Completely agree. I am not repeating cryptome's argument but adding to it. (It is difficult to say whether heartbleed was accidental or intentional - intention

Completely agree. I am not repeating cryptome's argument but adding to it. (It is difficult to say whether heartbleed was accidental or intentional - intentionally introduced bugs or purposefully accepted buggy code are likely to be deniable. Asking whether a bug is intentional is ultimately a question about the mind of the programmer and not the code. Check out the underhanded C coding contest if you'd like to try a hand at writing or trying to find intentionally deniable security bugs.) > You're talking about explicit backdoors separate from the encryption algorithms, with the exception of DUAL_EC Well I also mentioned the TLS one... and the removal of e-to-e in Skype. If you want to compare to heartbleed again that was an explicit backdoor - not actually similar to DUAL_EC. > The difference is that the consequence changes from "encryption is useless" to "don't trust implementations from the likes of Microsoft, AT&T or hardware vendors." Totally agree.