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Approval/Range voting fail the majority criteria in that they allow a candidate who is the second preference of 90% of people to beat a candidate who is the fir

Approval/Range voting fail the majority criteria in that they allow a candidate who is the second preference of 90% of people to beat a candidate who is the first preference of 51% of people. Is that necessarily a bad thing? Your link also discusses the later-no-harm criteria for Approval/Range leading to strategic voting, but all the examples I've seen for this seem to talk about giving a marginally preferred candidate an advantage in the absence of any truly disliked candidates. I think in practice, people will be far more interested in keeping disliked candidates out than furthering their marginal preferences. Meanwhile, IRV suffers from Favourite Betrayal, which is a much more obvious incentive for strategic voting IMO. (Your link about NP-completeness of strategy only talks about STV.)

ClayShentrup 12y ago
This issue has been solved by math PhD's and political scientists who've studied the matter for decades. www.electology.org/approval-voting-vs-irv IRV can elect X even if Y was preferred to X by an arbitrarily huge majority and got more first-place votes than X. www.electology.org/core-support Regarding favorite betrayal, you might enjoy this video. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
philipn 12y ago
In a range voting election, you'd have a lot of people who would bullet-vote for a particular candidate (100/100 points for candidate A). Then possibly lots of other people who would have to think about how people may be bullet-voting for those candidates, and then think about how they might distribute their points so as to ensure those candidates don't win. If I love candidate B and C, kind of like D, and hate candidate A, but all of candidate A's supporters are bullet-voting, how should I vote? It's ridiculous. It doesn't allow voters to express their preferences without strategic voting -- it's totally baked into the process. The range voting folks have come up with various metrics that say their system is the best, but completely ignore the most obvious reasons why its flawed. For the record, though, I'd vastly prefer any system over the current plurality elections (including range voting).
- aninhumer 12y ago
  >then think about how they might distribute their points Just to be clear, you're not imagining people have to share their vote between parties are you? Range voting means you can give every party 100 if you want to. >If I love candidate B and C, kind of like D, and hate candidate A, but all of candidate A's supporters are bullet-voting, how should I vote? If you really hate A so badly that you think any one of B, C or D would be vastly better, then go ahead and give them all 100. If A not getting in is that important to you then your "strategic" vote is in fact, an accurate representation of your preferences.
- ClayShentrup 12y ago
  In a range voting election, you'd have a lot of people who would bullet-vote for a particular candidate www.electology.org/bullet-voting > (100/100 points for candidate A). Score Voting (aka Range Voting) does not limit the number of votes. That's WHY it's so resistant to tactical voting. If you give Ralph Nader a "perfect 10", you can still help Gore against Bush as strongly as you want. You could even strategize to give Gore a 10 and Bush a 0.

ClayShentrup 12y ago

This issue has been solved by math PhD's and political scientists who've studied the matter for decades. www.electology.org/approval-voting-vs-irv IRV can elect X even if Y was preferred to X by an arbitrarily huge majority and got more first-place votes than X. www.electology.org/core-support Regarding favorite betrayal, you might enjoy this video. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ

philipn 12y ago

In a range voting election, you'd have a lot of people who would bullet-vote for a particular candidate (100/100 points for candidate A). Then possibly lots of other people who would have to think about how people may be bullet-voting for those candidates, and then think about how they might distribute their points so as to ensure those candidates don't win. If I love candidate B and C, kind of like D, and hate candidate A, but all of candidate A's supporters are bullet-voting, how should I vote? It's ridiculous. It doesn't allow voters to express their preferences without strategic voting -- it's totally baked into the process. The range voting folks have come up with various metrics that say their system is the best, but completely ignore the most obvious reasons why its flawed. For the record, though, I'd vastly prefer any system over the current plurality elections (including range voting).

aninhumer 12y ago
>then think about how they might distribute their points Just to be clear, you're not imagining people have to share their vote between parties are you? Range voting means you can give every party 100 if you want to. >If I love candidate B and C, kind of like D, and hate candidate A, but all of candidate A's supporters are bullet-voting, how should I vote? If you really hate A so badly that you think any one of B, C or D would be vastly better, then go ahead and give them all 100. If A not getting in is that important to you then your "strategic" vote is in fact, an accurate representation of your preferences.
ClayShentrup 12y ago
In a range voting election, you'd have a lot of people who would bullet-vote for a particular candidate www.electology.org/bullet-voting > (100/100 points for candidate A). Score Voting (aka Range Voting) does not limit the number of votes. That's WHY it's so resistant to tactical voting. If you give Ralph Nader a "perfect 10", you can still help Gore against Bush as strongly as you want. You could even strategize to give Gore a 10 and Bush a 0.