3 ms·
Well this is all good in theory, except that it requires the attacker to modify both the good file and the bad file to make them have the same MD5. This is a m
by cstejerean 19y ago
Well this is all good in theory, except that it requires the attacker to modify both the good file and the bad file to make them have the same MD5.
This is a more interesting attack vector for things like attacking digital signatures than untrusted binaries.
- gojomo 19y agoIf you can create matching hash pairs at will, the interesting attack in binaries is to distribute one that acquires a trusted reputation under the shared hash, then at a later date replace it with the problem one. Not too bad of a risk if diverse hashes are often used and people promptly move away from any hashes that demonstrate collisions; could be a nasty surprise if the collision is privately discovered and sprung at an inopportune moment, or people keep trusting an older hash after collisions start appearing in the wild.