3 ms·

The was a WaPo article[0] posted on HN a while back: >If I understand how it works, the only time the new design matters is when the government has a search wa

by Rylinks 12y ago

The was a WaPo article[0] posted on HN a while back: >If I understand how it works, the only time the new design matters is when the government has a search warrant, signed by a judge, based on a finding of probable cause. Under the old operating system, Apple could execute a lawful warrant and give law enforcement the data on the phone. Under the new operating system, that warrant is a nullity. It’s just a nice piece of paper with a judge’s signature. Because Apple demands a warrant to decrypt a phone when it is capable of doing so, the only time Apple’s inability to do that makes a difference is when the government has a valid warrant. The policy switch doesn’t stop hackers, trespassers, or rogue agents. It only stops lawful investigations with lawful warrants. 0:http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/09/19/apples-dangerous-game/ http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014...

dragonwriter 12y ago
> Under the old operating system, Apple could execute a lawful warrant and give law enforcement the data on the phone. [...] The policy switch doesn’t stop hackers, trespassers, or rogue agents. It only stops lawful investigations with lawful warrants. Incorrect: under the old operating system a human at Apple could give anyone the data on the phone. Apple had procedural safeguards that aimed to ensure that no one at Apple would do that without proper approval, but as anyone who pays attention to the news should be aware, procedural safeguards of data do not always prevent humans who are motivated to violate those safeguards. (Including, inter alia, "hackers, trespassers, and rogue agents" -- as certainly the US government is aware; its hardly as if the NSA didn't have procedural safeguards that applied to the data that Edward Snowden released.) The change (which is a technical change, not a policy change) means no human at Apple can do this, and the phone user is protected from humans who might violate Apple's policies, including "hackers, trespassers, and rogue agents." It incidentally means that any warrant for data on the phone will have to be served on the only person who has access to that data, the phone owner. It doesn't "stop lawful investigations with lawful warrants", it reduces the number of people who can access a phone, and therefore the set of people on whom a lawful warrant can be served. But law enforcement has no inherent right to expect that some third party will have access to my private property (whether physical or virtual) that enables law enforcement to serve a warrant on a third person, and that third person having access is always a compromise of my security that makes me more vulnerable to rogue actors. It is not simply a convenience for "lawful investigations with lawful warrants" that provides no risk to me outside of such investigations.
- ChrisAntaki 12y ago
  > and that third person having access is always a compromise of my security that makes me more vulnerable to rogue actors. You distill it well, a broken security solution is not a good security solution. Foreign intelligence services, "hackers", etc... they all want our trade secrets. We need real security systems to defend against them.

by Rylinks 12y ago

dragonwriter 12y ago

> Under the old operating system, Apple could execute a lawful warrant and give law enforcement the data on the phone. [...] The policy switch doesn’t stop hackers, trespassers, or rogue agents. It only stops lawful investigations with lawful warrants. Incorrect: under the old operating system a human at Apple could give anyone the data on the phone. Apple had procedural safeguards that aimed to ensure that no one at Apple would do that without proper approval, but as anyone who pays attention to the news should be aware, procedural safeguards of data do not always prevent humans who are motivated to violate those safeguards. (Including, inter alia, "hackers, trespassers, and rogue agents" -- as certainly the US government is aware; its hardly as if the NSA didn't have procedural safeguards that applied to the data that Edward Snowden released.) The change (which is a technical change, not a policy change) means no human at Apple can do this, and the phone user is protected from humans who might violate Apple's policies, including "hackers, trespassers, and rogue agents." It incidentally means that any warrant for data on the phone will have to be served on the only person who has access to that data, the phone owner. It doesn't "stop lawful investigations with lawful warrants", it reduces the number of people who can access a phone, and therefore the set of people on whom a lawful warrant can be served. But law enforcement has no inherent right to expect that some third party will have access to my private property (whether physical or virtual) that enables law enforcement to serve a warrant on a third person, and that third person having access is always a compromise of my security that makes me more vulnerable to rogue actors. It is not simply a convenience for "lawful investigations with lawful warrants" that provides no risk to me outside of such investigations.

ChrisAntaki 12y ago
> and that third person having access is always a compromise of my security that makes me more vulnerable to rogue actors. You distill it well, a broken security solution is not a good security solution. Foreign intelligence services, "hackers", etc... they all want our trade secrets. We need real security systems to defend against them.