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Nobody is talking about the key issue: In the US they have been intentionally consolidating ATCs[0] for the last thirty years as a cost saving measure, and ther
by Someone1234 12y ago
Nobody is talking about the key issue: In the US they have been intentionally consolidating ATCs[0] for the last thirty years as a cost saving measure, and there is more consolidation yet to come.
I linked an article at [0] titled "House Subcommittee Challenges ATC Consolidation Efforts" and you're likely assuming that the House is trying to block consolidation, but the truth is exactly the opposite: in 2012 the FAA were trying to stop/slow the consolidation and the House were pushing it through, the "challenge" is that the FAA wasn't going fast enough!
Yet the mainstream media aren't discussing this at all...
It is very easy to blame a single disgruntled employee for all the disruption but consider how many other things could cause a single ATC location to go black (e.g. bombing, aircrash, natural distaster, accidental fire, extreme power surge, etc).
Yet the consolidations will no doubt continue, and instead of them looking at the root cause of this issue (that too much sky is controlled from a single location) they will blame the employee and move on like nothing happened.
This incident was far more serious than the recent White House break-in, but yet heads are rolling for the White House thing while absolutely nothing is being asked about this one!
[0]http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ainsafety/2012-06-04/house-subcommittee-challenges-atc-consolidation-efforts http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ainsafety/2012-06-04/...
- opendais 12y agoPretty much. A single PoP failure should not shatter the entire system.
- Estragon 12y agoWhat's PoP?
- abstractbill 12y agohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Point_of_presence http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Point_of_presence
- cowpewter 12y agoPoint of Presence, I believe.
- toomuchtodo 12y agoAir traffic control in the US should continue to be consolidated, but with the ability to control the entire US airspace from any one control center. Redundant fiber, servers, RF gear, all that jazz (ADS-B/NextGen is going to make this much easier, as well as Iridium now deploying ADS-B receivers on their new satellites deployed). Disclaimer: Private pilot, have sat with several controllers for ~4 hours at ZAU during an open house while they moved traffic.
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- anigbrowl 12y agothe ability to control the entire US airspace from any one control center Hmm, if things are so bad that multiple regional centers are offline then it might be time to ground everything temporarily - I suppose this is what you're driving at, but I also imagine an unlikely-but-possible scenario where someone subverts an ATC, locks everyone else out, and then wreaks havoc.
- ISL 12y agoAgreed. The amazing thing about this outage is that there's not a failover to accommodate a complete loss of at least one major ATC office. Time to bring in the Chaos Monkey.
- Shivetya 12y agohonestly as tech progresses why should this not be expected or desired? automation will move into this industry in time and one would expect human intervention may only come for emergencies and handling small craft landing at smaller airfields.
- dietrichepp 12y agoIt's not about technology, it's about redundancy. If you have two data centers, and you consolidate them into one data center, you've just increased your exposure to risk by orders of magnitude.
- lotu 12y agoThis depends on what type of failover you have though. If you 1000 small data centers and you consolidate into 100 larger data centers this doesn't mean an order of magnitude increase in risk. As long as any data center can take over for any other data center you probably don't need more than a handful of data centers for redundancy (you might want them for other reasons though).
- bcohen5055 12y agoWhat you described is not redundancy. In your situation if 1 of the 2 data centers went down you would still have a blackout somewhere. In a truly redundant setup the load would be shifted to the redundant center with minimal interruption to the customer (airspace).
- anigbrowl 12y agoInteresting points. This is the source for the quotes in the article you linked to: http://archives.republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/112th/Aviation/Aviaton%20Briefing%20Memo%20%20%205-31-12.pdf http://archives.republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/f... I get the impression that this issue is particularly controversial in the US, going back to the air-traffic controllers strike of 1981, which was a political watershed for the Reagan administration: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Professional_Air_Traffic_Controllers_Organization_(1968)#August_1981_strike http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Professional_Air_Traffic_Contro... Relevant here is a recent Economist article on the decentralized approach that is slowly being adopted in European airspace: http://www.economist.com/news/technology-quarterly/21615069-more-aircraft-take-sky-new-technology-will-allow-pilots-pick-their-own http://www.economist.com/news/technology-quarterly/21615069-...
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- madaxe_again 12y agoNo no, the key issue here is Howard's ant-american sentiment, going by the article. If there weren't so many people who hated freedom it wouldn't be necessary to build systems to not have a single point of failure. Something about how failing autocratic nations don't invest in critical infrastructure, and every mishap is blamed on a "spy" or a "traitor".
- knd775 12y agoReally? I am not going to comment on the first sentence, but how I am going to say that it is pretty hard not to blame this on Howard. While it should have been much harder for one person to do all of this, it certainly is still his fault.