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Sure, remote attestation is one of many capabilities of TPMs. It does not need to be used to use other features of the TPM (and its use sometimes presents priva
by geofft 12y ago
Sure, remote attestation is one of many capabilities of TPMs. It does not need to be used to use other features of the TPM (and its use sometimes presents privacy concerns), and there's no "back door" in using it: it's the entity that's setting up the TPM to enable remote attestation that has the ability to compromise the privacy of the next user of the machine, not the manufacturer or anyone else. This is no more a "back door" than Debian shipping an SSH server with the OS for you to use.
I'm having trouble reading the machine translation of the article, but it sounds like Microsoft is enabling the TPM by default. This is a little concerning -- analogous to Debian adding their own public key to root's authorized_keys (but significantly _less_ concerning than that). However, it doesn't seem to indicate a back door in the _standard_ or its cryptography, any more than the Debian case would indicate a back door in OpenSSH or the secure-shell protocol.
- xnull2guest 12y agoI agree wholeheartedly with this. In fact the German gov't specifically claimed that TPMs + Windows is considered harmful - not the TPMs themselves. TPMs are a device that has DMA on your machine, that you can't inspect and can't run code on. And then there's the similarity to the Clipper Chip in function. These things should make you at least pause.