3 ms·

Thanks for responding. I get the sense that you have some expertise in this field? As I said above, I don't, so if you do please forgive any ignorance on my par

Thanks for responding. I get the sense that you have some expertise in this field? As I said above, I don't, so if you do please forgive any ignorance on my part: > CAs make >$30-40 per certificate and validation takes max 30 minutes spread out over a day or two (typically). $30-40 isn't much, and 30 minutes doesn't seem nearly sufficient to reliably verify someone's identity. > I will say there are very few maliciously issued EV certificates. How do we know? And is there a lower fraud rate for EV certs than for standard certs? (Probably there is little fraud in any set of business transactions -- otherwise nobody would participate -- but I don't think that's what you mean.)

iancarroll 12y ago
Sorry for the late reply: > 30 minutes doesn't seem nearly sufficient to reliably verify someone's identity. It's actually not that long of a process once you read over the CPS's of a few CAs and the EV baseline. > How do we know? Ah, the golden question! Hopefully CT (certificate transparency) will sort this out within the next 3 years. My statement is an assumption but any high level fraud (e.g. Google/MSFT) is caught immediately (chrome pinning/reporting and internal CA logs, if you're not DigiNotar). I don't know about small companies though. I don't think there's ever been a maliciously issued EV cert in the context of the ComodoHacker and other very public hacks. They typically have tighter internal controls, that I know (e.g. RAs have very limited EV issuance power) but I have no numbers. :( You should note that EV implies DV validation, so to, without hacking, maliciously issue a certificate an attacker would probably settle for a DV cert.