I've done that since before security.tls.version.min existed (the pref had another name before, and allowed nonsensical combinations like allowing TLS 1.0 and S

I've done that since before security.tls.version.min existed (the pref had another name before, and allowed nonsensical combinations like allowing TLS 1.0 and SSL 2.0 but not SSL 3.0). But Firefox 34 disabling SSL 3.0 by default will disable it even for nontechnical users. That should force the remaining non-TLS-compatible servers and middleboxes to be fixed. On the server side, hopefully the knee-jerk reaction of disabling SSL 3.0 will have the same effect, forcing the remaining non-TLS-compatible clients and middleboxes to be fixed. That could allow for the SSL 3.0 code to be finally removed from both clients and servers, like happened with the older SSL 2.0. And with it, the fallback code for extension intolerant servers, so clients can count on being able to use extensions.