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Nothing, and it's interesting that they have enough computational power to do that for a relatively trivial project. Meanwhile, whilst I applaud Facebook going
by mike_hearn 12y ago
Nothing, and it's interesting that they have enough computational power to do that for a relatively trivial project.
Meanwhile, whilst I applaud Facebook going above and beyond here, this doesn't set a good precedent.
Firstly, Onion service are very slow. There is no need to pay this cost for a service whose ownership is not actually hidden. If the Tor project made it easier to reliably identify traffic from Tor exit nodes, Facebook could apply whatever rules they wanted to Tor traffic without needing to slow things down for everyone.
Secondly, by doing this, there's now a risk that other firms who want to be on the cutting edge of privacy will try to copycat this approach, even though it makes no sense and is very complex and expensive to set up. Worse, users might think it's some kind of "gold standard".
Thirdly, it doesn't actually solve any of the reasons why Tor traffic is routinely discriminated against and harassed: Tor is effectively a "bulletproof ISP" that shields a lot of abuse and hacking. Merely making a Tor hidden service specifically for Facebook doesn't solve that, at all.
- justcommenting 12y ago> Firstly, Onion service are very slow. There is no need to pay this cost for a service whose ownership is not actually hidden. As long as you don't have to use it, I don't see why offering users a choice is a problem. >If the Tor project made it easier to reliably identify traffic from Tor exit nodes, Facebook could apply whatever rules they wanted to Tor traffic without needing to slow things down for everyone. ExoneraTor does this quite well in my opinion, and I don't follow how/why you think this will slow things down for everyone. Surely you're not referring to the entire Tor network? The main value in using this, in my opinion, is reducing the potential attack surface associated with MITM attacks--including CDNs--after your traffic exits Tor. Attacks on Facebook users involving Akamai have been documented by NSA, for example; Facebook is a PRISM partner, but this would arguably still stack the deck in favor of "going through the front door" to access Facebook user data.
- mike_hearn 12y agoAccessing an .onion address via Tor is slower than accessing a normal website via Tor. If this onion service is now the official way to access Facebook via Tor and direct access doesn't work well, then this is slowing things down. Tor's current support for detecting usage is patchy. You can't query a random third party website for every login for a system like Facebook, so you need a list of IPs that can be refreshed quickly. But such lists tend to be incomplete or behind e.g. the "exit" flag doesn't mean what you'd intuitively expect, so it's sometimes possible for Tor traffic to turn up from an IP that is not identified as an exit. Re: MITM security. Even if Facebook got lucky here, we're talking about an 80 bit identifier and brute forcing these has been demonstrated before, I believe. I'm not sure this is much of an upgrade over just regular SSL CA + HSTS pinning. (edit: last paragraph)
- justcommenting 12y ago> If this onion service is now the official way to access Facebook via Tor and direct access doesn't work well, then this is slowing things down. my take on the post was that it was presented as an option, and for users taking the time to access a site via tor, speed may not be the only (or even primary) consideration. i say that as someone who does ~95% of my browsing--both work and personal--via Tor. > But such lists tend to be incomplete or behind e.g. the "exit" flag doesn't mean what you'd intuitively expect, so it's sometimes possible for Tor traffic to turn up from an IP that is not identified as an exit. Doesn't the onion address solve this problem? > I'm not sure this is much of an upgrade over just regular SSL CA + HSTS pinning. Depends on your threat model, but I think it's a useful option and congratulate the Facebook team for offering it to users. I'd love to see Google, Twitter, and others start to compete on the extent to which they support TBB users.
- mike_hearn 12y agoYes, you're right, it's just an option and presumably access via the regular web address will still work. It may be that the hidden service is a way to identify Tor traffic, but it shouldn't really be necessary to do that if Tor had the right support in it. And of course you cannot assume everyone who uses Facebook via Tor will know about this service, unless TBB itself is adjusted to force usage, in which case you're now changing Tor and could as well make exit identification 100% reliable.
- neltnerb 12y agoYou effectively use Tor 95% of the time? This surprises me, actually. I think if I used it that much I would unavoidably lose my anonymity. Here is my worry -- Tor looks easy to use, but requires habit changes to actually be effective for anonymity. The habit changes that I am led to believe are required for any effective anonymity through Tor scream "NO NO NO NO NO!!!" at the idea of logging into javascript requiring, cookie placing, Facebook. This seems to me like a situation where the illusion of anonymity might be worse than the reality of non-anonymity. Granted, it lets you bypass censorship. Granted, if you are very careful and, say, only use your Tor Browser to connect to Facebook and nothing else whatsoever... maybe. I just don't think I could trust myself to do it properly. And while I'm no Edward Snowden, I'm also not dumb.
- meowface 12y ago> [quoted comment was deleted] How do you differentiate between this and account takeovers though? If someone constantly lives in from California, and then someone elsegets their Gmail password and logs in through Tor, can you know it's actually a compromised account and not the registrant just deciding to use Tor?
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- meowface 12y agoAh thanks, I understand. Still, you have to admit it kind of defeats the whole purpose of Tor if a user must use their real IP and/or give up their mobile phone number in order to use it. I agree with the restrictions, but it kind of makes me wonder why a legitimate Tor user would bother to use Gmail in this case.
- evgen 12y agoIt defeats the purpose of hiding your identity from the endpoint, but that is not the only use-case for Tor. Some people live in places where connecting to Facebook is blocked or where doing so places them in danger, it is this group that is being served here.
- mike_hearn 12y agoIt means you can log in without that provider knowing where you physically are. Useful for people in, say, Pakistan who might otherwise get "trial by metadata and punishment by Reaper drone". But yes it's a very specialised use case. Most people won't care. Fully anonymous accounts will require something like Bitcoin proof of sacrifice or multi jurisdictional identity escrow. But the problem for those is that there's far more demand from abusive users than legitimate users, so it's hard to make a business case for providing such support.
- nintendo1889 12y ago
- bostik 12y ago> Worse, users might think it's some kind of "gold standard". That may be the worst unexpected consequence. Once onion services become more mainstream, I fear FB's example - no matter how well intentioned - will turn into an engineering nightmare. After all, after one of the best known online brands does something clever, you can expect copycats to follow. First, we'll get clueless PHB types demanding long vanity names. Second, some services will happen upon neat onion addresses and ride the wave. Their very existence will act as a goal post for the others. Third, a vocal segment of users becomes accustomed to seeing "perfect" vanity names. After all, such name means that the entity behind the name has enough resources to actually get a proper vanity name. Amidst all that, somewhere between stages #2 and #3, we will see (horribly misguided) vanity onion service name markets. A bit like domain name squatting from the late 90's, but with far worse consequences: at least with domain names the only thing transferred was the control over the DNS entry. Because onion service names are directly mapped to the private keys, selling a $VANITY.onion address is the same as selling a copy of the private key. Caveat emptor, indeed.
- maxerickson 12y agoAre naive users and Tor worth worrying about? The list of "you have to" involved in making its use meaningful is pretty long, and "normal" users aren't good at caring about details like that. Please nobody construe that as a dismissal of the needs of those users, that isn't what I'm getting at.
- bostik 12y ago> Are naive users and Tor worth worrying about? Right now? No. But in a near future? Possibly yes, if Firefox decides to include a built-in Tor client. [0] Even if the article (and the slashdot thread I lifted it from) were vapourware right now, the idea clearly has been floated enough to make it an attractive option. [0]: http://www.dailydot.com/politics/tor-mozilla-firefox/ http://www.dailydot.com/politics/tor-mozilla-firefox/
- wowaname 12y ago> There is no need to pay this cost for a service whose ownership is not actually hidden. DuckDuckGo is being irrational? Keybase? Riseup? Sorry, but I don't see how knowing the owner of a service can immediately disqualify the service from having the privilege of a hidden service. The only thing limiting Facebook is the stress that may be placed on so many connections at once on a single onion. It should not cost too much out of actual resources to run one single gateway, especially when Facebook is a very successful business and can afford to invest in something that may expand their audience even more. I'm not saying anything for or against Facebook's ethics in general; I am a little hesitant given their history to trust them at all, but this is admittedly a huge step in shedding light on what Tor actually is. It's not just for drugs or child pornography; it can actually be used by the everyday Joe wanting to check on his friends and see if there's a party nearby. What people seem to miss is that Tor provides IP anonymity. Yes, encouraging users to be more careful about their browsing habits is a good thing, but if people want to give out their personal information, in the end that cannot be stopped. If the website owner wants to disclose his or her identity, that cannot be stopped. Tor provides anonymity of IP addresses and nothing else.
- mike_hearn 12y ago> DuckDuckGo is being irrational? Keybase? Riseup? Yes. There just isn't any really solid technical reason to do this. The closest I saw was something like "newspaper dropbox wants to force people to use Tor and an onion address is the easiest way to do that", but again, they could just identify traffic from exit nodes and block anything that isn't coming from there, if there were better tools for it.
- sarciszewski 12y ago> Signups from Tor on the other hand always require phone verification. If you use Tor, what's the point in providing a phone number. All that does is give Google data that can be subpoena'd by the feds. :(