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Bitcoin over Tor isn't a good idea
- s_q_b 12y agoTor and Bitcoin hide fundamentally different things in their pseudonymity specs. It's like people think Tor is magic anonymity peanut butter they can spread on whichever project they wish.
- exo762 12y agoIn fact Bitcoin design does not contain elements hinting that anonymity was ever a goal. People using Bitcoin over Tor might just want to circumvent censorship aka Tor as glorified proxy.
- s_q_b 12y agoRight, but it doesn't work. That's the whole point of the article. Tor+random app usually equals massive vulnerability. I should add I learned that the hard way trying to integrate Tor with OpenBazaar. What might be fun is stenography over the Tor protocol. Anybody interested?
- selimthegrim 12y agoThere is a project that uses stenography to hide the Tor protocol from inspection. I need to tie up a few loose ends to some of my branches for it (I am not the originator, just a contributor) but have gotten caught up in schoolwork these last few months. Any assistance is appreciated! [0] https://github.com/TheTorProject/stegotorus https://github.com/TheTorProject/stegotorus [1] https://github.com/SRI-CSL/stegotorus https://github.com/SRI-CSL/stegotorus
- s_q_b 12y agoCool, I'll check it out. I was thinking more along the lines of hiding messages in the Tor protocol itself, rather than hiding Tor traffic (which is desperately needed.)
- VMG 12y agoIf I understand the paper correctly, you can't rely on Tor for that either. You can disable other Bitcoin peers on the Tor network: > It turns out that by exploiting a Bitcoin built-in reputation based DoS protection an attacker is able to force specific Bitcoin peers to ban Tor Exit nodes of her choice. Section VII lists some countermeasures. Very happy to see academics having an increasing interest in this area.
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- resolutionx 12y ago" Many of these details do not appear in any specifications and were obtained by a careful analysis of the corresponding source code. This is especially true for Bitcoin for which there exists no official documentation except for the original white paper [14] and Bitcoin Wiki[3]." Well that seems a bit odd.
- patio11 12y agoYou have no idea how deep that rabbit hole goes. Bitcoin Core is referred to as a "reference implementation", which means "you should implement all bugs referenced by Bitcoin Core in transaction verification, or you have your choice of being kicked off the Bitcoin consensus immediately, which is bad, or at any point of an attacker's choosing, which is catastrophic."
- resolutionx 12y agoWhat a wonderful idea. /s Although I understand it to an extent. The core of software wouldn't be the core if it wasn't always used.
- 3pt14159 12y agoThat's the way a blockchain works though. If there is a bug in the client that 99% of people use then of course you'll have forking blockchains. And all of this matters less anyway, because clients can fallback to blockchain.info if there is a fork detected, and just warn the user that the client may have a bug.
- kanzure 12y ago> because clients can fallback to blockchain.info if there is a fork detected Unfortunately bc.i's implementation/instance is not immune to bugs, forking, lying or collusion. I don't know why you would expect it to be.
- 3pt14159 12y agoThe point is that it is a trusted enough party. If the client gets a suspicious block it can check against that party as a way of seeing if the client itself may have a bug.
- fsiefken 12y agoFor a better way of pseudonymity check darkcoin and it's masternode network.
- higherpurpose 12y agoIs Matthew Green & team's ZeroCash still getting an implementation?
- nhaehnle 12y agoThis is interesting in that it highlights a number of problems that every peer-to-peer network that wishes to use something like Tor for privacy needs to take into account. I also wasn't aware that Tor hidden services can be "blackholed" so easily (it sounds like this is probably well known to regular Tor users, though).
- Tangokat 12y agoSo what are the choices for people in oppressed countries? Use an altcoin or just hope that nobody implements this attack?
- lodewijkadlp 12y agoBitcoin over VPN can be a MUCH MUCH MUCH worse idea, because the VPN can MITM you. So, I guess we won't be happy until we have long range open access wireless. Which is, at the moment, completely corporate. So; good luck all, happy browsing :[
- andrelayer 12y agoThis is why something like Darkcoin should exist. It fixes one of Bitcoin's biggest issues, anonymity.
- handsomeransoms 12y agoThis reminds me of the recent (~2 months ago) addition of a new, very fast Tor relay (faster than any other relay at the time) that only relayed Bitcoin traffice [0]. Wonder if that has anything to do with this research, or if someone else has independently arrived at the same result? [0] http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/2bwds2/what_does_the_worlds_fastest_tor_node_have_to_do/ http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/2bwds2/what_does_th...
- chatmasta 12y agoI researched TorCoin. I feel like I know a fair amount about Tor and BitCoin. What worries me most about Tor is that people do not realize how trivially an exit relay can MITM your traffic. The value proposition of Tor is NOT keeping all your traffic safe. It's anonymizing your traffic from end to end, so that nobody who sees your data knows both where it came from and where it's going. They can still see the data itself. For all intents and purposes, traffic from Exit -> Internet is plaintext. The relay operator can MITM it. Tor is only safer than a VPN or proxy because the exit relay does not know your identity. It can still access the data you transfer through it. [4] Anyone can start a Tor exit relay, and setting up a MITM proxy on it is trivial. Siphoning bitcoin transactions is equally trivial. Just listen for the proper traffic patterns. You should not be transferring any business-critical data over Tor. It's a great tool for protecting your identity, but not your data. With HTTPS, you're relatively safer, since you'll get an alert if a relay is MITM'ing you and modifying the certificate. But with plain HTTP, you won't even know when you're getting MITM'd. More Resources: [1] http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/34804/how-safe-is-tor-from-mitm-snooping-attacks http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/34804/how-safe-i... [2] https://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/mitm https://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/mitm (includes links to research papers) [3] https://www.petsymposium.org/2014/papers/Winter.pdf https://www.petsymposium.org/2014/papers/Winter.pdf [4] Emphasis on "for all intents and purposes." Not a true statement universally.
- firepacket 12y agoSiphoning bitcoin transactions is not trivial. Transactions need to be signed by the holder of the private key to the inputs. A MITM attacker still does not have access to any keys. If it was that easy, bitcoin would be worthless.
- chatmasta 12y agoYou're right. Let me clarify: I'm not worried about the transactions themselves, as they appear on the blockchain. What worries me is the "meta transactions", if you will. The Bitcoin ecosystem is full of off-blockchain transactions. For example, mining pools use their own communication mechanisms, which the BGP attack this summer exploited. Also, dozens of exchanges, marketplaces, and services rely on HTTP API's for transacting. Even if the blockchain is not vulnerable, the external transactions that reference it certainly could be. Imagine how many "send X bitcoin from wallet Y to wallet Z" requests route over HTTP. Quite a few. So yeah, not "trivial" as I said. But certainly not impossible. (Welcome to HN! I'm glad my mistake brought you out of the woodwork.)
- runeks 12y ago> [...] control which Bitcoin blocks and transactions are relayed to the user and can delay or discard user’s transactions and blocks. Bear in mind that we can detect when a node does this, by monitoring it, and measuring whether blocks or transactions are withheld, kind of like in this paper: http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/spoiled_onions/techreport.pdf http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/spoiled_onions/techreport.pdf