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(edited down for size) Problem with this system: it requires input on a single device (the computer), removes an out-of-band authentication option (password),
by peterwwillis 12y ago
(edited down for size)
Problem with this system: it requires input on a single device (the computer), removes an out-of-band authentication option (password), and pushes the requirement for authentication down the stack to a system without a secure connection (e-mail, SMS).
In this new system, the password becomes an optional secondary authenticator. Your primary authenticator is now moved to some pre-authenticated service, such as your e-mail (which you have already logged into, presumably with a password) or SMS messaging (which you have already logged into, presumably with a swipe or pin on your phone). On top of that, neither of these uses a secured connection, so MITM/interception are trivial, to say nothing of phishing+CSRF.
One of the major flaws with existing out-of-band authentication access is that we assume the user only has one form of input: the computer. If the computer gets hacked [via malware] the user cannot protect themselves. But the future is here, and we carry [networked] computers in our pockets! Turns out the most secure way we can authenticate is via two separate networks and two separate computers using two secured connections. Example:
Step 1. User requests to login to HTTPS Site A.
Step 2a. Site A prompts User for a password.
Step 2b. Site A sends an SMS to User with an HTTPS link to click.
Step 3a. User enters password on site.
Step 3b. User clicks link on SMS in mobile device.
Step 4a. Site authenticates password.
Step 4b. Mobile site reads cookie on User's mobile browser.
Step 5. User is authenticated; both mobile device and computer have access to site.
Here you have two different authentication factors on two independent devices which are combined to authenticate the user. The attackers now have to steal a cookie or auth token from two separate devices at once. This is of course completely plausible, but is a much more expensive attack than any currently implemented. Best of all, the user doesn't have to remember the password if they use their browser's password manager or a cookie is stored locally.
It would be trivial to add this dual-auth method to their existing system, so hopefully they implement that instead of throwing the baby out with the bath water.
For what it's worth, of course, here's an attack that could compromise that system. Attacker shows user a phishing password prompt page that uses a browser hack to steal a cookie. Attacker sends an SMS to the user (assuming they found the user's phone number) with a link to another site which also exploits the mobile browser to steal that cookie. Now the attacker has the two cookies and can log in, assuming the site does not use an Authentication Manager that detects attackers who steal credentials (only large-dollar sites use these).