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I was involved with nuclear warheads in the USAF, and the Two-Man Policy was never compromised. We took it seriously and the penalties were severe. But that w
by CapitalistCartr 12y ago
I was involved with nuclear warheads in the USAF, and the Two-Man Policy was never compromised. We took it seriously and the penalties were severe. But that was the Cold War; things may have changed since. Much of it was built into the system. It took two keys to open anything, and the whole shop was divided into A locks and B locks. You were one or the other, never both. There was no practical way to open anything alone, including the maintenance bays.
- chiph 12y agoCold-war vet here too. My supervisor was on a two-man team, charged with moving COMSEC material. He and the other NCO took this very seriously, each of them keeping a hand on the sealed container. They'd get someone from base motorpool to drive them around in a van, since the leadership didn't want either of the couriers to be the driver (one of them would have had to let go of the container, and would have been out of sight of the other as they went around to the driver's seat), and the leadership didn't want anyone who had regular contact with either of them to be the driver either (I couldn't have done it, for example). When I read about what's been happening with the missile crews and the B-52 aircrew not knowing they had a white one on board (and then leaving it parked unguarded overnight) -- that's really concerning. In the days of SAC, there would have been a new commanding officer in place by the end of the day. The current command system for controlling the weapons is too fragmented, and it seems to be regarded as "business as usual". Complacency is not something you want around these things.