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CALEA, the Stored Communications Act and Section 215 of the Patriot Act all compel corporations (via the Department of Commerce) to build data and key escrow se

CALEA, the Stored Communications Act and Section 215 of the Patriot Act all compel corporations (via the Department of Commerce) to build data and key escrow services into their products. For example on modern Windows systems bitlocker keys are automatically uploaded to the (automatically created for you) Onedrive account associated with the Microsoft Account created during your install and Onedrive is on PRISM. Searching for 380/286 classification patents in the US is one way to figure out some escrow mechanisms and companies, though it is not exhaustive nor does it only include federally-inspired escrow. All of this is remnants of the Clinton Administration and alternatives to the failed Clipper Chip, then increased in scope by the Bush and then Obama administration. There's a decently history that only captures the broad strokes up until the late '90s here: http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/DOC_0006231614.pdf http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/DOC_0006231614.p...

tptacek 12y ago
CALEA does not require key escrow, nor, so far as I know, does PATRIOT s.215. From my work I'm personally aware of more than one major corporate effort to cryptographically protect user data for which key escrow was not only not implemented, but countermeasures above and beyond basic cryptographic best practices were implemented to mitigate likely user errors. None of these projects would seem to me to be possible if it were the case that the USG was requiring private companies to implement key escrow. In ~10 years of software security work performed for many of the largest companies in the world, I was never once asked to review a system that performed key escrow or anything like it (I would not work on such a system, nor would I or will I work on software security for the USG). Not only that, but having come into contact with source code, design documents, backend systems, and similar intimate technical details, I have never --- that I can recall --- even seen something like the backdoor you alluded to. Occam's Razor suggests to me that the popular idea that big tech companies spy on their users for the USG is fallacious. I've never looked at Bitlocker, though, so maybe I'm wrong.
- xnull2guest 12y ago
  CALEA requires a guarantee that customer traffic can be decrypted. S215 of the Patriot Act extends the larger body of the act and prior Acts to include "other artifacts". Though not specified, this presumably extends outside telecommunications. The Stored Communications Act similarly requires key (or data) escrow mechanisms. Here is a Microsoft Cloud Key Escrow system that "Once a request comes in from a third party (e.g. a user, a business, a legal entity or governmental entity, etc.) to access user's data, the data storage system may send..." https://www.google.com/patents/US20120321086 https://www.google.com/patents/US20120321086
  - tptacek 12y ago
    Please cite the portion of CALEA that requires commercial enterprises to subvert encryption in any way, key escrow or otherwise.
    - xnull2guest 12y ago
      Let's try Title 47, Chapter 9, Subchapter I, § 1002. The whole subsection is good but calling attention to (b)(3): "(3) Encryption A telecommunications carrier shall not be responsible for decrypting, or ensuring the government’s ability to decrypt, any communication encrypted by a subscriber or customer, unless the encryption was provided by the carrier and the carrier possesses the information necessary to decrypt the communication." http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/1002 http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/1002 Here's the Wikipedia article: "The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) is a United States wiretapping law passed in 1994, during the presidency of Bill Clinton (Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279, codified at 47 USC 1001-1010). CALEA's purpose is to enhance the ability of law enforcement agencies to conduct electronic surveillance by requiring that telecommunications carriers and manufacturers of telecommunications equipment modify and design their equipment, facilities, and services to ensure that they have built-in surveillance capabilities, allowing federal agencies to monitor all telephone, broadband internet, and VoIP traffic." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communications_Assistance_for_Law_Enforcement_Act https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communications_Assistance_for_... Here's a checklist for CALEA: http://transition.fcc.gov/bureaus/pshs/services/calea/CALEA%20Checklist%202013.pdf http://transition.fcc.gov/bureaus/pshs/services/calea/CALEA%...
- malandrew 12y ago
  Given your reputation and experience, don't you think is it possible that you never saw one because people would know better than to include you in the types of project that include such backdoors?
  - tptacek 12y ago
    No.
    - justcommenting 12y ago
      The difference between "big tech companies spy on their users for the USG" and "big tech companies spy on their users....and then the USG obtains those data through any number of means, legal and otherwise" may not be so sharp and bright outside a comment about the technical details of key escrow (which you're right about, just to be clear). Being clear on what the technical details of key escrow systems actually are is valuable, but may miss the crux of Snowden's arguments in this conversation with Lessig. Whether the Lavabit case should be construed as a law enforcement request for a mechanism that achieves many of the same goals as key escrow or should be construed as key disclosure points to the same sort of issue. CALEA is one of many tools to be used and perhaps misused... mass surveillance conducted by eavesdroppers with a legal backing is just as morally wrong as mass surveillance conducted by eavesdroppers without one. Sometimes the scandal is what's legal, and sometimes the scandal is what can obtained without building key escrow systems directly into big tech companies' systems.
    - danford 12y ago
      Welp tptacek has never seen anything like this so it must be made up! Obviously tptacek is smarter than the entire NSA. You heard it on HN folks! Nothing to worry about.
    - malandrew 12y ago
      No, these people wouldn't know better or no, it's not possible?
- Zigurd 12y ago
  > CALEA does not require key escrow, nor, so far as I know, does PATRIOT s.215. As far as is publicly known, this is correct. > Occam's Razor suggests to me that the popular idea that big tech companies spy on their users for the USG is fallacious. But that the second part doesn't, at all, follow from the first. For example, telcos have spied on Americans for the government since there were telcos. At best, you could argue that the heavy lifting is done in NSA equipment in terms of DPI and word-spotting, etc. But there are plenty of technology companies that are ass-deep in spying on the American people. I suppose you mean that it isn't obvious that Google and other companies with a strong reputation for being careful with customer data are spying on Americans. OK, it isn't obvious, but let's go back to the first premise: CALEA doesn't require companies to break encryption to make surveillance possible. IF there isn't some hidden agreement about that, why are there exactly zero major services that provide user-controlled keys, end-to-end encryption, and web-of-trust key exchange? All of these companies could get past any suspicion of surveillance by providing the means to be truly private. None have done so.
  - tptacek 12y ago
    Intentionally or, I presume! not, you're "spreading" the debate. It was not my claim that telecom companies didn't help the USG spy on their users. It was not my claim that the controlling interpretation of every security law was public. It was not my claim that NSA is working in good faith with technology. The claim I was responding to is that CALEA and PATRIOT have the effect of compelling all major US technology companies to implement key escrow or, more generously, some cryptographic or UX compromise with the same effect, in order to effectuate SIGINT. I know this claim to be false. I said so, and, within the limits of my ability (for obvious reasons), provided my evidence. If you want to keep talking about how you don't trust tech companies, that's fine by me. We don't have a live argument on that issue; I'm not interested in it.
    - xnull2guest 12y ago
      Well, we know quite well that if a person were to be only interested in the letter of the law - never the spirit, its interpretation, how it is practices, or how it interacts with other laws - and not interested in any channel of information that isn't blessed by a government representative, that there would be a reductionist bias that misses the broader strokes important to understanding current policy. For those reading it should be clear that the US 'voluntells' US corporations to provide access to information and keys and to build in key escrow mechanisms through regulatory and financial leverage, through partnerships, contracts and kickbacks, legal pressure, and otherwise. Tap and trace laws force telecommunications companies to subvert over-the-wire encryption - they can not subvert end-to-end encryption because they do not provide it. However Bush era interpretations of tap-and-trace and pen register laws expanded analog and phone communications to digital media. Skype, for example was fully and willingully subverted (Snowden docs, again) - the end-to-end crypto removed from the original versions of the product. If one enters into these conversations only wanting to examine single sentences of law and not the legal process/architecture, one fundamentally introduce a bias. That's okay (freedom of speech). But readers beware that they aren't going to be able to get a full story from legal reductionism.
wfjackson 12y ago
>For example on modern Windows systems bitlocker keys are automatically uploaded to the (automatically created for you) Onedrive account associated with the Microsoft Account created during your install and Onedrive is on PRISM. Please. http://cdn8.howtogeek.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/bitlocker-drive-encryption-how-do-you-want-to-back-up-your-recovery-key.png http://cdn8.howtogeek.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/bitlock...
- xnull2guest 12y ago
  The link you provide is just the manual backup you make. Windows automatically uploads the key to OneDrive. Check it on the link below under "If your PC isn’t connected to a domain" in "How can I get my Bitlocker Recovery key?" http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-8/bitlocker-recovery-keys-faq http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-8/bitlocker-recov...
  - wfjackson 12y ago
    From that link: >There are several locations in which your BitLocker recovery key might have been saved. Keyword: might.
    - xnull2guest 12y ago
      For personal use this is most certainly the case. Here are quotes and links from both Microsoft Technet and tech media coverage. "Unlike a standard BitLocker implementation, device encryption is enabled automatically so that the device is always protected. The following list outlines the way this is accomplished: * When a clean install of Windows 8.1 is completed the computer is prepared for first use. As part of this preparation, device encryption is initialized on the operating system drive and fixed data drives on the computer with a clear key (this is the equivalent of standard BitLocker suspended state). * If the device is not domain-joined a Microsoft Account that has been granted administrative privileges on the device is required. When the administrator uses a Microsoft account to sign in, the clear key is removed, a recovery key is uploaded to online Microsoft account and TPM protector is created. Should a device require the recovery key, the user will be guided to use an alternate device and navigate to a recovery key access URL to retrieve the recovery key using their Microsoft Account credentials." http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn306081.aspx http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn306081.aspx "... because the recovery key is automatically stored in SkyDrive for you." http://www.zdnet.com/surface-bitlocker-and-the-future-of-encryption-7000024613/ http://www.zdnet.com/surface-bitlocker-and-the-future-of-enc... "BitLocker provides support for device encryption on x86 and x64-based computers with a TPM that supports connected stand-by. Previously this form of encryption was only available on Windows RT devices." http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn306081.aspx#BKMK_Encryption http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn306081.aspx#BKM... Device Encryption is supported by Bitlocker for all major skews including Windows Server 2012 R2.
higherpurpose 12y ago
CALEA doesn't force tech companies to build backdoors. It forces telecoms to allow for wiretaps. That's why the FBI is pushing so hard for CALEA 2 - to allow backdoors in tech companies' products. Whether they've already convinced some like Microsoft or Apple or Google to build backdoors for them, that's en entirely different matter. But they are not forced to do it.
- xnull2guest 12y ago
  I agree with this entire comment, though I would add that the Bush administration expanded telecommunications to include communications over digital switches. The other thing I would suggest is that convincing rather than forcing is NOT an entirely different matter, as the amount of leverage the United States Government has is insanely high. In practice companies are forced to by overwhelming incentives - legal, financial, and otherwise. If you are going to provide a wiretap you are going to provide it in the clear. That is a backdoor. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third-party_doctrine https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third-party_doctrine

tptacek 12y ago

CALEA does not require key escrow, nor, so far as I know, does PATRIOT s.215. From my work I'm personally aware of more than one major corporate effort to cryptographically protect user data for which key escrow was not only not implemented, but countermeasures above and beyond basic cryptographic best practices were implemented to mitigate likely user errors. None of these projects would seem to me to be possible if it were the case that the USG was requiring private companies to implement key escrow. In ~10 years of software security work performed for many of the largest companies in the world, I was never once asked to review a system that performed key escrow or anything like it (I would not work on such a system, nor would I or will I work on software security for the USG). Not only that, but having come into contact with source code, design documents, backend systems, and similar intimate technical details, I have never --- that I can recall --- even seen something like the backdoor you alluded to. Occam's Razor suggests to me that the popular idea that big tech companies spy on their users for the USG is fallacious. I've never looked at Bitlocker, though, so maybe I'm wrong.

xnull2guest 12y ago
CALEA requires a guarantee that customer traffic can be decrypted. S215 of the Patriot Act extends the larger body of the act and prior Acts to include "other artifacts". Though not specified, this presumably extends outside telecommunications. The Stored Communications Act similarly requires key (or data) escrow mechanisms. Here is a Microsoft Cloud Key Escrow system that "Once a request comes in from a third party (e.g. a user, a business, a legal entity or governmental entity, etc.) to access user's data, the data storage system may send..." https://www.google.com/patents/US20120321086 https://www.google.com/patents/US20120321086
- tptacek 12y ago
  Please cite the portion of CALEA that requires commercial enterprises to subvert encryption in any way, key escrow or otherwise.
  - xnull2guest 12y ago
    Let's try Title 47, Chapter 9, Subchapter I, § 1002. The whole subsection is good but calling attention to (b)(3): "(3) Encryption A telecommunications carrier shall not be responsible for decrypting, or ensuring the government’s ability to decrypt, any communication encrypted by a subscriber or customer, unless the encryption was provided by the carrier and the carrier possesses the information necessary to decrypt the communication." http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/1002 http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/1002 Here's the Wikipedia article: "The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) is a United States wiretapping law passed in 1994, during the presidency of Bill Clinton (Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279, codified at 47 USC 1001-1010). CALEA's purpose is to enhance the ability of law enforcement agencies to conduct electronic surveillance by requiring that telecommunications carriers and manufacturers of telecommunications equipment modify and design their equipment, facilities, and services to ensure that they have built-in surveillance capabilities, allowing federal agencies to monitor all telephone, broadband internet, and VoIP traffic." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communications_Assistance_for_Law_Enforcement_Act https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communications_Assistance_for_... Here's a checklist for CALEA: http://transition.fcc.gov/bureaus/pshs/services/calea/CALEA%20Checklist%202013.pdf http://transition.fcc.gov/bureaus/pshs/services/calea/CALEA%...
malandrew 12y ago
Given your reputation and experience, don't you think is it possible that you never saw one because people would know better than to include you in the types of project that include such backdoors?
- tptacek 12y ago
  No.
  - justcommenting 12y ago
    The difference between "big tech companies spy on their users for the USG" and "big tech companies spy on their users....and then the USG obtains those data through any number of means, legal and otherwise" may not be so sharp and bright outside a comment about the technical details of key escrow (which you're right about, just to be clear). Being clear on what the technical details of key escrow systems actually are is valuable, but may miss the crux of Snowden's arguments in this conversation with Lessig. Whether the Lavabit case should be construed as a law enforcement request for a mechanism that achieves many of the same goals as key escrow or should be construed as key disclosure points to the same sort of issue. CALEA is one of many tools to be used and perhaps misused... mass surveillance conducted by eavesdroppers with a legal backing is just as morally wrong as mass surveillance conducted by eavesdroppers without one. Sometimes the scandal is what's legal, and sometimes the scandal is what can obtained without building key escrow systems directly into big tech companies' systems.
  - danford 12y ago
    Welp tptacek has never seen anything like this so it must be made up! Obviously tptacek is smarter than the entire NSA. You heard it on HN folks! Nothing to worry about.
  - malandrew 12y ago
    No, these people wouldn't know better or no, it's not possible?
Zigurd 12y ago
> CALEA does not require key escrow, nor, so far as I know, does PATRIOT s.215. As far as is publicly known, this is correct. > Occam's Razor suggests to me that the popular idea that big tech companies spy on their users for the USG is fallacious. But that the second part doesn't, at all, follow from the first. For example, telcos have spied on Americans for the government since there were telcos. At best, you could argue that the heavy lifting is done in NSA equipment in terms of DPI and word-spotting, etc. But there are plenty of technology companies that are ass-deep in spying on the American people. I suppose you mean that it isn't obvious that Google and other companies with a strong reputation for being careful with customer data are spying on Americans. OK, it isn't obvious, but let's go back to the first premise: CALEA doesn't require companies to break encryption to make surveillance possible. IF there isn't some hidden agreement about that, why are there exactly zero major services that provide user-controlled keys, end-to-end encryption, and web-of-trust key exchange? All of these companies could get past any suspicion of surveillance by providing the means to be truly private. None have done so.
- tptacek 12y ago
  Intentionally or, I presume! not, you're "spreading" the debate. It was not my claim that telecom companies didn't help the USG spy on their users. It was not my claim that the controlling interpretation of every security law was public. It was not my claim that NSA is working in good faith with technology. The claim I was responding to is that CALEA and PATRIOT have the effect of compelling all major US technology companies to implement key escrow or, more generously, some cryptographic or UX compromise with the same effect, in order to effectuate SIGINT. I know this claim to be false. I said so, and, within the limits of my ability (for obvious reasons), provided my evidence. If you want to keep talking about how you don't trust tech companies, that's fine by me. We don't have a live argument on that issue; I'm not interested in it.
  - xnull2guest 12y ago
    Well, we know quite well that if a person were to be only interested in the letter of the law - never the spirit, its interpretation, how it is practices, or how it interacts with other laws - and not interested in any channel of information that isn't blessed by a government representative, that there would be a reductionist bias that misses the broader strokes important to understanding current policy. For those reading it should be clear that the US 'voluntells' US corporations to provide access to information and keys and to build in key escrow mechanisms through regulatory and financial leverage, through partnerships, contracts and kickbacks, legal pressure, and otherwise. Tap and trace laws force telecommunications companies to subvert over-the-wire encryption - they can not subvert end-to-end encryption because they do not provide it. However Bush era interpretations of tap-and-trace and pen register laws expanded analog and phone communications to digital media. Skype, for example was fully and willingully subverted (Snowden docs, again) - the end-to-end crypto removed from the original versions of the product. If one enters into these conversations only wanting to examine single sentences of law and not the legal process/architecture, one fundamentally introduce a bias. That's okay (freedom of speech). But readers beware that they aren't going to be able to get a full story from legal reductionism.

wfjackson 12y ago

>For example on modern Windows systems bitlocker keys are automatically uploaded to the (automatically created for you) Onedrive account associated with the Microsoft Account created during your install and Onedrive is on PRISM. Please. http://cdn8.howtogeek.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/bitlocker-drive-encryption-how-do-you-want-to-back-up-your-recovery-key.png http://cdn8.howtogeek.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/bitlock...

xnull2guest 12y ago
The link you provide is just the manual backup you make. Windows automatically uploads the key to OneDrive. Check it on the link below under "If your PC isn’t connected to a domain" in "How can I get my Bitlocker Recovery key?" http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-8/bitlocker-recovery-keys-faq http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-8/bitlocker-recov...
- wfjackson 12y ago
  From that link: >There are several locations in which your BitLocker recovery key might have been saved. Keyword: might.
  - xnull2guest 12y ago
    For personal use this is most certainly the case. Here are quotes and links from both Microsoft Technet and tech media coverage. "Unlike a standard BitLocker implementation, device encryption is enabled automatically so that the device is always protected. The following list outlines the way this is accomplished: * When a clean install of Windows 8.1 is completed the computer is prepared for first use. As part of this preparation, device encryption is initialized on the operating system drive and fixed data drives on the computer with a clear key (this is the equivalent of standard BitLocker suspended state). * If the device is not domain-joined a Microsoft Account that has been granted administrative privileges on the device is required. When the administrator uses a Microsoft account to sign in, the clear key is removed, a recovery key is uploaded to online Microsoft account and TPM protector is created. Should a device require the recovery key, the user will be guided to use an alternate device and navigate to a recovery key access URL to retrieve the recovery key using their Microsoft Account credentials." http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn306081.aspx http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn306081.aspx "... because the recovery key is automatically stored in SkyDrive for you." http://www.zdnet.com/surface-bitlocker-and-the-future-of-encryption-7000024613/ http://www.zdnet.com/surface-bitlocker-and-the-future-of-enc... "BitLocker provides support for device encryption on x86 and x64-based computers with a TPM that supports connected stand-by. Previously this form of encryption was only available on Windows RT devices." http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn306081.aspx#BKMK_Encryption http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn306081.aspx#BKM... Device Encryption is supported by Bitlocker for all major skews including Windows Server 2012 R2.

higherpurpose 12y ago

CALEA doesn't force tech companies to build backdoors. It forces telecoms to allow for wiretaps. That's why the FBI is pushing so hard for CALEA 2 - to allow backdoors in tech companies' products. Whether they've already convinced some like Microsoft or Apple or Google to build backdoors for them, that's en entirely different matter. But they are not forced to do it.

xnull2guest 12y ago
I agree with this entire comment, though I would add that the Bush administration expanded telecommunications to include communications over digital switches. The other thing I would suggest is that convincing rather than forcing is NOT an entirely different matter, as the amount of leverage the United States Government has is insanely high. In practice companies are forced to by overwhelming incentives - legal, financial, and otherwise. If you are going to provide a wiretap you are going to provide it in the clear. That is a backdoor. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third-party_doctrine https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third-party_doctrine