4 ms·

Hey FBI, if you want the data on the phone get a Warrant that requires the person who owns the phone to unlock it for you - or go to jail for not complying. You

by kenrikm 12y ago

Hey FBI, if you want the data on the phone get a Warrant that requires the person who owns the phone to unlock it for you - or go to jail for not complying. You don't go to a next-door neighbor who has the key to a house and serve him the Warrant to get into your their neighbors house. Don't go to Apple or Google and make them unlock the phone. 4th Amendment, unlawful search and seizure and all that jazz.

Rylinks 12y ago
Previously apple would only provide data in response to a warrant. Now they don't provide data at all.
- ChrisAntaki 12y ago
  Where did you read that, out of curiosity?
  - Rylinks 12y ago
    The was a WaPo article[0] posted on HN a while back: >If I understand how it works, the only time the new design matters is when the government has a search warrant, signed by a judge, based on a finding of probable cause. Under the old operating system, Apple could execute a lawful warrant and give law enforcement the data on the phone. Under the new operating system, that warrant is a nullity. It’s just a nice piece of paper with a judge’s signature. Because Apple demands a warrant to decrypt a phone when it is capable of doing so, the only time Apple’s inability to do that makes a difference is when the government has a valid warrant. The policy switch doesn’t stop hackers, trespassers, or rogue agents. It only stops lawful investigations with lawful warrants. 0:http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/09/19/apples-dangerous-game/ http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014...
    - dragonwriter 12y ago
      > Under the old operating system, Apple could execute a lawful warrant and give law enforcement the data on the phone. [...] The policy switch doesn’t stop hackers, trespassers, or rogue agents. It only stops lawful investigations with lawful warrants. Incorrect: under the old operating system a human at Apple could give anyone the data on the phone. Apple had procedural safeguards that aimed to ensure that no one at Apple would do that without proper approval, but as anyone who pays attention to the news should be aware, procedural safeguards of data do not always prevent humans who are motivated to violate those safeguards. (Including, inter alia, "hackers, trespassers, and rogue agents" -- as certainly the US government is aware; its hardly as if the NSA didn't have procedural safeguards that applied to the data that Edward Snowden released.) The change (which is a technical change, not a policy change) means no human at Apple can do this, and the phone user is protected from humans who might violate Apple's policies, including "hackers, trespassers, and rogue agents." It incidentally means that any warrant for data on the phone will have to be served on the only person who has access to that data, the phone owner. It doesn't "stop lawful investigations with lawful warrants", it reduces the number of people who can access a phone, and therefore the set of people on whom a lawful warrant can be served. But law enforcement has no inherent right to expect that some third party will have access to my private property (whether physical or virtual) that enables law enforcement to serve a warrant on a third person, and that third person having access is always a compromise of my security that makes me more vulnerable to rogue actors. It is not simply a convenience for "lawful investigations with lawful warrants" that provides no risk to me outside of such investigations.
      - ChrisAntaki 12y ago
        > and that third person having access is always a compromise of my security that makes me more vulnerable to rogue actors. You distill it well, a broken security solution is not a good security solution. Foreign intelligence services, "hackers", etc... they all want our trade secrets. We need real security systems to defend against them.
- Tloewald 12y ago
  I believe Apple has implemented things so that they cannot divulge the necessary data. Having it and withholding it would be contempt of court, which has unlimited penalties.
neltnerb 12y ago
Unless they know that the owner has the password, and can recall it, this potentially infringes on the 5th amendment. This has been tested repeatedly in court, although not always with the same result.
- joshvm 12y ago
  Forced key disclosure is legal in the UK, with up to 2 years (5 if terrorism is involved) in prison if you fail to comply. In the US it's more iffy and you'd be trying your luck with the judge.
  - toomuchtodo 12y ago
    Not sure if you can do this with Location Services on iOS, but I'd pay for an app that destroys my private key on the device if it detects I've been within X feet of a police station for longer than X minutes. You can then have my passphrase. It's no longer any use.
anigbrowl 12y ago
FTA: The irony, some say, is that while the legal and technical changes are fueled by anger over reports of mass surveillance by the National Security Agency, the consequences are being felt most heavily by police detectives, often armed with warrants certifying that a judge has found probable cause that a search of a smartphone will reveal evidence of a crime.

by kenrikm 12y ago

Rylinks 12y ago

Previously apple would only provide data in response to a warrant. Now they don't provide data at all.

ChrisAntaki 12y ago
Where did you read that, out of curiosity?
- Rylinks 12y ago
  The was a WaPo article[0] posted on HN a while back: >If I understand how it works, the only time the new design matters is when the government has a search warrant, signed by a judge, based on a finding of probable cause. Under the old operating system, Apple could execute a lawful warrant and give law enforcement the data on the phone. Under the new operating system, that warrant is a nullity. It’s just a nice piece of paper with a judge’s signature. Because Apple demands a warrant to decrypt a phone when it is capable of doing so, the only time Apple’s inability to do that makes a difference is when the government has a valid warrant. The policy switch doesn’t stop hackers, trespassers, or rogue agents. It only stops lawful investigations with lawful warrants. 0:http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/09/19/apples-dangerous-game/ http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014...
  - dragonwriter 12y ago
    > Under the old operating system, Apple could execute a lawful warrant and give law enforcement the data on the phone. [...] The policy switch doesn’t stop hackers, trespassers, or rogue agents. It only stops lawful investigations with lawful warrants. Incorrect: under the old operating system a human at Apple could give anyone the data on the phone. Apple had procedural safeguards that aimed to ensure that no one at Apple would do that without proper approval, but as anyone who pays attention to the news should be aware, procedural safeguards of data do not always prevent humans who are motivated to violate those safeguards. (Including, inter alia, "hackers, trespassers, and rogue agents" -- as certainly the US government is aware; its hardly as if the NSA didn't have procedural safeguards that applied to the data that Edward Snowden released.) The change (which is a technical change, not a policy change) means no human at Apple can do this, and the phone user is protected from humans who might violate Apple's policies, including "hackers, trespassers, and rogue agents." It incidentally means that any warrant for data on the phone will have to be served on the only person who has access to that data, the phone owner. It doesn't "stop lawful investigations with lawful warrants", it reduces the number of people who can access a phone, and therefore the set of people on whom a lawful warrant can be served. But law enforcement has no inherent right to expect that some third party will have access to my private property (whether physical or virtual) that enables law enforcement to serve a warrant on a third person, and that third person having access is always a compromise of my security that makes me more vulnerable to rogue actors. It is not simply a convenience for "lawful investigations with lawful warrants" that provides no risk to me outside of such investigations.
    - ChrisAntaki 12y ago
      > and that third person having access is always a compromise of my security that makes me more vulnerable to rogue actors. You distill it well, a broken security solution is not a good security solution. Foreign intelligence services, "hackers", etc... they all want our trade secrets. We need real security systems to defend against them.
Tloewald 12y ago
I believe Apple has implemented things so that they cannot divulge the necessary data. Having it and withholding it would be contempt of court, which has unlimited penalties.

neltnerb 12y ago

Unless they know that the owner has the password, and can recall it, this potentially infringes on the 5th amendment. This has been tested repeatedly in court, although not always with the same result.

joshvm 12y ago
Forced key disclosure is legal in the UK, with up to 2 years (5 if terrorism is involved) in prison if you fail to comply. In the US it's more iffy and you'd be trying your luck with the judge.
- toomuchtodo 12y ago
  Not sure if you can do this with Location Services on iOS, but I'd pay for an app that destroys my private key on the device if it detects I've been within X feet of a police station for longer than X minutes. You can then have my passphrase. It's no longer any use.

anigbrowl 12y ago

FTA: The irony, some say, is that while the legal and technical changes are fueled by anger over reports of mass surveillance by the National Security Agency, the consequences are being felt most heavily by police detectives, often armed with warrants certifying that a judge has found probable cause that a search of a smartphone will reveal evidence of a crime.