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> Anonymity. Votes cast are not linked to voters who cast them. And as an extension to this: It is important that it is not possible to prove what you voted fo

by xorcist 12y ago

> Anonymity. Votes cast are not linked to voters who cast them. And as an extension to this: It is important that it is not possible to prove what you voted for. This means not only that the link from voter to cast vote must be absent even for the voter, but also that the actual physical circumstances when the vote is cast is subject to the transparency and oversight mentioned above. Anything else (voting from home, or being presented with a slip linked to your cast vote, or any other such system) is subject to buying and selling votes and the result of such vote would never (and should never) be legitimate in the public eye. These physcial factors must also be taken into account when designing e-voting systems. It is a hard problem to solve these things in a way that the general voter would understand and therefore should accept.

crdoconnor 12y ago
>Anything else (voting from home, or being presented with a slip linked to your cast vote, or any other such system) is subject to buying and selling votes and the result of such vote would never (and should never) be legitimate in the public eye. Vote buying is a MUCH lesser problem than fraud by those running the ballot box. It's expensive; it's hard to do without being detected and on a large scale it becomes almost impossible. Furthermore, it is impossible to create a system that simultaneously lets you prove that your own vote was counted correctly AND prevents vote buying (where the buyer can verify you voted correctly). If you can verify your vote was counted, so can the vote buyer. If you can't, you're trusting the person running the (electronic) ballot box instead. Bearing that in mind, any fair electronic open source voting system should absolutely NOT prevent people from verifying their own votes. The person running the ballot box software is inherently less trustworthy than the person casting the vote. Let the police deal with vote buyers. They can set up stings and catch them easily. The voting system should be primarily protected against the people who are running it.
- xorcist 12y ago
  > Vote buying is a MUCH lesser problem than fraud by those running the ballot box. If it is, it's either because 1) you don't know it's there, or 2) there are easier ways to cheat the system. Please take note that buying votes does not need to be large scale to put the legitimacy of the outcome in question. It is enough if, for example, it is possible for abusive patriarchs to vote for family members. > Furthermore, it is impossible to create a system that simultaneously lets you prove that your own vote was counted correctly AND prevents vote buying Impossible is a strong word to use. There are several interesting theoretical systems proposed that make this possible. But are they practical? > Let the police deal with vote buyers. They can set up stings and catch them easily. You don't seem to understand why vote secrecy is desirable. It is not (primarily) to protect against criminal gangs, but serves to make voting legitimate in the democratic system. Part of that is to make sure no one can prove how they voted for their bosses, husbands etc. > The voting system should be primarily protected against the people who are running it. Not traditionally. That is normally achieved through transparency. When anyone and everyone can participate on equal means in the voting process, and that process is transparent to everyone involved, that is enough to guarantee legitimacy.
  - ddingus 12y ago
    "impossible" refers to this: When a voter marks a ballot, there is an unbroken chain of trust between their intent and the record of their intent used for the tally. When a voter uses a machine, the machine records something it thinks is the voter intent. The voter must trust the machine as they are not capable of seeing the actual record. Further, the actual record of their intent is never captured, just an interpretation of it. Additionally, this record is copied, not used directly.
  - crdoconnor 12y ago
    >If it is, it's either because 1) you don't know it's there, or 2) there are easier ways to cheat the system. No, it is difficult because it doesn't scale. After a certain (relatively low) point it becomes prohibitively expensive and your likelihood of being caught approaches near-certainty. This (along with enforcement) is why it is rare. >Please take note that buying votes does not need to be large scale to put the legitimacy of the outcome in question. Please also note that you do not have to be able to verify the outcome to be able to successfully offer a bribe and get a vote in return. It simply makes it somewhat easier. Policing and enforcement of the law is the answer to this problem - not clever cryptography. That should be used to prove that the people running the voting machines didn't corrupt them. >Impossible is a strong word to use. There are several interesting theoretical systems proposed that make this possible. Impossible because it essentially implies a trustless system. Clever cryptographic techniques only go so far and they do not let you run a system where nobody can be trusted. >You don't seem to understand why vote secrecy is desirable. I understand why it is desirable, but I also understand that every system must face a trade off between placing trust in the administrators of the voting system and the voters themselves. >It is not (primarily) to protect against criminal gangs, but serves to make voting legitimate in the democratic system. Part of that is to make sure no one can prove how they voted for their bosses, husbands etc. If they can't do this then they cannot truly know whether their vote was counted at all. Maybe it was lost, ignored or counted towards the opposition. >Not traditionally. What the fuck does tradition have to do with it? This is about security.
    - xorcist 12y ago

by xorcist 12y ago

crdoconnor 12y ago

>Anything else (voting from home, or being presented with a slip linked to your cast vote, or any other such system) is subject to buying and selling votes and the result of such vote would never (and should never) be legitimate in the public eye. Vote buying is a MUCH lesser problem than fraud by those running the ballot box. It's expensive; it's hard to do without being detected and on a large scale it becomes almost impossible. Furthermore, it is impossible to create a system that simultaneously lets you prove that your own vote was counted correctly AND prevents vote buying (where the buyer can verify you voted correctly). If you can verify your vote was counted, so can the vote buyer. If you can't, you're trusting the person running the (electronic) ballot box instead. Bearing that in mind, any fair electronic open source voting system should absolutely NOT prevent people from verifying their own votes. The person running the ballot box software is inherently less trustworthy than the person casting the vote. Let the police deal with vote buyers. They can set up stings and catch them easily. The voting system should be primarily protected against the people who are running it.

xorcist 12y ago
> Vote buying is a MUCH lesser problem than fraud by those running the ballot box. If it is, it's either because 1) you don't know it's there, or 2) there are easier ways to cheat the system. Please take note that buying votes does not need to be large scale to put the legitimacy of the outcome in question. It is enough if, for example, it is possible for abusive patriarchs to vote for family members. > Furthermore, it is impossible to create a system that simultaneously lets you prove that your own vote was counted correctly AND prevents vote buying Impossible is a strong word to use. There are several interesting theoretical systems proposed that make this possible. But are they practical? > Let the police deal with vote buyers. They can set up stings and catch them easily. You don't seem to understand why vote secrecy is desirable. It is not (primarily) to protect against criminal gangs, but serves to make voting legitimate in the democratic system. Part of that is to make sure no one can prove how they voted for their bosses, husbands etc. > The voting system should be primarily protected against the people who are running it. Not traditionally. That is normally achieved through transparency. When anyone and everyone can participate on equal means in the voting process, and that process is transparent to everyone involved, that is enough to guarantee legitimacy.
- ddingus 12y ago
  "impossible" refers to this: When a voter marks a ballot, there is an unbroken chain of trust between their intent and the record of their intent used for the tally. When a voter uses a machine, the machine records something it thinks is the voter intent. The voter must trust the machine as they are not capable of seeing the actual record. Further, the actual record of their intent is never captured, just an interpretation of it. Additionally, this record is copied, not used directly.
- crdoconnor 12y ago
  >If it is, it's either because 1) you don't know it's there, or 2) there are easier ways to cheat the system. No, it is difficult because it doesn't scale. After a certain (relatively low) point it becomes prohibitively expensive and your likelihood of being caught approaches near-certainty. This (along with enforcement) is why it is rare. >Please take note that buying votes does not need to be large scale to put the legitimacy of the outcome in question. Please also note that you do not have to be able to verify the outcome to be able to successfully offer a bribe and get a vote in return. It simply makes it somewhat easier. Policing and enforcement of the law is the answer to this problem - not clever cryptography. That should be used to prove that the people running the voting machines didn't corrupt them. >Impossible is a strong word to use. There are several interesting theoretical systems proposed that make this possible. Impossible because it essentially implies a trustless system. Clever cryptographic techniques only go so far and they do not let you run a system where nobody can be trusted. >You don't seem to understand why vote secrecy is desirable. I understand why it is desirable, but I also understand that every system must face a trade off between placing trust in the administrators of the voting system and the voters themselves. >It is not (primarily) to protect against criminal gangs, but serves to make voting legitimate in the democratic system. Part of that is to make sure no one can prove how they voted for their bosses, husbands etc. If they can't do this then they cannot truly know whether their vote was counted at all. Maybe it was lost, ignored or counted towards the opposition. >Not traditionally. What the fuck does tradition have to do with it? This is about security.
  - xorcist 12y ago