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> As announced by Germany, TPM 2.0 was backdoored. China will not import TPM 2.0 (in fact any TPM from America) or Window 8.1 as a result. I'm curious (since I
by geofft 12y ago
> As announced by Germany, TPM 2.0 was backdoored. China will not import TPM 2.0 (in fact any TPM from America) or Window 8.1 as a result.
I'm curious (since I care about TPMs and am looking forward to TPM 2.0 being more widely available) what this is, since this is the first I've heard of it. A quick Google search brings up this article:
http://www.zdnet.com/german-government-refutes-windows-backdoor-claims-7000019739/ http://www.zdnet.com/german-government-refutes-windows-backd...
which seems to say that the entirety of the German government's claims is that TPMs, as a technology, can be used to implement back doors (which is true of older versions of the standard, too), and the same article claims that the chips are often manufactured in China and _exported_ from there (which matches my previous understanding), not imported. So I assume there's something more up-to-date here; do you have a link to more details?
- xnull2guest 12y agoHere is the original article that broke the story (you'll need to translate it) - still trying to source the leaked document from the German gov't. http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2013-08/trusted-computing-microsoft-windows-8-nsa http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2013-08/trusted-compu... Here's a press release from the BSI - not the original one but the announcement made _after_ the fallout of previous reporting: "From the perspective of the BSI, the use of Windows 8 in combination with a TPM 2.0 goes hand in hand with a loss of control over the operating system and the hardware used." The paragraph goes on to describe a scenario where a fault somewhere causes the system to fail and put it into an irrecoverable mode. The article (not this announcement) mentions _other_ ways that it could manipulate the computer. Specifically, policy attestation can force software decision and installs and can set Machine Level policy - in the case of a compromise this would means forcing the machine to use weaker security settings. "For certain user groups can use Windows 8 in combination with a TPM certainly improve safety. This includes users who may for various reasons not care about the security of their systems, or want, but trust the manufacturer of the system that this provides a secure solution and cares." The announcement goes on to say that this is a legitimate use case for some users, especially those who do trust Microsoft, manufacturers and their partners. https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/Presse2013/Windows_TPM_Pl_21082013.html https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/Presse2... As the leak specifically centered around new features in Windows 8 and the new TPM capabilities, my best guess would be that the backdoor was in remote attestation, which allows the TPM to identify trusted entities for the Operating System. https://duckduckgo.com/?q=remote+attestation+tpm&t=canonical https://duckduckgo.com/?q=remote+attestation+tpm&t=canonical Remote attestation also raises privacy concerns: "The above protocol raises privacy concerns. The fear is that the attestation key and its certificate can be used to track activity and compromise privacy. Originally, a trusted third party was proposed that would provide anonymized identity services to users. The trusted third party would issue certified attestation keys that were not directly traceable to the device and could issue multiple attestation keys to a device in order to prevent correlation. Due to problems with this proposal, another protocol was developed that provides a anonymity without the need for a trusted third party." http://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/csep590/06wi/finalprojects/bare.pdf http://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/csep590/06wi/finalp... Then again the TPM spec does not specify where the chip must be placed and the most common location is the low pin count bus, which can request bus master and has DMA.
- geofft 12y agoSure, remote attestation is one of many capabilities of TPMs. It does not need to be used to use other features of the TPM (and its use sometimes presents privacy concerns), and there's no "back door" in using it: it's the entity that's setting up the TPM to enable remote attestation that has the ability to compromise the privacy of the next user of the machine, not the manufacturer or anyone else. This is no more a "back door" than Debian shipping an SSH server with the OS for you to use. I'm having trouble reading the machine translation of the article, but it sounds like Microsoft is enabling the TPM by default. This is a little concerning -- analogous to Debian adding their own public key to root's authorized_keys (but significantly _less_ concerning than that). However, it doesn't seem to indicate a back door in the _standard_ or its cryptography, any more than the Debian case would indicate a back door in OpenSSH or the secure-shell protocol.
- xnull2guest 12y agoI agree wholeheartedly with this. In fact the German gov't specifically claimed that TPMs + Windows is considered harmful - not the TPMs themselves. TPMs are a device that has DMA on your machine, that you can't inspect and can't run code on. And then there's the similarity to the Clipper Chip in function. These things should make you at least pause.