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> I have granted The New Yorker an exclusive license to the article for a limited period... If, a year from now, someone else, without my permission, reprints m
> I have granted The New Yorker an exclusive license to the article for a limited period... If, a year from now, someone else, without my permission, reprints my article in a book called “The Most Thoughtful and Penetrating Essays of 2014,” I can complain that my right to make copies is being violated and, if the court agrees with me, legally suppress the book... Although not the author of this piece, you, too, would likely feel that the publisher of “Most Thoughtful Essays” was a bandit.
> But suppose that a Web site ran an item that said something like “This piece on copyright is a great read!” with a hyperlink on the word “piece” to my article’s page on The New Yorker’s Web site. You wouldn’t think this was banditry at all. You would find it unexceptionable.
I would argue that the latter seems unexceptional because it is qualitatively different than the former.
If I pick up an essay from the New Yorker and print it in a book that I then sell, I am depriving the New Yorker of revenue, because now there is a way to get it that doesn't involve paying the rights-holder (the New Yorker). This -- taking money out of the hands of the people who own the content to put it in my own -- is what copyright is designed to stop.
If I link to an essay on the New Yorker's web site from my own web site, I am not depriving them of revenue, because you can only read it by following the link, and the New Yorker is free to put up any financial barriers -- paywalls, ads, etc. -- between you and the endpoint of the link that they wish. So they're not losing the opportunity to sell you the content; I'm not taking money out of their hands. And maybe my endorsement that there's good stuff to be found behind the paywall will be the factor that convinces you to pay up.
Or, alternately, they can decide to forgo the money they'd make by forcing you to subscribe in the hopes that they can make more money by showing ads against the content instead. But the crucial point is that it is their decision, not mine. Whereas if I put the essay in a printed book, and then sold it, I am making the decision for them.
Where all this breaks down, of course, is in cases where I, the linker, reprint large portions (or all) of the article on my own site in addition to just providing a link. In that case, yes, I am depriving you of revenue, because the reader no longer has to click through to get the meat of the story. But traditional copyright law covers this scenario too -- I don't have the right to do that. All I'm allowed to do by the doctrine of fair use (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fair_use http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fair_use) is reprint a small snippet. If I put up the whole thing, I'm violating your copyright and you can and should come at me with guns blazing.
(I wrote a bit more about this distinction between what I call "ethical" and "unethical" aggregation here: http://jasonlefkowitz.net/2012/05/ethical-aggregation-its-simple/ http://jasonlefkowitz.net/2012/05/ethical-aggregation-its-si...)
Later on in the article, the purpose of copyright is further discussed, specifically the "moral" side of copyright.
For example: "Samuel Beckett’s restrictions on the staging of his plays is a well-known example of the exercise of copyright as a moral right." and "...although the buyer of a work of art may destroy it, he or she cannot deface or otherwise alter it." as well as the inability to copy or publish out of print books. None one of these is referring to the money making side of copyright, but rather to the "moral" side that you own your creation completely, and others only get to "consume" it.
Yes. This has long been part of copyright law in most of the world, and in the US since 1989 when the US amended its copyright law to match the rest of the world so that it could join the Berne Convention.
This reflects an interesting philosophical difference in how Europe and the US historically view creative works.
The historical philosophical justification of copyright in the US is the "fruits of your labor" theory of ownership. If by your labor your make something, you should own that thing. This leads to the US taking a more utilitarian view, and so US copyright law was only concerned with "economic rights". You created a work, so you owned the rights to make and sell copies of it. I've not really studied the classical philosophers, but I'm told that the US view is heavily influenced by John Locke.
The historical European view is that a work of art is an extension of the creator. The philosophical justification for copyright under the European view is self ownership and self determination. European copyright law therefore not only protects economic rights, but also "moral rights". If you deface a work of art, or if you falsely attribute a work of art, that is an attack on the artist himself. I'm told that the European view is heavily influenced by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention requires recognition of moral rights:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights,
and even after the transfer of the said rights, the
author shall have the right to claim authorship of
the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation
or other modification of, or other derogatory action
in relation to, the said work, which would be
prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance
with the preceding paragraph shall, after his death,
be maintained, at least until the expiry of the
economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the
persons or institutions authorized by the
legislation of the country where protection is
claimed. However, those countries whose legislation,
at the moment of their ratification of or accession
to this Act, does not provide for the protection
after the death of the author of all the rights set
out in the preceding paragraph may provide that some
of these rights may, after his death, cease to be
maintained.
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights
granted by this Article shall be governed by the
legislation of the country where protection is
claimed.
The US was not willing to go that far, so when the US introduced some moral rights via the Berne Implementation Act of 1988, it did so in a limited fashion--it only covers works of visual art (which is a narrower category than most people would expect--see note below). It is generally believed that it was meant to be just enough so that with vigorous hand waving one could say that the US met the qualifications to join the Berne Convention.
The US copyright moral rights are in 17 USC 106A:
(a) Rights of Attribution and Integrity.— Subject
to section 107 and independent of the exclusive
rights provided in section 106, the author of a work
of visual art—
(Note: section 107 is "fair use")
(1) shall have the right—
(A) to claim authorship of that work, and
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the
author of any work of visual art which he or she did
not create;
(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his
or her name as the author of the work of visual art
in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of the work which would be prejudicial
to his or her honor or reputation; and
(3) subject to the limitations set forth in section
113 (d), shall have the right—
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of that work which
would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation, and any intentional distortion,
mutilation, or modification of that work is a
violation of that right, and
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of
recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly
negligent destruction of that work is a violation of
that right.
(b) Scope and Exercise of Rights.— Only the author
of a work of visual art has the rights conferred by
subsection (a) in that work, whether or not the
author is the copyright owner. The authors of a
joint work of visual art are coowners of the rights
conferred by subsection (a) in that work.
(c) Exceptions.—
(1) The modification of a work of visual art which
is a result of the passage of time or the inherent
nature of the materials is not a distortion,
mutilation, or other modification described in
subsection (a)(3)(A).
(2) The modification of a work of visual art which
is the result of conservation, or of the public
presentation, including lighting and placement, of
the work is not a destruction, distortion,
mutilation, or other modification described in
subsection (a)(3) unless the modification is caused
by gross negligence.
(3) The rights described in paragraphs (1) and (2)
of subsection (a) shall not apply to any
reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or other use of
a work in, upon, or in any connection with any item
described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of the
definition of “work of visual art” in section
101, and any such reproduction, depiction,
portrayal, or other use of a work is not a
destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other
modification described in paragraph (3) of
subsection (a).
(Note: this excludes "any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic publication, or similar publication" and "any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering, or packaging material or container", and it excludes any "work made for hire")
(d) Duration of Rights.—
(1) With respect to works of visual art created on
or after the effective date set forth in section
610(a) of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, the
rights conferred by subsection (a) shall endure for
a term consisting of the life of the author.
(2) With respect to works of visual art created
before the effective date set forth in section
610(a) of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, but
title to which has not, as of such effective date,
been transferred from the author, the rights
conferred by subsection (a) shall be coextensive
with, and shall expire at the same time as, the
rights conferred by section 106.
(3) In the case of a joint work prepared by two or
more authors, the rights conferred by subsection (a)
shall endure for a term consisting of the life of
the last surviving author.
(4) All terms of the rights conferred by subsection
(a) run to the end of the calendar year in which
they would otherwise expire.
(e) Transfer and Waiver.—
(1) The rights conferred by subsection (a) may not
be transferred, but those rights may be waived if
the author expressly agrees to such waiver in a
written instrument signed by the author. Such
instrument shall specifically identify the work, and
uses of that work, to which the waiver applies, and
the waiver shall apply only to the work and uses so
identified. In the case of a joint work prepared by
two or more authors, a waiver of rights under this
paragraph made by one such author waives such rights
for all such authors.
(2) Ownership of the rights conferred by subsection
(a) with respect to a work of visual art is distinct
from ownership of any copy of that work, or of a
copyright or any exclusive right under a copyright
in that work. Transfer of ownership of any copy of a
work of visual art, or of a copyright or any
exclusive right under a copyright, shall not
constitute a waiver of the rights conferred by
subsection (a). Except as may otherwise be agreed by
the author in a written instrument signed by the
author, a waiver of the rights conferred by
subsection (a) with respect to a work of visual art
shall not constitute a transfer of ownership of any
copy of that work, or of ownership of a copyright or
of any exclusive right under a copyright in that
work.