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Keyless SSL: The Nitty Gritty Technical Details
- spindritf 12y agoIs this all the software necessary to run your own little keyless-like infrastructure with a couple of nginx server not having a key and talking to this reference key server over the Internet? BTW I probably should have asked yesterday but which CloudFlare plans will include the keyless feature?
- justinsb 12y agoTo save people a long read, there's nothing particularly surprising in these details. The key is held by the origin; when a computation using the key is needed the origin is asked to perform it over a secure connection. They have improved support for session resumption in a distributed environment (which is even more important now that key computations are even slower), this is commonly done as closed-source, and CloudFlare have promised to open-source it. Good improvements, and session resumption is important to implement, but nothing groundbreaking.
- fathom108 12y agoOh well. Guess we'll have to wait for Homomorphic encryption: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphic_encryption http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphic_encryption
- vader1 12y agoInteresting how they specifically refer to yesterday's discussion here on HN and over at Reddit, but don't go into the frequently mentioned complaint that despite not having access to the PK itself, Cloudflare can still intercept and modify all cleartext sent between the client and server, which for most intents and purposes means pretty much the same. Maybe not intentionally so, but it comes off as slightly misleading, because many people I spoke to who briefly skimmed the original announcement thought "keyless SSL" would mean this is no longer the case. Let me ask again: why not offer a setup where Cloudflare only acts on the network layer instead of on the application layer and proxies the still-encrypted HTTPS packets to the destination server? This would mean a customer could not use Cloudflare's caching (CDN) features, but still enjoy their DDOS protection without them being able to see all my customer's private details. If I were the CISO at one of the world's largest banks, that is exactly what I would want.
- jgrahamc 12y agoBecause DDoS protection isn't just something you do at the network layer. It's important to be able to apply filtering at the "application" level.
- vader1 12y agoI understand that there are many different types of DDOS attacks, and that for some of them having access to the content on the application level makes your job of mitigating them a lot easier. But even without that, would comparing the encrypted traffic patterns for an individual client to other client's patterns (or to that client's traffic to one of the other 2 million Cloudflare websites); and analyzing the encrypted traffic as in [1] not still give you a wealth of information to use? It might have made for a much more rewarding two years of development: even if such a setup would be slightly less effective at mitigating DDOS', it would be infinitely better in terms of privacy and trust. [1] http://arxiv.org/abs/1403.0297 http://arxiv.org/abs/1403.0297
- jgrahamc 12y agoIn some ways what you propose sounds even scarier, i.e. figure out the best way to look inside SSL encrypted data without having the key. But in terms of privacy and trust, CloudFlare is already in the position of terminating SSL connections and establishing new ones to origin web servers. We take the protection of that data and the associated keys very seriously. There will be more announcements over the coming weeks and months about how we secure things.
- vader1 12y agoI'm not quite following how having just enough insights about the encrypted data to perform DDOS mitigation would be scarier than having full read- and write access to the cleartext. Thanks for the responses though, and definitely looking forward to those blogs.
- 12y ago
- higherpurpose 12y agoIt's one thing to keep SHA1 in old services, but why do they keep pushing SHA1 into new ones?
- annnnd 12y agoFrom what I understand, the keys stay the same - this is the whole point of this approach. So it's not a "new service". I agree that SHA1 should be deprecated ASAP though.
- jgrahamc 12y agoWhat use of SHA-1 are you talking about?
- rakoo 12y agoFrom the user POV, nothing is changed. The decision to deprecate SHA1 or not isn't specific to Keyless SSL (ie, Keyless SSL isn't a new product for the users) From the bank's point of view, where we can say that Keyless SSL is a new product, only 2 cipher suites are allowed: ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 which, as you can see, don't include sha1.
- xorcist 12y agoInteresting read. Still no information how it compares to other HSM implementations however, and why they didn't use the more well studied PKCS protocols in theirs. I would imagine the problem was more with existing implementations rather than some problems with HSMs per se, as they probably have much larger latency than you normally have so things like blocking reads start to matter.
- ctz 12y agoI guess you mean PKCS#11, but that isn't a protocol. It's a C API. Trying to funnel it over a network would be both extremely complex, and non-standard.
- xorcist 12y agoNo, I was thinking of PKCS#7 which you can run over IP if you want. But it's a complicated set of standards and I'm not sure how they inter-relate. That's why I summarized them as PKCS-style protocols. This is not some theoretical thing. You can buy these devices off the shelf. If you have worked with PKI you have seen them, or some variant thereof.
- alexwilliamsca 12y agoThe Keyless SSL server is open source and available on GitHub - https://github.com/cloudflare/keyless https://github.com/cloudflare/keyless - although I'm wondering if its dependence on OpenSSL was a good choice.
- corobo 12y agoOut of curiosity what would you have used?
- alexwilliamsca 12y agoCyaSSL - http://www.yassl.com/yaSSL/Products-cyassl.html http://www.yassl.com/yaSSL/Products-cyassl.html
- guipsp 12y agoGPLv2
- justinsb 12y agoMy guess is that the customer for whom they developed this has crypto-acceleration hardware that is supported by OpenSSL. Also, this is only doing the actual crypto operations, not running the whole SSL protocol. Edit: I guess it's also exposing SSL publicly for talking to CloudFlare, which is I guess why they suggested IP firewalling as well (in case of another HeartBleed). And it's only a reference implementation!
- peterwwillis 12y agoYou've hit on the most dangerous part of this whole scheme: increased attack surface. There is now a much higher likelihood of a successful attack taking down the site, due to the client needing to both open up and harden its keyserver on the internet (i'm presuming they don't have private connections between cloudflare and the customer site). And obviously if any hole is found in either the client's keyserver or the network or host it runs on, the private key is now at risk. One could argue that the client is much less reliable in terms of hardening their security than CloudFlare is. In order to reduce the attack surface, the client's keyserver needs to be connecting to CloudFlare, so they don't need to expose a service on the internet and thus an attacker won't know what to try to attack to take down the keyserver.
- mrfusion 12y agoSo from a non-technical business owner perspective this means I can offer SSL for free without buying certs or making changes to my server?
- peterwaller 12y agoNo. This allows a content delivery network (such as cloudflare) to host content on your behalf without having to have direct access to your private key material. The main use cases you may be interested in are to 1) make it so that users connecting to you get a faster experience - since they can connect to a geographically nearby cloudflare server, rather than your distant server and 2) make it so that cloudflare can absorb large denial-of-service attacks that your server couldn't otherwise cope with.
- mrfusion 12y agoOk thanks. So this basically makes it easier and more secure to get set up with cloudflare? So why couldn't Cloudflare set up what I'm suggesting? Are there technical reasons, or just lack of demand?
- peterwaller 12y agoCloudflare probably is easier than running your own servers and configuring them correctly - I don't know since I haven't used them myself. But it sounds like you're not very familiar with the importance of the private key. If anyone else other than the bank obtains the bank's private key, the bank would consider that a serious failure, since it means others could impersonate them. The whole point is that you shouldn't give your private key to anyone else, and that without that key, others can't impersonate you. This "keyless SSL" scheme allows the bank to set up an entity it controls which knows the key. This entity delegates to cloudflare the ability to pretend to be the bank on a request-by-request basis, without divulging the key to anyone. If cloudflare gets compromised, the bank can stop that delegation on demand, the compromise is closed and the key is kept safe.
- icebraining 12y ago
- ehPReth 12y agoSorry if I'm missing something, but shouldn't this be called "Keyless TLS" as CloudFlare uses TLS and not SSL for this program?
- kisielk 12y agoFrom the article: "This may seem confusing at first, but makes sense since TLS is just a minor update to SSL 3.0. Subsequent versions of TLS have followed this pattern. Since TLS is an evolution of the SSL protocol, people still use the terms TLS and SSL somewhat interchangeably."
- ehPReth 12y agoOops, must have missed that. Thanks! I'm personally a fan of using the new official name whenever possible but I understand the tradition/ingrained nature of SSL.
- bifel 12y agoI don't get it. What's the point in keeping the key secret from cloudflare whilst providing a key server signing everything it is asked to sign? Isn't this like "Sorry I don't trust you enough to provide you a key to my apartment. But if you need something, just ask the janitor, he'll open the door any time you want"?
- wsh 12y agoIf you no longer trust the person, it's easier to tell the janitor not to admit him than to rely on his returning the key (and any copies) or to change the lock on the apartment.
- bifel 12y agoIs "changing the locks" (revoking the certificate) really so complicated that this "janitor-solution" is easier/cheaper/safer?
- wsh 12y agoThe CA can revoke the certificate, but since revocation checking in browsers is neither universal nor reliable under attack, revocation isn't a completely effective way to recover from a compromised private key.
- snowwrestler 12y agoThe more people who have a copy of a key, the more chances for a copy to be lost or stolen by a bad guy.
- yalogin 12y agoWhy should all of these have a marketing spin to them? By that I mean a catchy name. Keyless SSL is very misleading. I guess after the stupendous success of the heartbleed bug marketing every one now wants a catchy name. Having said that is it solving any security problems? 1. Companies don't have to give out their private key to Cloudflare but they still give them the encryption and hmac keys. So nothing really changed from a privacy or data protection point of view. 2. Now they opened up a new public API on the company's server for cloudflare to use the private key. 3. Is it simply to mitigate against another heartbleed kind of bug? Whats preventing the same bug to appear in the company's server?