4 ms·
I'm a bit surprised that there aren't purpose limitations in the enabling legislation for the most controversial new government investigative authorities. The
by schoen 12y ago
I'm a bit surprised that there aren't purpose limitations in the enabling legislation for the most controversial new government investigative authorities.
The Wiretap Act has an explicitly enumerated list of offenses for the investigation of which wiretaps may be authorized:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2516 http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2516
The default is that a wiretap is not available to investigate an arbitrary crime. (Of course, there's been a lot of creep and wiretap authority has been expanded to more and more crimes.) This is based on the idea that a wiretap is uniquely and intensely invasive compared to other law enforcement techniques.
I don't see why that pattern hasn't been repeated with other investigative authorities. In the case of section 213 of the Patriot Act, described here, the effect of the new law was to amend 18 USC §3103a
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/3103a http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/3103a
to allow for "delayed notice" when a search warrant was used. But that section authorized the issuance of warrants for "any property that constitutes evidence of a criminal offense in violation of the laws of the United States" (emphasis added), that is, for the investigation of any Federal crime. Presumably it would have been easy for section 213 to have taken a Wiretap Act-like approach and said that the delayed notice procedure was available for investigation of crimes x, y, and z, but not other crimes.
(I work with the author of the original article, but we haven't discussed this topic.)
- anigbrowl 12y agoLegislative drafting ought to be the pinnacle of legal endeavor, but sadly this is not the case. Indeed, a glance at the House's legislative drafting guidelines show that assessment of constitutionality is barely discussed, and then only insofar as it pertains to the mechanics of passage. http://legcounsel.house.gov/HOLC/Drafting_Legislation/Drafting_Guide.html http://legcounsel.house.gov/HOLC/Drafting_Legislation/Drafti... While the constitutionality of a proposed bill is properly a matter for debate on the floor of the legislative chamber, in practice a great deal of debate seems to consist of procedural maneuvers at the expense of substantive discussion - and as you say, the substantive changes wrought by a bill are often couched in the form of obscure and minor-seeming tweaks to existing legislation that can result in dramatic changes of scope or authority despite their superficial blandness.
- smsm42 12y agoWhen some lawmakers openly admit they don't even read the laws they are voting for, it is no wonder things are passing that people afterwards go "wtf these guys were thinking?" It's like writing code without any review, testing and debugging - just type it in and ship to production. But it's about fighting terrorism - so who has the time to do it right? And of course then when people see the exploits and try to fix it, they get the pushback - you are siding with terrorists? So when we get lucky and somebody writing the law really cares about not breaking things - we can get reasonable limits. Otherwise, best case we can hope Supreme Court will eventually patch it, once it gets there, which probably will take another 10-15 years.
- MichaelGG 12y ago>It's like writing code without any review, testing and debugging Well, most PMs don't personally review/test/debug. They assume their people have done it for them, which I'd guess is how senators operate. So in and of itself, not reading the laws isn't intrinsically bad. If they had proper oversight of their teams and knew there was enough QA in the process, they could rely on summaries from their teams.