy claims thoroughly debunked by tptacek and myself that you couldn't be bothered to correct yourself about. That's why it's pointless correcting you. If another user cares to discuss these issues, I'll gladly take them up on the offer. As for my documents, you linked to the canonical document that broke the story itself. You even quoted the part about how it most likely works. "They said the device determines which phones belong to suspects and 'lets go' of the non-suspect phones." The rest of the article consists of evidence-free speculation about data collection that is not necessary to perform the task that the device is required for. I'm done. Thanks for the link to the previous conversation. I'll just repost that the next time you respond to one of my comments, so everybody will understand why I won't bother to correct your points.
- xnull2guest 12y ago
  You failed to link to documents (again), failed to reply to all items (again) and selectively quoted content (again). "it collects information on cellphones belonging to people who aren’t criminal suspects" "unknown are the steps taken to ensure data collected on innocent people isn’t kept for future examination" "scooping up of large volumes of information, even for a short period, may not be properly understood by judges" "Some within the agency also question whether people scanning cellphone signals are doing enough to minimize intrusions into the phones of other citizens, and if there are effective procedures in place to safeguard the handling of that data." > If another user cares to discuss these issues, I'll gladly take them up on the offer. @adventured, the ball's yours.
tptacek 12y ago
I don't know much about either of you but would like to add here that you were --- no harm, no foul --- comprehensively wrong about CALEA. The law itself refutes your claims about its impact on software companies, right up front in the "definitions" section.
- xnull2guest 12y ago
  Haha, thanks Thomas. I'm half in agreement with you about CALEA, but think the thread missed the larger point. Forests and trees and all of that. If one were to take my point as a specific claim about only CALEA and as a specific claim only about key (and not data) escrow under a strong letter of the law reading, then yes most certainly I was wrong. However this interpretation of the thesis is/was an injudicious one. There are laws requiring plaintext access to communications records and computing services records upon lawful request. CALEA does have a section on this (focused on telecommunications, which have been expanded to include digital transport such as VOIP technologies), as does 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) (which do apply to digital services such as cloud technologies), as do others. The thread fixated on CALEA - yet from the beginning my thesis was about a constellation of laws and the interpretation of these laws under EO 12333 and the Third Party Doctrine, current political climate and the real world pragmatic implementation of policies in tandem with the private sector (e.g. telecoms in America today do not provide strong escrow-less crypto). From what I can ascertain for large providers the Department of Commerce streamlines the process. Telecommunications have been streamlined since the late 90s. Internet services are still in the process of being streamlined - PRISM was one of said programs. For smaller providers requests/demands are run when the value of ends supersedes the cost of means. Lavabit is an extreme example of how leverage has been applied to acquire plaintext access to communications.

lern_too_spel 12y ago

Thanks for pointing people to that thread. It shows another one of your crazy claims thoroughly debunked by tptacek and myself that you couldn't be bothered to correct yourself about. That's why it's pointless correcting you. If another user cares to discuss these issues, I'll gladly take them up on the offer. As for my documents, you linked to the canonical document that broke the story itself. You even quoted the part about how it most likely works. "They said the device determines which phones belong to suspects and 'lets go' of the non-suspect phones." The rest of the article consists of evidence-free speculation about data collection that is not necessary to perform the task that the device is required for. I'm done. Thanks for the link to the previous conversation. I'll just repost that the next time you respond to one of my comments, so everybody will understand why I won't bother to correct your points.

xnull2guest 12y ago
You failed to link to documents (again), failed to reply to all items (again) and selectively quoted content (again). "it collects information on cellphones belonging to people who aren’t criminal suspects" "unknown are the steps taken to ensure data collected on innocent people isn’t kept for future examination" "scooping up of large volumes of information, even for a short period, may not be properly understood by judges" "Some within the agency also question whether people scanning cellphone signals are doing enough to minimize intrusions into the phones of other citizens, and if there are effective procedures in place to safeguard the handling of that data." > If another user cares to discuss these issues, I'll gladly take them up on the offer. @adventured, the ball's yours.

tptacek 12y ago

I don't know much about either of you but would like to add here that you were --- no harm, no foul --- comprehensively wrong about CALEA. The law itself refutes your claims about its impact on software companies, right up front in the "definitions" section.

xnull2guest 12y ago
Haha, thanks Thomas. I'm half in agreement with you about CALEA, but think the thread missed the larger point. Forests and trees and all of that. If one were to take my point as a specific claim about only CALEA and as a specific claim only about key (and not data) escrow under a strong letter of the law reading, then yes most certainly I was wrong. However this interpretation of the thesis is/was an injudicious one. There are laws requiring plaintext access to communications records and computing services records upon lawful request. CALEA does have a section on this (focused on telecommunications, which have been expanded to include digital transport such as VOIP technologies), as does 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) (which do apply to digital services such as cloud technologies), as do others. The thread fixated on CALEA - yet from the beginning my thesis was about a constellation of laws and the interpretation of these laws under EO 12333 and the Third Party Doctrine, current political climate and the real world pragmatic implementation of policies in tandem with the private sector (e.g. telecoms in America today do not provide strong escrow-less crypto). From what I can ascertain for large providers the Department of Commerce streamlines the process. Telecommunications have been streamlined since the late 90s. Internet services are still in the process of being streamlined - PRISM was one of said programs. For smaller providers requests/demands are run when the value of ends supersedes the cost of means. Lavabit is an extreme example of how leverage has been applied to acquire plaintext access to communications.