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I'm surprised this Keyless SSL thing hasn't taken more flack here on HN... To me it seems the only advantage is in the time dimension: Keyless SSL allows for q

I'm surprised this Keyless SSL thing hasn't taken more flack here on HN... To me it seems the only advantage is in the time dimension: Keyless SSL allows for quicker/easier revocation than plain SSL. But to say that Keyless SSL allows SSL termination in insecure locations, that's clearly controversial. An attacker can still access plain text in these insecure locations of course, but also (in my mind more importantly): persistent access to the "Keyless SSL Key Server" gives an attacker the same benefits as access to SSL private key, e.g. the ability to MITM SSL communication anywhere else on the Internet. It can of course be argued that it's more difficult inject malicious requests to the key server than it is to steal a private key, but it's in the domain of "security by obscurity". At least that's how I classify it.

praseodym 12y ago
It has: - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8339705 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8339705 top comment - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8334933 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8334933 further down
rdl 12y ago
Converting the SSL key from a file to a separate oracle is exactly how HSMs work, and they were existing best practice in securing keys. Keyless works the same way, just remotely, and using commodity stuff (although the local key at the user's site can live in an EKCM system, in an HSM, or otherwise be protected.) As you say, it's a big deal for revocation. It's ALSO a big deal for auditing -- you know every time a session was initially negotiated, vs. if you give someone else the key -- you have no idea how many sessions were set up. It's also just a policy/compliance thing -- not needing to go through the process to be approved to store keys from organizations makes our sales process a lot faster. There are some fairly obvious extensions to the security model which are in the works as well. The reason why I think it's obvious there are security advantages to keyless is that we're using it internally. For us, consolidating our keys in a smaller number of secure locations is totally worth it.
- xorcist 12y ago
  > Keyless works the same way, just remotely, Again, you can attach to a remote HSM. It's called a network attached HSM. They're not even uncommon. A smart card is an HSM. An HSM is not necessarily a smart card.

praseodym 12y ago

It has: - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8339705 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8339705 top comment - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8334933 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8334933 further down

rdl 12y ago

Converting the SSL key from a file to a separate oracle is exactly how HSMs work, and they were existing best practice in securing keys. Keyless works the same way, just remotely, and using commodity stuff (although the local key at the user's site can live in an EKCM system, in an HSM, or otherwise be protected.) As you say, it's a big deal for revocation. It's ALSO a big deal for auditing -- you know every time a session was initially negotiated, vs. if you give someone else the key -- you have no idea how many sessions were set up. It's also just a policy/compliance thing -- not needing to go through the process to be approved to store keys from organizations makes our sales process a lot faster. There are some fairly obvious extensions to the security model which are in the works as well. The reason why I think it's obvious there are security advantages to keyless is that we're using it internally. For us, consolidating our keys in a smaller number of secure locations is totally worth it.

xorcist 12y ago
> Keyless works the same way, just remotely, Again, you can attach to a remote HSM. It's called a network attached HSM. They're not even uncommon. A smart card is an HSM. An HSM is not necessarily a smart card.