Here is the original article that broke the story (you'll need to translate it) - still trying to source the leaked document from the German gov't. http://www.

Here is the original article that broke the story (you'll need to translate it) - still trying to source the leaked document from the German gov't. http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2013-08/trusted-computing-microsoft-windows-8-nsa http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2013-08/trusted-compu... Here's a press release from the BSI - not the original one but the announcement made _after_ the fallout of previous reporting: "From the perspective of the BSI, the use of Windows 8 in combination with a TPM 2.0 goes hand in hand with a loss of control over the operating system and the hardware used." The paragraph goes on to describe a scenario where a fault somewhere causes the system to fail and put it into an irrecoverable mode. The article (not this announcement) mentions _other_ ways that it could manipulate the computer. Specifically, policy attestation can force software decision and installs and can set Machine Level policy - in the case of a compromise this would means forcing the machine to use weaker security settings. "For certain user groups can use Windows 8 in combination with a TPM certainly improve safety. This includes users who may for various reasons not care about the security of their systems, or want, but trust the manufacturer of the system that this provides a secure solution and cares." The announcement goes on to say that this is a legitimate use case for some users, especially those who do trust Microsoft, manufacturers and their partners. https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/Presse2013/Windows_TPM_Pl_21082013.html https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/Presse2... As the leak specifically centered around new features in Windows 8 and the new TPM capabilities, my best guess would be that the backdoor was in remote attestation, which allows the TPM to identify trusted entities for the Operating System. https://duckduckgo.com/?q=remote+attestation+tpm&t=canonical https://duckduckgo.com/?q=remote+attestation+tpm&t=canonical Remote attestation also raises privacy concerns: "The above protocol raises privacy concerns. The fear is that the attestation key and its certificate can be used to track activity and compromise privacy. Originally, a trusted third party was proposed that would provide anonymized identity services to users. The trusted third party would issue certified attestation keys that were not directly traceable to the device and could issue multiple attestation keys to a device in order to prevent correlation. Due to problems with this proposal, another protocol was developed that provides a anonymity without the need for a trusted third party." http://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/csep590/06wi/finalprojects/bare.pdf http://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/csep590/06wi/finalp... Then again the TPM spec does not specify where the chip must be placed and the most common location is the low pin count bus, which can request bus master and has DMA.