3 ms·
If an adversary has physical access to a computer, they can get basically anything. In unencrypted scenarios they can pull out drives and mount them in their ow
by maerF0x0 12y ago
If an adversary has physical access to a computer, they can get basically anything. In unencrypted scenarios they can pull out drives and mount them in their own run time (OS). If the device is also running then coldboot attacks can allow the encryption to be attacked.
Finally, there is the eventual cracking of many encryption algorithms via cryptanalysis and moores law.
[1]: Answer about moore's law effects on bits of security http://crypto.stackexchange.com/a/1828 http://crypto.stackexchange.com/a/1828
[2]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_boot_attack http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_boot_attack
- bitJericho 12y agoMy computer is encrypted. It's far more complicated to break into my computer than to use a rock against a window.
- mahyarm 12y agoCold Boot is hard to implement, and can be mitigated by putting the 16kb of key memory on the L2/L3 cache or some other piece of memory that instantly clears on power off. With FDE and memory encryption, how else can you get pass this?