3 ms·
Would HSTS have helped in this situation? HSTS is mainly to prevent SSL-stripping. But I think part of HSTS could also note that the certificate was trusted, a
by zaroth 12y ago
Would HSTS have helped in this situation?
HSTS is mainly to prevent SSL-stripping. But I think part of HSTS could also note that the certificate was trusted, and then having an HSTS header could entirely prevent any later connection with the self-signed certificate, without clearing the HSTS history.
You may not need to even store the extra bit, it's enough to say if you have HSTS then by default the connection must not just be encrypted, but it must be trusted.
Do current browsers entirely prevent a connection to untrusted certs when HSTS is set? Or is it just the same error you get when connecting to any self-signed cert?
- acebarry 12y ago> Do current browsers entirely prevent a connection to untrusted certs when HSTS is set? Yes. HSTS would not do much to prevent active MiTM. HSTS just tells the browser that it should only connect to the site over HTTPS. It does not mention which certificates are trusted. It seems like you are hinting towards certificate pinning (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Certificate_pinning https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Certi...). Pinning would prevent rouge CA's from signing bad certificates, but pinning is hard to do on the web. It is mainly used with mobile applications from what I have seen. Edit: Here is a list of pinned sites in Chrome, if you are curious. (https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome/trunk/src/net/http/transport_security_state_static.json https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome/trunk/src/net/http/tr...)