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This of course assumes that bash is set as the default shell for those users all those programs run under. None of my systems have bash installed, thus they are
by X-Istence 12y ago
This of course assumes that bash is set as the default shell for those users all those programs run under. None of my systems have bash installed, thus they aren't vulnerable. FreeBSD by default does not ship with bash, and unless it is specifically installed for 3rd party software use, it is not required for anything, and certainly won't be found as /bin/sh...
Shell shock is being blown out of proportion, people are worried local machines they use to browse internet are going to get popped when in reality it is only really Linux machines that have bash as the default shell that should be worried.
- sophacles 12y agoAll those osx machines have bash as /bin/sh by default too. It's unclear how often shellouts happen within OSX for various operations.
- nitrogen 12y agoAny program that calls a library that calls a program that executes a script with #!/bin/bash could be vulnerable, client or server. There are many ways data can get into an environment variable. For example, a hypothetical encryption library might be a wrapper around /usr/bin/gpg or /usr/bin/openssl, and to avoid having arguments show up in ps or top, it might pass arguments as environment variables. Later a secure e-mail program might use that library to validate a signature from an e-mail, and pass signature data in an environment variable. So that's MacOSX and Fedora owned with /bin/bash as /bin/sh. Say the encryption library used a script written in Bash to do some other processing. That's BSD owned.
- X-Istence 12y agoExcept that bash is not installed by default... if bash is not installed how does BSD suddenly become vulnerable?
- nitrogen 12y agoIt would have been installed as a dependency of whatever used it in some obscure way.
- nitrogen 12y agoOkay, since someone actually downvoted both of my comments, I'll point out that libgpgme is a common encryption library that calls /usr/bin/gpg. Fortunately it uses execv(), but that leaves the environment unchanged so if anything further down the chain uses Bash it's still vulnerable. I'll also provide a list of files from /usr/bin that are actually implemented using Bash (from a Linux Mint system). Anything using these with user-controlled environment variable values is vulnerable: $ grep -nR '#!.*bash' * | grep :1: apg:1:#!/bin/bash aptitude-create-state-bundle:1:#!/bin/bash aptitude-run-state-bundle:1:#!/bin/bash banshee:1:#!/usr/bin/env bash cautious-launcher:1:#!/bin/bash checkinstall:1:#!/bin/bash cinnamon2d:1:#!/bin/bash dns-fix:1:#!/bin/bash editdiff:1:#!/bin/bash fakenect:1:#!/bin/bash fakeroot:1:#!/bin/bash fakeroot-sysv:1:#!/bin/bash fakeroot-tcp:1:#!/bin/bash gnome-www-browser:1:#!/bin/bash google-chrome:1:#!/bin/bash google-chrome-stable:1:#!/bin/bash gufw-pkexec:1:#!/bin/bash im-config:1:#!/bin/bash -e init-checkconf:1:#!/bin/bash installwatch:1:#!/bin/bash inxi:1:#!/bin/bash itweb-settings:1:#!/bin/bash javaws:1:#!/bin/bash lcf:1:#!/bin/bash ldd:1:#! /bin/bash libtool:1:#! /bin/bash lua2dox_filter:1:#!/bin/bash lzcmp:1:#!/bin/bash lzdiff:1:#!/bin/bash lzegrep:1:#!/bin/bash lzfgrep:1:#!/bin/bash lzgrep:1:#!/bin/bash lzless:1:#!/bin/bash lzmore:1:#!/bin/bash mate-help:1:#!/bin/bash mintBackup:1:#!/bin/bash mint-fortune:1:#!/bin/bash mintupload:1:#!/bin/bash mintupload-manager:1:#!/bin/bash muinshee:1:#!/usr/bin/env bash mysqld_safe:1:#!/bin/bash p7zip:1:#!/bin/bash pipelight-plugin:1:#!/usr/bin/env bash pnmindex:1:#!/bin/bash policyeditor:1:#!/bin/bash ppmquantall:1:#!/bin/bash rarian-sk-config:1:#!/bin/bash rarian-sk-extract:1:#!/bin/bash rarian-sk-rebuild:1:#!/bin/bash rarian-sk-update:1:#!/bin/bash scrollkeeper-config:1:#!/bin/bash scrollkeeper-extract:1:#!/bin/bash scrollkeeper-rebuilddb:1:#!/bin/bash scrollkeeper-update:1:#!/bin/bash sotruss:1:#! /bin/bash steam:1:#!/usr/bin/env bash su-to-root:1:#!/bin/bash tomboy:1:#!/usr/bin/env bash tzselect:1:#!/bin/bash ucf:1:#!/bin/bash ucfr:1:#! /bin/bash usb-devices:1:#!/bin/bash X11/scrollkeeper-config:1:#!/bin/bash X11/fakenect:1:#!/bin/bash X11/lzgrep:1:#!/bin/bash X11/cautious-launcher:1:#!/bin/bash X11/xzdiff:1:#!/bin/bash X11/aptitude-create-state-bundle:1:#!/bin/bash X11/mint-fortune:1:#!/bin/bash X11/mate-help:1:#!/bin/bash X11/scrollkeeper-extract:1:#!/bin/bash X11/fakeroot:1:#!/bin/bash X11/editdiff:1:#!/bin/bash X11/lzdiff:1:#!/bin/bash X11/apg:1:#!/bin/bash X11/mintupload-manager:1:#!/bin/bash X11/gnome-www-browser:1:#!/bin/bash X11/ucfr:1:#! /bin/bash X11/lzcmp:1:#!/bin/bash X11/libtool:1:#! /bin/bash X11/im-config:1:#!/bin/bash -e X11/xzmore:1:#!/bin/bash X11/mintupload:1:#!/bin/bash X11/xzegrep:1:#!/bin/bash X11/javaws:1:#!/bin/bash X11/xchat-systray:1:#!/bin/bash X11/itweb-settings:1:#!/bin/bash X11/dns-fix:1:#!/bin/bash X11/su-to-root:1:#!/bin/bash X11/checkinstall:1:#!/bin/bash X11/usb-devices:1:#!/bin/bash X11/rarian-sk-extract:1:#!/bin/bash X11/tzselect:1:#!/bin/bash X11/google-chrome-stable:1:#!/bin/bash X11/xzcmp:1:#!/bin/bash X11/xzgrep:1:#!/bin/bash X11/pipelight-plugin:1:#!/usr/bin/env bash X11/lcf:1:#!/bin/bash X11/scrollkeeper-rebuilddb:1:#!/bin/bash X11/banshee:1:#!/usr/bin/env bash X11/cinnamon2d:1:#!/bin/bash X11/xzfgrep:1:#!/bin/bash X11/muinshee:1:#!/usr/bin/env bash X11/lzfgrep:1:#!/bin/bash X11/mintBackup:1:#!/bin/bash X11/tomboy:1:#!/usr/bin/env bash X11/fakeroot-sysv:1:#!/bin/bash X11/aptitude-run-state-bundle:1:#!/bin/bash X11/gufw-pkexec:1:#!/bin/bash X11/init-checkconf:1:#!/bin/bash X11/x-www-browser:1:#!/bin/bash X11/lzegrep:1:#!/bin/bash X11/rarian-sk-update:1:#!/bin/bash X11/sotruss:1:#! /bin/bash X11/ldd:1:#! /bin/bash X11/ppmquantall:1:#!/bin/bash X11/rarian-sk-rebuild:1:#!/bin/bash X11/xzless:1:#!/bin/bash X11/rarian-sk-config:1:#!/bin/bash X11/p7zip:1:#!/bin/bash X11/google-chrome:1:#!/bin/bash X11/lzmore:1:#!/bin/bash X11/fakeroot-tcp:1:#!/bin/bash X11/mysqld_safe:1:#!/bin/bash X11/ucf:1:#!/bin/bash X11/policyeditor:1:#!/bin/bash X11/lzless:1:#!/bin/bash X11/lua2dox_filter:1:#!/bin/bash X11/installwatch:1:#!/bin/bash X11/inxi:1:#!/bin/bash X11/scrollkeeper-update:1:#!/bin/bash X11/steam:1:#!/usr/bin/env bash X11/pnmindex:1:#!/bin/bash xchat-systray:1:#!/bin/bash x-www-browser:1:#!/bin/bash xzcmp:1:#!/bin/bash xzdiff:1:#!/bin/bash xzegrep:1:#!/bin/bash xzfgrep:1:#!/bin/bash xzgrep:1:#!/bin/bash xzless:1:#!/bin/bash xzmore:1:#!/bin/bash
- jameshart 12y agoThis is as helpful as a windows admin saying 'this whole thing seems to be blown out of proportion, none of my servers are vulnerable'.