The big elephant in the room is the intermediate certificates; conveniently unaddressed in this glib "everything's fine" piece. Everything's not fine. We're on

The big elephant in the room is the intermediate certificates; conveniently unaddressed in this glib "everything's fine" piece. Everything's not fine. We're only just beginning to tackle deep-seated problems in TLS and improve things, but we're probably stuck with some of the most regrettable decisions, like x.509 and the CAs. We need Certificate Transparency most of all for intermediates. The roots may be small in number, and many of them a little outdated, but the number of still-unaccounted-for intermediates worries me. How many have no path and/or usage restriction? Who has them? Are they all regulated? Because they should be. Some are likely in the hands of attackers. We should be accounting for them all. The CA model, as it stands today, is inferior to DNSSEC for DV. Yes, under DNSSEC, those above you in the chain of authority can fake DNS responses, but at least no-one else can. If the DNS root is removed from the control of a potential attacker (not that they'd ever get away with it, but still) then I view DANE pinning as strictly superior to DV certificates (although still not perfect, but nor is DNS). The CA model may still have use with EV. The problem of a transparency equivalent for DNSSEC remains unsolved, and is under tension with it being considered a bad thing to be able to enumerate domains and hosts (although it is in practice very practical to do so anyway).