Maybe I am missing something here, but I didn't even know Samsung Knox did storage encryption. As far as I understand, the use case for this technology was isol

Maybe I am missing something here, but I didn't even know Samsung Knox did storage encryption. As far as I understand, the use case for this technology was isolating enterprise apps from user-installed/general apps. Given that, is there any scenario in which non-Knox apps could read the password from disk and use that to mess with apps inside the Knox container? If so, then this is a serious threat to Knox as a technology, if not, it still sounds like a silly way to implement passwords, but not a deal-breaker (kinda like having a plain-text /etc/shadow in mode 600 is silly - or a sign of negligence, depending on your standards regarding defense-in-depth - but not a full attack vector in and of itself). I always assumed Knox was something you used in addition to Android's whole-system encryption, not instead of, but I could be wrong.