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While it is true that you can "write in" anyone you want, the reality of all voting means that the winner is (Generally) going to be the person who is most well
by AndrewKemendo 12y ago
While it is true that you can "write in" anyone you want, the reality of all voting means that the winner is (Generally) going to be the person who is most well known - and like it or not that means campaigning aka advertising.
So in practice, this doesn't get you anywhere.
What we need is a nationwide NOTA (None of the above) vote option, wherein if the NOTA vote gets a plurality, the race must re-occur with different candidates. Like in Brewsers Millions.
- acjohnson55 12y agoI think instant-runoff voting is a better idea https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting
- eru 12y agoOr approval voting. It's much easier to understand, and not really gameable.
- pateras 12y agoThe thing I don't get about approval voting is when do you stop voting for your second choice? It seems like every vote with approval voting is a strategic vote, whereas with IRV you just always vote for your preferred candidates in order. Yes, favorite betrayal is possible, but it requires a very specific set of circumstances, and the only gaming of the system is people throwing their top vote to the opponent, which is very risky and requires a freakish amount of insight into the race to know if the conditions of a spoiler are even possible. To me, strategic voting seems much more likely with approval voting than it does with IRV, and it's that strategic voting that is maintaining the two party system. I think the possibility of a possible spoiler effect under IRV is small, and that its chances of actually allowing 3rd party victories are much higher, and thus worth the risk, especially because, to me, approval voting doesn't really remove the spoiler effect, but just delays it. I like approval voting, but IRV seems like a better solution, overall. Also, I disagree that approval voting is much easier to understand. IRV isn't significantly more complicated than approval voting, and neither are significantly more complicated the current plurality/FPTP system. TL;DR - In my opinion, IRV's rewards outweigh its risks and IRV > approval voting > FPTP.
- eru 12y agoIt's strategic voting under first past the post that maintaining the two-party system, not strategic voting in general. In approval voting you are always best off voting your preference. The only thing you have to decide is your cutoff for how many people you want to approve. From what I've read, people are pretty good at that intuitively.
- ClayShentrup 12y agowww.electology.org/threshold
- aninhumer 12y ago>The thing I don't get about approval voting is when do you stop voting for your second choice? I actually think splitting parties into which ones you like or dislike is a far more natural process than ranking them. Especially when you start getting more variety. That said, I tend to prefer Range voting, since it gives people the most flexibility to actually express their relative preferences. >Yes, favorite betrayal is possible, but it requires a very specific set of circumstances I don't think they're that uncommon circumstances. But more importantly, even the possibility of a spoiler is enough to make people think twice about putting their actual favourite first. It's nowhere near as bad as FPTP, but there's still some pressure to choose a popular party.
- nitrogen 12y agoIRV has a problem with nonmonotonicity: http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/ http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/
- philipn 12y agoWell, no voting system is perfect. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theorem http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theorem. IRV is pretty good, and is being slowly adopted across the country. In particular, IRV satisfies the important "majority criteria," e.g. if the majority of people vote for a candidate, that candidate should win. Approval / range voting fail this criteria. See, again, Arrow's Theorem. http://archive.fairvote.org/monotonicity/ http://archive.fairvote.org/monotonicity/. Additionally, voting so as to strategically take advantage of non-monotonicity using IRV/STV/Ranked Choice Voting is NP-Complete- see http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.127.97 http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.127....
- aninhumer 12y agoApproval/Range voting fail the majority criteria in that they allow a candidate who is the second preference of 90% of people to beat a candidate who is the first preference of 51% of people. Is that necessarily a bad thing? Your link also discusses the later-no-harm criteria for Approval/Range leading to strategic voting, but all the examples I've seen for this seem to talk about giving a marginally preferred candidate an advantage in the absence of any truly disliked candidates. I think in practice, people will be far more interested in keeping disliked candidates out than furthering their marginal preferences. Meanwhile, IRV suffers from Favourite Betrayal, which is a much more obvious incentive for strategic voting IMO. (Your link about NP-completeness of strategy only talks about STV.)
- ClayShentrup 12y agoThis issue has been solved by math PhD's and political scientists who've studied the matter for decades. www.electology.org/approval-voting-vs-irv IRV can elect X even if Y was preferred to X by an arbitrarily huge majority and got more first-place votes than X. www.electology.org/core-support Regarding favorite betrayal, you might enjoy this video. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
- mjevans 12y agoThis is the best that normal people can understand... unless you trick them in to being smart. Voters, thanks to mainstream media, understand the concept of 'voting off' or expressing whom they have the most dis-approval for. Thus get voters to construct a ranking from least to most liked; which you can invert to get the most to least liked. IRV also has poor behavior in the process for selecting whom to remove. My personal solution for that is to remove 'winners' until all that's left is a single candidate; that is the candidate that failed to win any election possible in that round and the one to drop. Re-calculate until there are the target number of candidates left and you have the set of IRV plurality winners (I wasn't even aware of the term plurality until CGPGrey's wonderful series on voting brought up the methods of voting in Robert's Rules of Order).
- baddox 12y agoIt's not even true in general that you can write in anyone you want. Many jurisdictions require write-in candidates to register themselves, and write-ins with any other name or text are invalid ballots.
- noer 12y agoI think there's more of a chance for jury nullification to be a widely understood (and used) concept than for any NOTA campaign to work.
- noer 12y agoI think there's more of a chance for jury nullification to be a widely understood (and used) concept than for any NOTA campaign to work.
- filoeleven 12y agoI really like this idea for a few reasons, though I would begin by trying to pass it at state levels. First, it is simple to implement. Aside from the special election in the case of NOTA getting a plurality, it requires no change to the existing voting system except for the addition of a NOTA option for each position being voted on in an election. Second, it is very easy to understand. IRV, Approval, other schemes are not that difficult to pick up once you've seen an example, but just about everyone already has experience with None Of The Above selections, and often on ballot-like forms, no less. Third, it encourages [the segment of non-voters who abstain from voting due to feeling that there is a lack of viable candidates] to make their positions known, resulting in a better understanding of the wishes of the public. Fourth, due to the other reasons listed above, it is very hard to argue against. What good reasons are there to NOT have this? The only place I can see a strong argument taking hold against the adoption of this measure is that a special election is required if NOTA wins, and that's a non-trivial change to the system. In order to see this get widely implemented, I would explore the idea of starting out with NOTA being non-binding. I do not know if this is a good idea. If it starts out "toothless" (in the sense that whichever candidate gets the most votes still gets in even if the candidate is outranked by NOTA), will the realization of the public that the plurality does not approve of any candidate provide enough pressure to update it to something more powerful once it's established? Does the risk of that not being the case outweigh the benefits we get from seeing just how little approval there is for the candidates selected for us before the voting starts? We know that public pressure is one of the best tools that citizens have to rein in their governments. I believe that starting with a narrow wedge--implementing a non-binding NOTA option at state levels--makes it more likely to be adopted in a larger number of states than otherwise. Seeing in hard, official numbers how disappointed the public is with the choices they are continually offered should be enough to enable further action. Of course if there is a strong enough public will for it, the binding law is better to have from the start. It just seems to me that there won't be enough support for something like this until there's more widespread awareness of how abysmal the current situation is.