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Because DDoS protection isn't just something you do at the network layer. It's important to be able to apply filtering at the "application" level.
by jgrahamc 12y ago
Because DDoS protection isn't just something you do at the network layer. It's important to be able to apply filtering at the "application" level.
- vader1 12y agoI understand that there are many different types of DDOS attacks, and that for some of them having access to the content on the application level makes your job of mitigating them a lot easier. But even without that, would comparing the encrypted traffic patterns for an individual client to other client's patterns (or to that client's traffic to one of the other 2 million Cloudflare websites); and analyzing the encrypted traffic as in [1] not still give you a wealth of information to use? It might have made for a much more rewarding two years of development: even if such a setup would be slightly less effective at mitigating DDOS', it would be infinitely better in terms of privacy and trust. [1] http://arxiv.org/abs/1403.0297 http://arxiv.org/abs/1403.0297
- jgrahamc 12y agoIn some ways what you propose sounds even scarier, i.e. figure out the best way to look inside SSL encrypted data without having the key. But in terms of privacy and trust, CloudFlare is already in the position of terminating SSL connections and establishing new ones to origin web servers. We take the protection of that data and the associated keys very seriously. There will be more announcements over the coming weeks and months about how we secure things.
- vader1 12y agoI'm not quite following how having just enough insights about the encrypted data to perform DDOS mitigation would be scarier than having full read- and write access to the cleartext. Thanks for the responses though, and definitely looking forward to those blogs.
- buro9 12y agoYou are implying something fundamental: that the encrypted traffic could be adequately analysed for insight without the need for decryption. Yet to do so would be to defeat SSL itself, or at least to declare it as insufficient to adequately protect secrets. What CloudFlare is doing isn't defeating SSL or any kind of attack on it. They are merely working around some prior limitations on requiring access to an organisation's private key. As a proxy that is charged with DDoS protection (and other types of protection and performance improvements), they are being asked to terminate and work on the unencrypted data to a very strict set of complience by the end organisations, but they need to do this in a way that does not involve possessing or having access to the private key. Their solution works extremely well given the multiple constraints (technological and legal) that they have.
- handsomeransoms 12y ago> You are implying something fundamental: that the encrypted traffic could be adequately analysed for insight without the need for decryption. > Yet to do so would be to defeat SSL itself, or at least to declare it as insufficient to adequately protect secrets. This is possible through HTTPS traffic analysis, see [0] and [1] for starters. Of course, it's much easier for Cloudflare to do analysis for DDoS protection if they have access to plaintext. Whether this means that SSL is, as you say, "insufficient to adequately protect secrets" is an interesting discussion to have. [0] http://arxiv.org/pdf/1403.0297.pdf http://arxiv.org/pdf/1403.0297.pdf [1] http://blog.ioactive.com/2012/02/ssl-traffic-analysis-on-google-maps.html http://blog.ioactive.com/2012/02/ssl-traffic-analysis-on-goo...
- dsl 12y agoActually thats pretty disingenuous. Most of the attacks CloudFlare prides itself on defending are amplification attacks (NTP and DNS specifically) not DoS attacks within the relevant protocols. Servers that simply forwarded 80 and 443 while dropping everything else sitting on really big pipes is really what people are paying you for today.
- jgrahamc 12y agoYou are correct that we deal with amplification/reflection attacks all the time. But what you don't see are the HTTP-level attacks where we put in place filtering rules in our WAF to block them. You don't see them because we mostly don't write about them. These attacks are different from the NTP/DNS style (which fill pipes) because they use server resources on the origin web servers. We need to be able to defend against both.
- dsl 12y agoSure, there are probably a handful of custom rules that some customers get, but like I said... most of your customers are paying for something that drops NTP/DNS and forwards HTTP/HTTPS. The standard WAF that all customers get scores pretty badly in independent tests: http://www.slideshare.net/zeroscience/cloudflare-vs-incapsula-round-2 http://www.slideshare.net/zeroscience/cloudflare-vs-incapsul...
- rdl 12y agoThe WAF product has had a LOT of upgrades since that report, and has a huge update coming in Q4. That report is pretty out of date; I'd be happy to provide a test setup for Zeroscience to do a new analysis if they'd like, and am looking at how to do a continuous test/demo of the new WAF, because it's pretty interesting how it works. When a source IP is shared (Tor exits, carrier NAT, etc.), trying to push as much into URL pattern vs source-IP filtering, for instance.