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There is no crypto based system which is appropriate for actual elections in the USA. While cool for technophiles, all crypto based systems rely on hash collis
by specialist 12y ago
There is no crypto based system which is appropriate for actual elections in the USA.
While cool for technophiles, all crypto based systems rely on hash collisions to protect voter privacy. It's a combinatorial problem. Given a typical general election ballot (say 10-30 issues, with 1-6 choices each), the pool of voters (ballots cast) would need to number in the 100,000s.
Alas, elections are administered per precinct, which typically number 1 - 1,000 voters.
To use crypto election administration would require splitting our ballots into a ballot per issue, greatly increasing the size of precincts, or both.
But whatever the case, the burden of proof for this hair brained ideas is on the proponents. And until they (you) assume the responsibility of proving these systems work for real world elections, I'm not interested.
- oggy 12y agoIt sounds like one of us doesn't know what they are talking about, and I don't think it's me. How does, say, Pret a Voter rely on hash collisions to protect voter privacy?
- specialist 12y agoHow does pret a voter protect voter privacy in a voter pool (precinct) of 400 with a ballot containing 30 issues. Go ahead, work it out for yourself, manually, like I did. I'll wait.
- oggy 12y agoThe premise of whatever it was that you were manually working out was that "all crypto based systems rely on hash collisions to protect voter privacy". Again, pray tell, how does Pret a Voter rely on hash collisions?
- specialist 12y agoDown vote? Petty. You're right, of course. I conflated Pret a Voter with another hare brained scheme: Chaum's Punchscan, which at least makes a token attempt to protect voter privacy. My apologies. (It's been a few years since I studied this nonsense.) Pret a voter does not throw information away (a la secure one-way hash), it merely obfuscates the process. It's just a more fancy kabuki.