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I think that TOR should no longer be considered secure in the wake of so many busts. Either it isn't secure by some flaw, or it is too easy to fingerprint visi
by bhouston 12y ago
I think that TOR should no longer be considered secure in the wake of so many busts. Either it isn't secure by some flaw, or it is too easy to fingerprint visitors, or some other work around.
- s_q_b 12y agoAgreed. From this point forward Tor is considered harmful. But the same time, it seems like they're using workarounds, attacking the browser etc. I still believe the underlying network remains unbroken.
- owenmarshall 12y ago> Agreed. From this point forward Tor is considered harmful. Planting that seed in your mind was almost certainly one of the goals of this action. Mission accomplished, FBI.
- s_q_b 12y agoOkay, let me put it this way: Tor needs to be run from a live CD with an extended-hop circuit and a text only browser. TBB on regular box considered harmful. We don't know the situation, so we have to assume that some part of the Tor stack is broken. It's likely to be the integrated web browser that's the weekend, but it could easily be higher or lower level.
- w1ntermute 12y agoI think that the feds having found and exploited a Tor vulnerability is much less likely than them having violated the law in the process of their investigation and then covered it up with parallel construction.
- privong 12y agoThat may very well be true, but in the absence of supporting evidence, prudence would suggest caution (with respect to tor) is not a bad idea.
- tomp 12y agoBut Tor should protect against illegal actions as much as against legal ones. Unless, of course, they hacked into the servers (using flaws unrelated to Tor), but the problem is how these servers were even located!
- joosters 12y agoNote that this is all about .onion hosted servers. Any flaws might be about locating the servers inside the TOR network and not about identifying individual users.
- kissickas 12y agoI sincerely hope this was done not through Tor backdoors but through traditional police techniques. It would be a great piece of evidence in support of anonymity if they were able to do all of this without finding/creating exploits. Hopefully we'll eventually know the truth.
- EStudley 12y agoI've heard reports that Feds were actually moderators of SR2 from the very start. So from the beginning they were actively building a case against the other owners.
- xorcist 12y agoIf your job is to catch drug dealers on the Internet, I would expect you to be undercover on all these sites. You could either hire lots and lots of cryptographers and hope for a theoretical breakthrough, or you could hire police officers and let them work undercover. It's the reasonable thing to do.
- gumber 12y agoI refuse to believe that the FBI is privy to a funamental TOR break that's completely eluded the cryptographic community, and they're risking revealing it with some darknet busts. If TOR was broken, they'd be encouraging its use while secretly mining it for parallel construction opportunities across the board. Instead, we get warning shots. TOR is fine, but now that we know that the FBI has its tendrils everywhere perhaps we should be a lot more cautious about trusting people we meet online. At the very least we shouldn't be granting administrator privileges to people we don't know the identities of, which is a mistake some of these operators seemingly made.
- owenmarshall 12y ago> I refuse to believe that the FBI is privy to a funamental TOR break[...] and they're risking revealing it with some darknet busts. This is probably the best analysis I've heard. If the Tor protocol was broken in some way, agencies would be sitting on it to vacuum up as much information as possible. If the underlying cryptographic primitives were broken in any way, that information would be restricted to the highest levels of government and used against state actors. Darknet busts mean JS browser injection attacks, poor development practices on the server side, or bad human factors (probably this one, from what we're hearing). But more importantly, increasing the frequency of darknet busts gives a hint of what the authorities think about Tor: they don't have fundamental attacks, so it's best to scare people away as much as possible to discourage use.
- uptownJimmy 12y agoThis rings true. And I think those "bad human factors" are the same as always: the folks slinging the goods are also tasting the goods, which inevitably results in sloppiness.. Good highs and good judgement are seldom seen hand-in-hand.
- justcommenting 12y agoI would caution against drawing arbitrary lines between agencies like FBA and NSA or GCHQ or the "cryptographic community" in terms of information/skills, e.g. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure... It might be more accurate to conclude that information is a currency in an unregulated market: GCHQ shares with NSA who shares with FBI DITU amongst many other public and private sector customers. In a world of parallel construction, the most reasonable assumption is that anyone can be privy to anything, or at least information derived from it.
- jacquesm 12y agoI can think of at least one very easy way to break Tor, if you have access to a bunch of choke points however I'm nowhere near an expert in security so feel free to beat me to death over exceeding my area of expertise. In a nutshell: assume that Tor hidden services are not amongst the highest traffic sites, that they still need to be hosted somewhere and that you can make your own traffic to such hosts stand out by sending alternate long-short sequences of packets to a hidden service by crafting requests simply inject a long sequence of such packets into Tor destined for the service you wish to unmask, then monitor your choke points to see where the sequence of long/short packets pops out last. That's the endpoint you're looking for. This undoes all the layers of the onion in one move. It will take some time before you have certainty because that same sequence will likely appear a number of times in a regular bunch of traffic as well but with increasing sequence length you should be able to get to good confidence that you have found the relevant host.
- 67726e 12y agoI believe this has been a well known underlying problem with Tor for a long time as it only really provides anonymity. If you control enough exit nodes, or alternatively, control the means of transmission in enough places, you can narrow the net and get closer to finding things. At the very least, one could get close enough to allow one to focus more traditional investigatory techniques. The problem is this is a fairly large scale problem. Now any organizations with the capacity to do something like that? I seem to recall lots of speculation around the time Snowden came out.
- owenmarshall 12y agoThat type of traffic correlation attack is pretty well known and understood. The problem is that Tor simply isn't designed to protect against a global adversary. If you're the NSA, you can inject traffic through, bisect the network by forcing certain nodes offline, ... Tor can't defend against that. But we don't have anything right now that would.
- jnaglick 12y agoIt is much, much more likely that law enforcement hacked onion domains because of their improper implementations of TOR procedures and/or general shitty security than it is that they discovered a fundamental security vulnerability in TOR. The weak link here isn't TOR, it's the doofus who bought the Tesla with $130k worth of BTC. Which is why I would never mess with darknet sites. I trust the TOR network, but I don't at all trust the individual domain owners.
- devconsole 12y agoThere are some interesting theories being tossed around. I'd like to add one more. The common thread across all darknet websites is the fact that they generally run from datacenters. Most people don't host websites from their residence. Further, most people don't colocate servers anymore. I would be surprised if any of the 414 websites operated on boxes that had been colocated. However I won't rule out that colocating is also compromised. I'd like to posit the following law of nature: You can't run a darknet website from a datacenter and think you've hidden the location of the server, regardless of whether it's using Tor or other anonymity software. Why not? Because the datacenter has the ability to image servers, along with the ability to notice that you're generating large amounts of outgoing Tor traffic (or other anonymity software). Here's how the attack may have happened: Step one, collect data about which computers are sending and receiving large amounts of Tor bandwidth. Step two, if the server resides in a datacenter, request an image of the server. Step three, you now know whether the server is a darknet website. Remember, the point of Tor is to hide the final IP address of a web request or web service. It does not hide the total volume of traffic that must be delivered. And it can't. If you operate a darknet marketplace, you're probably serving a large volume of traffic. Guess who notices? ISPs and datacenters. Guess which datacenters can be trusted not to divulge an image of your server to authorities? None of them. What do I think the future of darknet opsec will look like? Well, if you're reading this, and you're an individual or group interested in pursuing your ideology through a darknet website, you will need to run your website from a datacenter and not rent your server in your name. In fact, your opsec needs to be so good that there's no way to trace the account back to you. This sounds hard, and it is, but it's possible. Secondly, you must assume at all times that the server you're using is compromised. Assume that aurhorities can access the contents of the server, can manipulate it, and can subvert anything you put on it. This is a grim situation, to be sure. The above assumption is that you are never safe from authorities gaining a copy of the contents of your datacenter-hosted darknet website (including any databases), and from a takedown of the service whenever authorities deem to do so. Here's the ray of hope: Just because they takedown your website doesn't mean they take you down. This is where opsec comes into play, and it's our last hope. Every other link in the chain of trust for darknet websites has been broken. The one and only chance is that you can figure out a way to create accounts at datacenters without authorities being able to trace them back to you. Authorities takedown your service? Okay, start it again at some other datacenter. Authorities get a copy of what's on your server? Okay, no problem: you were assuming it was compromised anyway, right? Authorities install a program to make your software malfunction? That's unfortunate, and will shake the trust in your website, but it's possible to recover from this. Do your best, and do not get caught. The rest follows from this. At a minimum, you need to research opsec. Read history of how groups have evaded detection. Do your research using Tor, because associating such Google searches with your home account is a terrible mistake. One of your biggest problems is going to be anonymous money. No, bitcoin won't help you. You can't rent a server from a datacenter using bitcoin. But you can anonymize your money and then use that money to rent your server. It's a long shot, but it's all we've got left. Be perfect. There's no room for error. Or realize the truth: If you can't be perfect, you will get caught. And you may get caught anyway. Being perfect sounds impossible, but human history has shown that there are situations in which no or few mistakes are made. I would recommend you research those situations and how to minimize the total number of mistakes you make. Use software to help you do this, while realizing that clever software alone won't be enough. For example, if you're configuring an individual piece of software on your personal computer to connect to your darknet website, even through Tor, you're doing it wrong. You need to isolate yourself from this equation at all times. Sound hard? Oh, it's hard. It will slowly dawn on you how hard this method of operating is. Convenience? No. You don't get to enjoy the benefits of convenience. Convenience is the opposite of security. Oh, and if you do happen to somehow make a lot of money, you should keep it as bitcoin for the forseeable future. What good is it? Maybe converting small amounts won't be noticed. On the other hand, converting large amounts of bitcoin to dollars will be noticed, and it's extraordinarily dangerous to your opsec. I'll be around to answer questions if you have them. If you'd like to ask a question anonymously using Tor, create a new HN account and post your question. I'll see it, but it will show up as dead on HN, so I won't be able to reply to it directly. So I'll reply to my own comment with a copy of your question, along with a response. Then you can reply to that, and I'll repeat the process. HN is one of the few websites that we can even have these kinds of conversations on using Tor. Everything on Reddit is autokilled. 4chan doesn't let you use Tor. Maybe we should work on this problem first: How to make the equivalent of unlisted Tor exit nodes so that Tor isn't so trivially blocked? There are a lot of ideas in my comment, and some of them are better than others. I hope that the bad ideas can be discarded and the good ones refined until we have someting workable.
- gasull 12y agoThe DHS had an infiltrator in Silk Road 2.0: http://building.liberty.me/2014/11/06/breaking-silk-road-2-0-admin-arrested-10-markets-seized-by-fbi/ http://building.liberty.me/2014/11/06/breaking-silk-road-2-0...
- tedks 12y agoThis is a very hasty conclusion. I think it's several orders of magnitude more probable that several greedy and half-intelligent people (intelligent enough to execute a darknet market and unintelligent enough that they aren't already well-compensated for their intelligence) saw a MASSIVE vacuum open up in the ecosystem when the Silk Road shut down. And they went for it, with varying degrees of success. Tor is an anonymizing TCP overlay. That is all it is. It will make it so your TCP stream is not connected to your IP address. But that's all. I got asked a question, just two days ago, if Tor would make someone anonymous if they logged into their facebook account. Do you think it will? Do you think it's advertised that way? Further, even the Tor developers acknowledge that hidden services are not a priority for them. Their priority is far and away client usage, because their largest userbase and their funders' priorities are bypassing Internet censorship, not running darknet marketplaces. What was your reasoning process that lead you to discard the other explanations rather than Tor being weak?
- Istof 12y agoall they need to make the correlations is everybody's "metadata"... which is apparently considered fair game by the US government