5 ms·

So just two be clear, BitLocker has (at least) two modes of operation, normal mode where you yourself/your company are responsible for managing your encryption

So just two be clear, BitLocker has (at least) two modes of operation, normal mode where you yourself/your company are responsible for managing your encryption keys and passive "device encryption" mode which is enabled by default on many consumer devices (e.g. Surface 3, Surface RT, Windows Phone, etc). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitLocker#Device_encryption http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitLocker#Device_encryption So the complaint is essentially, an encryption mode which is a freebie on many devices which traditionally would have no drive encryption at all is somehow spying for the NSA by uploading decryption keys. But the problem I have with that line of thinking is: Without device encryption many devices wouldn't have drive encryption at all and therefore the NSA (with possession of the device) could trivially retrieve that data. If you really want NSA-secure BitLocker encryption then why the heck don't you just set up BitLocker yourself instead of using Microsoft's "feature-limited" device encryption mode? The key won't be put on OneDrive in that situation. Also if Microsoft did enable full BitLocker on many consumer devices, do you really trust your average person to keep their keys safe? Or explain that there is no forgotten password feature, that their family photos are just "fucking gone" [0]. [0] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GWxC8ezE4Dk https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GWxC8ezE4Dk

t0mas88 12y ago
The problem is that Microsoft gives users a false sense of security. Marketing speak for this feature is "Your device is always automatically encrypted", which results in users thinking their data is safe. The content is then automatically backed up to Microsoft servers, to which users will not have much of an objection since it's encrypted anyway. But then behind their backs, Microsoft not only stores the encryption keys as a backup but also immediately shares them with the NSA that has full access to those backups. So basically they fucked up three times: 1. Marketing encryption while it's not safe, 2. Storing accessible backups of your data on their servers and 3. Actively sharing those backups with the NSA. Out of those, #1 would be an excusable thing that many companies do, #2 is a reason to mistrust them and #3 is a reason never to store anything with Microsoft ever again. It's just not acceptable to take my data, promise me it is encrypted, then lie about it and freely share my data with the NSA whenever they want.
- UVB-76 12y ago
  I think you are misunderstanding here. BitLocker is a full disk encryption system. Under the "device encryption" scheme discussed here, the recovery key is stored on Microsoft servers, but the content remains on the physical device. I assume if a user was to backup their data using one of Microsoft's other services (e.g. OneDrive), that data would be encrypted under a different regime. The BitLocker arrangement does provide users with some degree of security, in that an adversary would need access both to the physical device and the recovery keys on Microsoft servers to retrieve a user's data.
  - tankenmate 12y ago
    PRISM (or NSL, or similar) + ANT (or 0 day hack or other) == compromised drive
- firepacket 12y ago
  I don't understand- how they are lying exactly? Don't they explicitly ask you if you want to backup your recovery key to the cloud? Is it really that hard to read prompts and change the default setting to manage your own key backup? If checking a single radio button is all it takes to NSA-proof your device, I'd say we are in pretty good shape. What is everyone complaining about?
  - emergentcypher 12y ago
    Yes, it is. It is well known that the battleground in all these areas is over what should be "default" settings because most people can't be bothered.
justcommenting 12y ago
> Without device encryption many devices wouldn't have drive encryption at all and therefore the NSA (with possession of the device) could trivially retrieve that data. This argument gets to the heart of mass surveillance vs. targeted/individualized surveillance. I personally prefer a world where someone would have to do something like steal my device to gain access to my data to a world where everyone's data is compromised by default all of the time. Maybe that makes me an outlier, but if I had owned one of these devices, I'd be pretty outraged...not unlike some were in the midst of the recent iCloud brouhaha.
- smtddr 12y ago
  Nope, you're not an outlier. If someone steals your device, be it random theft or FBI/NSA storm your home, at least you know exactly what was taken and when and you probably know why(fair or otherwise). Much better for your state of mind to know for sure whether or not your data has been taken rather than what we have now - a constant state of paranoia because none of us really know what the NSA is up to. For the most part, I just assume any internet-capable device is compromised. One thing I still suspect is outside of NSA's wide-sweeping data collecting is proper usage of Steganography. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steganography http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steganography >>For example, a sender might start with an innocuous image file and adjust the color of every 100th pixel to correspond to a letter in the alphabet, a change so subtle that someone not specifically looking for it is unlikely to notice it. I cannot comprehend that the NSA is scanning every image on the internet looking for patterns like that. If I were planning on some anti-establishment action, that's what I'd do. It would also be pretty cool for someone to make a tool that does this automatically. For regular people who just want plain privacy, keep on whistleblowing, keep on naming and shaming, keep on making the NSA's strategies not work by posting more and more tools & techniques to render their surveillance useless.... until we reach some kind of critical point that even the average-joe can't ignore.
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matthewdgreen 12y ago
I'm not sure I understand the argument here. Several manufacturers have now implemented on-by-default device encryption with no backdoor. This is not only feasible (in a business and technical sense) but is rapidly becoming the standard. Microsoft's approach is now an outlier. It almost certainly provides a much more vulnerable form of encryption than, say, Apple's and Google's. You're correct that Microsoft's device encryption is "free" to some extent, and it certainly is more secure than plaintext. That still doesn't mean it's ok to compromise it. At least with plaintext you avoid the performance overhead and associated risks of device encryption. With Microsoft's solution, you oay all the overhead -- and still get a much more limited form of protection.
- UnoriginalGuy 12y ago
  > Several manufacturers have now implemented on-by-default device encryption with no backdoor. Both Apple and Google's schemes are predicated on the assumption that you'll have a full phone backup stored in the "cloud." They also offer photo backup and sync other key data. The whole setup is meant to make an individual phone (and Chromebook) completely hardware agnostic. You lose your old phone? You buy a new one, sign in, wait a bit and like magic it is all set and ready to go. Windows (and OS X) aren't really designed with that model in mind, so if you lose your keys you may not have your data stored elsewhere (and indefinitely data loss due to a HDD/SSD failure is extremely common). > With Microsoft's solution, you oay all the overhead -- and still get a much more limited form of protection. In this context "much more limited" is against: almost every government in the world, private individuals, and against private companies. So, what, like 98%+ of the world's population? You make it sound like Microsoft's device encryption scheme uses ROT13. Instead they're using industrial strength encryption and your only real criticism is that either someone with a court order or the NSA can potentially gain access. That's still a huge win for day to day security. If someone breaks into my apartment and steals my laptop, I will be a bit less concerned about potential identity theft as it is reasonable to assume that your average street thief isn't an NSA agent.
  - biafra 12y ago
    Since when can I do a full backup with Google/Android? Let alone store it in some cloud? If this is really possible, how do I do it? There is a backup api that backups stuff the developer of the individual app thinks about storing. And there is adb backup which does backup some stuff of apps that allow it. There are full backup solutions but they are not by Google and they require an unlocked bootloader to install them in the recovery partition or root. So if you know a full backup solution by Google for Android that does not require root or an unlockes bootloader I'd be interested to hear about it.

t0mas88 12y ago

The problem is that Microsoft gives users a false sense of security. Marketing speak for this feature is "Your device is always automatically encrypted", which results in users thinking their data is safe. The content is then automatically backed up to Microsoft servers, to which users will not have much of an objection since it's encrypted anyway. But then behind their backs, Microsoft not only stores the encryption keys as a backup but also immediately shares them with the NSA that has full access to those backups. So basically they fucked up three times: 1. Marketing encryption while it's not safe, 2. Storing accessible backups of your data on their servers and 3. Actively sharing those backups with the NSA. Out of those, #1 would be an excusable thing that many companies do, #2 is a reason to mistrust them and #3 is a reason never to store anything with Microsoft ever again. It's just not acceptable to take my data, promise me it is encrypted, then lie about it and freely share my data with the NSA whenever they want.

UVB-76 12y ago
I think you are misunderstanding here. BitLocker is a full disk encryption system. Under the "device encryption" scheme discussed here, the recovery key is stored on Microsoft servers, but the content remains on the physical device. I assume if a user was to backup their data using one of Microsoft's other services (e.g. OneDrive), that data would be encrypted under a different regime. The BitLocker arrangement does provide users with some degree of security, in that an adversary would need access both to the physical device and the recovery keys on Microsoft servers to retrieve a user's data.
- tankenmate 12y ago
  PRISM (or NSL, or similar) + ANT (or 0 day hack or other) == compromised drive
firepacket 12y ago
I don't understand- how they are lying exactly? Don't they explicitly ask you if you want to backup your recovery key to the cloud? Is it really that hard to read prompts and change the default setting to manage your own key backup? If checking a single radio button is all it takes to NSA-proof your device, I'd say we are in pretty good shape. What is everyone complaining about?
- emergentcypher 12y ago
  Yes, it is. It is well known that the battleground in all these areas is over what should be "default" settings because most people can't be bothered.

justcommenting 12y ago

> Without device encryption many devices wouldn't have drive encryption at all and therefore the NSA (with possession of the device) could trivially retrieve that data. This argument gets to the heart of mass surveillance vs. targeted/individualized surveillance. I personally prefer a world where someone would have to do something like steal my device to gain access to my data to a world where everyone's data is compromised by default all of the time. Maybe that makes me an outlier, but if I had owned one of these devices, I'd be pretty outraged...not unlike some were in the midst of the recent iCloud brouhaha.

smtddr 12y ago
Nope, you're not an outlier. If someone steals your device, be it random theft or FBI/NSA storm your home, at least you know exactly what was taken and when and you probably know why(fair or otherwise). Much better for your state of mind to know for sure whether or not your data has been taken rather than what we have now - a constant state of paranoia because none of us really know what the NSA is up to. For the most part, I just assume any internet-capable device is compromised. One thing I still suspect is outside of NSA's wide-sweeping data collecting is proper usage of Steganography. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steganography http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steganography >>For example, a sender might start with an innocuous image file and adjust the color of every 100th pixel to correspond to a letter in the alphabet, a change so subtle that someone not specifically looking for it is unlikely to notice it. I cannot comprehend that the NSA is scanning every image on the internet looking for patterns like that. If I were planning on some anti-establishment action, that's what I'd do. It would also be pretty cool for someone to make a tool that does this automatically. For regular people who just want plain privacy, keep on whistleblowing, keep on naming and shaming, keep on making the NSA's strategies not work by posting more and more tools & techniques to render their surveillance useless.... until we reach some kind of critical point that even the average-joe can't ignore.
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matthewdgreen 12y ago

I'm not sure I understand the argument here. Several manufacturers have now implemented on-by-default device encryption with no backdoor. This is not only feasible (in a business and technical sense) but is rapidly becoming the standard. Microsoft's approach is now an outlier. It almost certainly provides a much more vulnerable form of encryption than, say, Apple's and Google's. You're correct that Microsoft's device encryption is "free" to some extent, and it certainly is more secure than plaintext. That still doesn't mean it's ok to compromise it. At least with plaintext you avoid the performance overhead and associated risks of device encryption. With Microsoft's solution, you oay all the overhead -- and still get a much more limited form of protection.

UnoriginalGuy 12y ago
> Several manufacturers have now implemented on-by-default device encryption with no backdoor. Both Apple and Google's schemes are predicated on the assumption that you'll have a full phone backup stored in the "cloud." They also offer photo backup and sync other key data. The whole setup is meant to make an individual phone (and Chromebook) completely hardware agnostic. You lose your old phone? You buy a new one, sign in, wait a bit and like magic it is all set and ready to go. Windows (and OS X) aren't really designed with that model in mind, so if you lose your keys you may not have your data stored elsewhere (and indefinitely data loss due to a HDD/SSD failure is extremely common). > With Microsoft's solution, you oay all the overhead -- and still get a much more limited form of protection. In this context "much more limited" is against: almost every government in the world, private individuals, and against private companies. So, what, like 98%+ of the world's population? You make it sound like Microsoft's device encryption scheme uses ROT13. Instead they're using industrial strength encryption and your only real criticism is that either someone with a court order or the NSA can potentially gain access. That's still a huge win for day to day security. If someone breaks into my apartment and steals my laptop, I will be a bit less concerned about potential identity theft as it is reasonable to assume that your average street thief isn't an NSA agent.
- biafra 12y ago
  Since when can I do a full backup with Google/Android? Let alone store it in some cloud? If this is really possible, how do I do it? There is a backup api that backups stuff the developer of the individual app thinks about storing. And there is adb backup which does backup some stuff of apps that allow it. There are full backup solutions but they are not by Google and they require an unlocked bootloader to install them in the recovery partition or root. So if you know a full backup solution by Google for Android that does not require root or an unlockes bootloader I'd be interested to hear about it.