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Orin Kerr is definitely a lawyer, and has been working and writing on digital crime and civil rights for years. For example, he was part of the defense team dur
by snowwrestler 12y ago
Orin Kerr is definitely a lawyer, and has been working and writing on digital crime and civil rights for years. For example, he was part of the defense team during weev's appeal of his conviction.
I do think he thinks beyond the technicalities of the law. And I think he's correct that there are legitimate reasons to pierce device encryption. If a victim is murdered, and their phone is locked, it sure would be nice too see if there were some evidence on that phone that could help catch the killer.
That said, he knows better than most what the law does say, and I think that makes this an op-ed worth reading carefully. I found two of his points interesting.
1) A passcode is probably not covered by Fifth Amendment protections. Thus a phone owner who refuses to lock their phone could be punished by the court anyway.
2) An encryption system strong enough to thwart legitimate and legal police actions could lead to a legislative "backlash" (my word, not Orin's) of increased consequences for failure to unlock. This is the "game" in the title of the op-ed. Technology and law are often in tension and an escalation from one side could trigger an escalation from the other.
But I disagreed with his state that "The policy switch doesn’t stop hackers, trespassers, or rogue agents. It only stops lawful investigations with lawful warrants." That seems wrong to me because it's not just a policy change, it's an improvement in how the OS encryption actually works. Seems to me that could help keep out some bad guys too.
- RickHull 12y agoI completely agree with your assessment of Kerr, and there is nothing wrong with purely legal analysis. What got to me initially was the deliberate limiting of legal scope to warranted privacy violations, as though warrantless privacy violations are insignificant. He's welcome to do so, but he should be clearer about this and less rhetorically dedicated to his agenda. EDIT: I see now that he reasons this technology only affects warranted privacy violations, since Apple has a policy of refusing unwarranted inquiries. He is overlooking the possibility that Apple may nonetheless be pressured, deceived, or compelled to violate users' privacy. He doesn't realize that Apple's claim of being invulnerable to warrants also protects the user from Apple's own vulnerabilities. It's not just USA law enforcement that targets users by exploiting Apple's access to protected data. My understanding is that warrantless privacy violations have grown tremendously since the Patriot Act, both in scope and quantity -- that we have many new laws or codes since then which reclassify previously warrantful privacy violations as now warrantless. He asks "How is the public interest served by a policy that only thwarts lawful search warrants?" This is a nasty rhetorical trick. Does Apple's policy change serve any other purpose than to thwart lawful search warrants? Kerr puts "no" in your head, but of course the answer is yes. He then makes appeal to the "civil libertarian tradition" of protection from warrants, saying that Apple is thumbing its nose at "that great tradition". What a joke. Apple is selling a product with powerful capabilities, some of which can be used to break the law, all of which have legitimate lawful purposes. Are Ford, Boeing, Delta, Budweiser, Louisville Slugger, Smith & Wesson all playing dangerous games as well? Lastly, this is about removing Apple's ability to unlock. Just like Colin Percival's tarsnap. Doing proper security via proper cryptography. Minimizing untrusted third parties. Apple is getting criticized by Kerr for doing the right thing for its users. There are no victims in this action. It should matter not a whit that this makes the government work harder to violate privacy. Apple has no general duty to offer permanent taps for the government's pleasure. This is why focusing only on warrantful privacy violations is a travesty of justice. Please watch this before re-reading Kerr: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eT2fQu50sMs https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eT2fQu50sMs
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- glenra 12y agoRight. The claim "The policy switch doesn’t stop hackers, trespassers, or rogue agents. It only stops lawful investigations with lawful warrants." is invalid because "hackers, trespassers, or rogue agents" might either get warrants or plausibly claim to have warrants. Indeed, the chief problem Apple is trying to address is that everybody suspects the NSA has been engaging in massive secret fishing expeditions. Warrants are too easy to obtain. Law officers might easily BE the bad guy or WORKING FOR a bad guy, in which case denying them access provides a social good. In the current context (the era of "parallel construction" and gag orders), the fact that a judge rubber-stamped a warrant does not provide much evidence that social good is met by serving that warrant. If cops have to work a little harder to get their job done, on balance that's probably a good thing.
- joesmo 12y ago> 1) A passcode is probably not covered by Fifth Amendment protections. Thus a phone owner who refuses to lock their phone could be punished by the court anyway. No, Kerr either doesn't know the case law or is completely ignoring a huge chunk of it to make his point. I prefer the latter, but regardless, his point about the 5th Amendment is completely wrong as this is far from a settled issue and other courts have ruled differently: http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/federal-appeals-court-fifth-amendment-protects-suspect-from-having-to-decrypt-hard-drive/ http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/federal-appeals-court-fifth...