"Despite all the new constructions that have been presented, the security of white-box cryptography is very unclear. Almost all of the presented constructions h

"Despite all the new constructions that have been presented, the security of white-box cryptography is very unclear. Almost all of the presented constructions have been shown insecure with academic cryptanalysis papers that have been published. Only a few constructions remain ‘unbroken’, but they are merely a minor tweak to existing constructions – hence the existing attacks will apply with little effort." Actually, the security is quite clear. If your application is important and you have a motivated or funded attacker, white box cryptography isn't going to do much for you. That seems to be the overall point of the paper. You can add a small delay or confuse those who are curious but not dedicated. "These days, white-box cryptography is being used in real-world applications; mainly DRM applications. While academic attacks have been published, as far as we know, no attacks on commercial white-box implementations have been seen. Instead, attackers focus on other parts of the system and exploit the cryptographic functionality without attacking it." This can also read "we do not know if they have been attacked or not". (It's not fair that not knowing implies assuming none have). In addition there's also other ways attackers circumvent the use of white-box-crypto without needing to break it - they are aware of these but don't address them in the paper. Shrug Waiting for secure obfuscators to get small enough. Give it 25 years. :)