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> Vote buying is a MUCH lesser problem than fraud by those running the ballot box. If it is, it's either because 1) you don't know it's there, or 2) there are

by xorcist 12y ago

> Vote buying is a MUCH lesser problem than fraud by those running the ballot box. If it is, it's either because 1) you don't know it's there, or 2) there are easier ways to cheat the system. Please take note that buying votes does not need to be large scale to put the legitimacy of the outcome in question. It is enough if, for example, it is possible for abusive patriarchs to vote for family members. > Furthermore, it is impossible to create a system that simultaneously lets you prove that your own vote was counted correctly AND prevents vote buying Impossible is a strong word to use. There are several interesting theoretical systems proposed that make this possible. But are they practical? > Let the police deal with vote buyers. They can set up stings and catch them easily. You don't seem to understand why vote secrecy is desirable. It is not (primarily) to protect against criminal gangs, but serves to make voting legitimate in the democratic system. Part of that is to make sure no one can prove how they voted for their bosses, husbands etc. > The voting system should be primarily protected against the people who are running it. Not traditionally. That is normally achieved through transparency. When anyone and everyone can participate on equal means in the voting process, and that process is transparent to everyone involved, that is enough to guarantee legitimacy.

ddingus 12y ago
"impossible" refers to this: When a voter marks a ballot, there is an unbroken chain of trust between their intent and the record of their intent used for the tally. When a voter uses a machine, the machine records something it thinks is the voter intent. The voter must trust the machine as they are not capable of seeing the actual record. Further, the actual record of their intent is never captured, just an interpretation of it. Additionally, this record is copied, not used directly.
crdoconnor 12y ago
>If it is, it's either because 1) you don't know it's there, or 2) there are easier ways to cheat the system. No, it is difficult because it doesn't scale. After a certain (relatively low) point it becomes prohibitively expensive and your likelihood of being caught approaches near-certainty. This (along with enforcement) is why it is rare. >Please take note that buying votes does not need to be large scale to put the legitimacy of the outcome in question. Please also note that you do not have to be able to verify the outcome to be able to successfully offer a bribe and get a vote in return. It simply makes it somewhat easier. Policing and enforcement of the law is the answer to this problem - not clever cryptography. That should be used to prove that the people running the voting machines didn't corrupt them. >Impossible is a strong word to use. There are several interesting theoretical systems proposed that make this possible. Impossible because it essentially implies a trustless system. Clever cryptographic techniques only go so far and they do not let you run a system where nobody can be trusted. >You don't seem to understand why vote secrecy is desirable. I understand why it is desirable, but I also understand that every system must face a trade off between placing trust in the administrators of the voting system and the voters themselves. >It is not (primarily) to protect against criminal gangs, but serves to make voting legitimate in the democratic system. Part of that is to make sure no one can prove how they voted for their bosses, husbands etc. If they can't do this then they cannot truly know whether their vote was counted at all. Maybe it was lost, ignored or counted towards the opposition. >Not traditionally. What the fuck does tradition have to do with it? This is about security.
- xorcist 12y ago
  > After a certain (relatively low) point it becomes prohibitively expensive Look, vote secrecy is nothing new. Let's not have a discussion about the basic tenets of voting systems unless you have a grasp of the fundamentals. I'm not saying it is an axiom of democracy that must never be breached. I'm saying if you advocate against it, the very least you must do if you want to be taken seriously is to counter the basic arguments why we have voting secrecy in the current system, and what there is to be gained and lost with an alternative system. The common vote secrecy is not to protect from large scale manipulation, although it does achieve that as well. It is to gain legitimacy by protecting against many small ones. Only then can it be argued that a vote is truly vox populi. > What the fuck does tradition have to do with it? This is about security. Please try to keep it serious. Security is not a one dimensional variable. Traditionally voting security is designed to obtain legitimacy, not protect against a corrupt voting administrator. The latter is not ignored though, it is merely achieved by other means. If your system cannot offer voting secrecy, and has no other benefits compared to a publicly auditable pen and paper system, it is overall less secure.

by xorcist 12y ago

ddingus 12y ago

"impossible" refers to this: When a voter marks a ballot, there is an unbroken chain of trust between their intent and the record of their intent used for the tally. When a voter uses a machine, the machine records something it thinks is the voter intent. The voter must trust the machine as they are not capable of seeing the actual record. Further, the actual record of their intent is never captured, just an interpretation of it. Additionally, this record is copied, not used directly.

crdoconnor 12y ago

>If it is, it's either because 1) you don't know it's there, or 2) there are easier ways to cheat the system. No, it is difficult because it doesn't scale. After a certain (relatively low) point it becomes prohibitively expensive and your likelihood of being caught approaches near-certainty. This (along with enforcement) is why it is rare. >Please take note that buying votes does not need to be large scale to put the legitimacy of the outcome in question. Please also note that you do not have to be able to verify the outcome to be able to successfully offer a bribe and get a vote in return. It simply makes it somewhat easier. Policing and enforcement of the law is the answer to this problem - not clever cryptography. That should be used to prove that the people running the voting machines didn't corrupt them. >Impossible is a strong word to use. There are several interesting theoretical systems proposed that make this possible. Impossible because it essentially implies a trustless system. Clever cryptographic techniques only go so far and they do not let you run a system where nobody can be trusted. >You don't seem to understand why vote secrecy is desirable. I understand why it is desirable, but I also understand that every system must face a trade off between placing trust in the administrators of the voting system and the voters themselves. >It is not (primarily) to protect against criminal gangs, but serves to make voting legitimate in the democratic system. Part of that is to make sure no one can prove how they voted for their bosses, husbands etc. If they can't do this then they cannot truly know whether their vote was counted at all. Maybe it was lost, ignored or counted towards the opposition. >Not traditionally. What the fuck does tradition have to do with it? This is about security.

xorcist 12y ago
> After a certain (relatively low) point it becomes prohibitively expensive Look, vote secrecy is nothing new. Let's not have a discussion about the basic tenets of voting systems unless you have a grasp of the fundamentals. I'm not saying it is an axiom of democracy that must never be breached. I'm saying if you advocate against it, the very least you must do if you want to be taken seriously is to counter the basic arguments why we have voting secrecy in the current system, and what there is to be gained and lost with an alternative system. The common vote secrecy is not to protect from large scale manipulation, although it does achieve that as well. It is to gain legitimacy by protecting against many small ones. Only then can it be argued that a vote is truly vox populi. > What the fuck does tradition have to do with it? This is about security. Please try to keep it serious. Security is not a one dimensional variable. Traditionally voting security is designed to obtain legitimacy, not protect against a corrupt voting administrator. The latter is not ignored though, it is merely achieved by other means. If your system cannot offer voting secrecy, and has no other benefits compared to a publicly auditable pen and paper system, it is overall less secure.