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I'm surprised that the Clipper Chip wasn't mentioned. That was an attempt to have the government hold the (a) key for encryption hardware. It failed for obvio

by chiph 12y ago

I'm surprised that the Clipper Chip wasn't mentioned. That was an attempt to have the government hold the (a) key for encryption hardware. It failed for obvious reasons - too big a hole, and no one trusted the NSA (correctly, as it turns out).

mcmancini 12y ago
Agreed. That was my first thought when law enforcement started getting press for screaming "think of the children". I'm surprised and disappointed that people have apparently forgotten recent history. This is why I greatly respect historian as a profession.
- Zigurd 12y ago
  Another reason why Clipper Chip was a Very Bad Idea is that, when strong encryption without back doors is outlawed, only outlaws will know how to make secure crypto. It would have created a War on Forbidden Knowledge. Brrrr.
  - drvdevd 12y ago
    Also, what could the U.S. government do when this knowledge is so widespread and in so many forms at this point? Take down notices to github? Cease and desist orders to Linus Torvalds? The encryption cat is out of the bag to a certain degree. Legislation along this line would simply further harm U.S. business interest in the global marketplace, even if it were desirable.
pdkl95 12y ago
I remember the Clipper Chip well - it was one of the first issues to introduce me to the EFF and the (still growing) war against general purpose computing. Regarding the Clipper Chip, there is an observation that I haven't seen talked about in these discussions. There is an important difference in the NSA's tactics with their Clipper Chip proposal and their more recent activities: while technically and socially flawed, the key-escrow plan at least attempts to respect the constitution. By keeping the keys at a 3rd party, in theory the NSA was limited to what they could ask for. Automatic rubber stamped warrants may allow them access to a lot of data, but it (again, in theory) would have been tiny in comparison to their current dragnets. At first I took this as implying a change in the goals or leadership at the agency; a lot can change in a decade. But then we were introduced to BULLRUN and how it may have targeted[1] IPSEC. Given that the IPSEC working group was started in 1995, this suggests the NSA may have been trying to subvert opportunistic crypto during the Clipper Chip imbroglio. While it is speculation, this could raise the possibility that the Clipper Chip was just a distraction, while NSA's eye's were on the larger goal was the crypto standards themselves. Of course, any proof, if any, of this is buried deep in the NSA and not likely to see the light of day anytime soon. [1] http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg12325.html http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg123...
- wahern 12y ago
  "this suggests the NSA may have been trying" Well, we know that an NSA contractor on the IETF removed opportunistic crypto from the PPP protocol. See http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-rep-dirt.htm http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-rep-dirt.htm I think it would be prudent to believe that the NSA was systematically throwing up road blocks then, and it would be prudent to believe that they're doing it now. I can't even see how such a claim would be controversial. It is their job after all, at least given the presumption that foreign bad guys use and rely on domestic technology. And we know that the NSA makes that presumption.

by chiph 12y ago

mcmancini 12y ago

Agreed. That was my first thought when law enforcement started getting press for screaming "think of the children". I'm surprised and disappointed that people have apparently forgotten recent history. This is why I greatly respect historian as a profession.

Zigurd 12y ago
Another reason why Clipper Chip was a Very Bad Idea is that, when strong encryption without back doors is outlawed, only outlaws will know how to make secure crypto. It would have created a War on Forbidden Knowledge. Brrrr.
- drvdevd 12y ago
  Also, what could the U.S. government do when this knowledge is so widespread and in so many forms at this point? Take down notices to github? Cease and desist orders to Linus Torvalds? The encryption cat is out of the bag to a certain degree. Legislation along this line would simply further harm U.S. business interest in the global marketplace, even if it were desirable.

pdkl95 12y ago

I remember the Clipper Chip well - it was one of the first issues to introduce me to the EFF and the (still growing) war against general purpose computing. Regarding the Clipper Chip, there is an observation that I haven't seen talked about in these discussions. There is an important difference in the NSA's tactics with their Clipper Chip proposal and their more recent activities: while technically and socially flawed, the key-escrow plan at least attempts to respect the constitution. By keeping the keys at a 3rd party, in theory the NSA was limited to what they could ask for. Automatic rubber stamped warrants may allow them access to a lot of data, but it (again, in theory) would have been tiny in comparison to their current dragnets. At first I took this as implying a change in the goals or leadership at the agency; a lot can change in a decade. But then we were introduced to BULLRUN and how it may have targeted[1] IPSEC. Given that the IPSEC working group was started in 1995, this suggests the NSA may have been trying to subvert opportunistic crypto during the Clipper Chip imbroglio. While it is speculation, this could raise the possibility that the Clipper Chip was just a distraction, while NSA's eye's were on the larger goal was the crypto standards themselves. Of course, any proof, if any, of this is buried deep in the NSA and not likely to see the light of day anytime soon. [1] http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg12325.html http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg123...

wahern 12y ago
"this suggests the NSA may have been trying" Well, we know that an NSA contractor on the IETF removed opportunistic crypto from the PPP protocol. See http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-rep-dirt.htm http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-rep-dirt.htm I think it would be prudent to believe that the NSA was systematically throwing up road blocks then, and it would be prudent to believe that they're doing it now. I can't even see how such a claim would be controversial. It is their job after all, at least given the presumption that foreign bad guys use and rely on domestic technology. And we know that the NSA makes that presumption.