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What flabbergasts me is how much of this is what the gaming world would call "push this button not to die". That is, it's a question with a right answer and a
by Pxtl 12y ago
What flabbergasts me is how much of this is what the gaming world would call "push this button not to die". That is, it's a question with a right answer and a wrong answer and no real other options or any reason you'd ever want to choose the "wrong" option. Intelligent defaults are supposed to take care of that sort of thing.
- yourabi 12y agoIt is rarely that clean-cut which is why these are not defaults in server configs. If you're hosting an API that has older / embedded clients you may HAVE to support SSLv3 during a migration plan...etc
- pixl97 12y agoYour defaults would change every few months. BEAST attack comes out... Use RC4. Not long after.. RC4 is weak use GCM. GCM isn't supported on older versions of almost everything. Upgrade servers to 2012R2, latest versions of Linux, throw away your old phones, check out your legacy devices... Security isn't a question with a right or wrong answer, it's a question with the best answer for the available information and the clients you have at the time. And those answers are changing daily with all the research being conducted.
- skybrian 12y agoAll the more reason for someone who's on top of things to fix the defaults whenever they change.
- pixl97 12y agoWhile that would be nice, it doesn't fix the problem, that problem is If you are administering SSL enabled sites, you MUST keep track of latest security practices Why is that? If you add a new server with different defaults, do you a) update all the other servers to the new defaults, or b) set the new server to your existing configuration. Most server applications don't change defaults between minor versions because it leads to even worse problems. Such as users not updating because their application breaks and keeping old bugs alive.
- xorcist 12y agoThe combination of recommending to use modern cipher modes with no known vulnerabilities and HSTS can be lethal. Older clients won't even know you're there. No first page, no contact info, nothing. Just hang on page load. It might not always be desirable. It might be a good idea to have two security levels if you're doing HSTS. One to accept every cipher under the sun to use for public pages and data, and a secure one to use to protect session cookies for logged in users.