5 ms·
Why don't you just use different user accounts and permissions? That way you don't have to trust extra code and can achieve the same goal. Edit: But the way yo
by mrottenkolber 12y ago
Why don't you just use different user accounts and permissions? That way you don't have to trust extra code and can achieve the same goal.
Edit: But the way you talk to me, obviously I must be stupid.
- csirac2 12y agoI'd say the reasoning is that you then have to trust there are no privesc/bypass opportunities in your environment. Trusting that all your dbus/pulseaudio/network-manager/cups/fuse/display manager & friends aren't going to give your rogue chrome process on one account some kind of access to another (thanks to X11/XDMCP, they'll at least have keylogging) - that's a big surface area, aas in: space is big. Really big. You just won't believe how vastly, hugely, mind-bogglingly big it is. Compared to the few hundred lines in the hypervisor providing VM-level isolation you'd be a bit mad to say that these are equivalent means of isolation.