3 ms·
It should have been abundantly clear, however it's not hard to imaging that if you're flying 99% of the time in an airplane that makes it _impossible_ to stall
by snom390 12y ago
It should have been abundantly clear, however it's not hard to imaging that if you're flying 99% of the time in an airplane that makes it _impossible_ to stall it (ie. pushing back all the way on the stick will not allow it to stall), you might be in a mindset where the possibility of a stall might not even enter your thought.
The fact that the stall warning stopped due to low airspeed and came on again when they pushed the nose forward (because airspeeds became available again and the stall warning started working) only made the problem worse, and can explain why they completely lost the trust in the instruments.
In the end, there's a host of factors and bad design decisions that led up to the accident, and on top of that poor high altitude training.
- mikeash 12y agoThat's why I blame a lack of training for the basics. If you can ever get to the point as a pilot where the possibility of a stall might not even enter your mind, you've become dangerous. If the planes don't enter that regime themselves, then it needs to be intentionally caused in training so they don't lose proficiency.
- snom390 12y agoAgreed, and that was one of the recommendations in the report. AFAIK current commercial flight simulators aren't designed to accurately simulate the aircraft outside the normal flight envelope, so pilots can only simulate approach to stall, or a stall that might not accurately represent what will happen with an actual airplane, in contrast to the stall training you do in a light aircraft.