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> KNOX does save the encryption key required to auto-mount the container’s file system in TrustZone. However, unlike what is implied in the blog, the access to
by kstrauser 12y ago
> KNOX does save the encryption key required to auto-mount the container’s file system in TrustZone. However, unlike what is implied in the blog, the access to this key is strongly controlled. Only trusted system processes can retrieve it
LOL no. If your security is predicated on the underlying OS perfectly enforcing permissions, then you're insecure.
> KNOX 1.0’s Personal containers, designed to let consumers experience the KNOX container, were not managed by an MDM agent. Therefore, they either store an alternative PIN or use a Samsung account to recover forgotten passwords. This KNOX 1.0 Personal container is not a part of the KNOX enterprise solution and was discontinued early this year.
My takeaway: unless you've had a 100% staff turnover this calendar year, at least some of the designers and implementers who thought it'd be OK to store a PIN in cleartext are still on the team. That's enough to make me run screaming from it.
- praseodym 12y agoThey're talking about ARM TrustZone (http://www.arm.com/TrustZone http://www.arm.com/TrustZone) here, which can do these kinds of things securely. However, I'm not sure if Samsung uses it correctly.
- comex 12y ago'Securely' is relative. While a TrustZone kernel is supposed to be isolated from the main OS, it can still be compromised, which would allow the key to be retrieved. I don't know why they are storing the key at all, considering that it's supposed to be derived from the password; other systems certainly don't. (Apple's goes farther than that by attempting to prevent parallelized cracking using hardware encryption keys.)
- michaelt 12y agoI don't know why they are storing the key at all, considering that it's supposed to be derived from the password A lot of people secure their phone with comparatively weak passwords of 4 to 6 numeric digits - I know I do! While you'd certainly want to hash that and include it in the key, using it as the sole source to derive the key wouldn't be enough. I can understand also trying to work in some sort of trusted hardware that imposes a rate limit and prevents performing attacks in parallel. You'd still hash the user's password into the encryption key, of course. And shether Samsung has managed to get the trusted hardware right is of course another matter...