Exactly... Tor nodes that don't just let anything through, but do let "safe" (to some agreed definition) web traffic through. Then a client could say "only exit

Exactly... Tor nodes that don't just let anything through, but do let "safe" (to some agreed definition) web traffic through. Then a client could say "only exit via safe nodes" and you'd have this much better chance that the exit hadn't been used for the nefarious purposes that were likely to have resulted in an IP being blocked or challenged. I get what you said in the earlier comment, but it sounds like CF would run a node and people would need to connect to it. I'm not sure of the implementation details, but either that's only a single hop through Tor (thus reducing the privacy/anonymity), or you're still making a single entry/exit point be the focus of all traffic from a given user (reducing privacy/anonymity by creating a single target for state attacks - likely court order based). There's got to be a way to keep the multi-hop high-privacy and high-anonymity for those who need it, without having those users treated the same as those using Tor to hide various attacks (spam, the kind of attacks the CF WAF mitigates the risk of, etc). I think this idea of Tor nodes that are trusted to have implemented various policies, and that only exit traffic that has filtered out attacks (and obvious spam), kinda works. By protecting the IP reputation of the exit node, we get a Tor that isn't being penalised and affecting the end user experience and that doesn't reduce the privacy/anonymity stuff that is important.