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Here's the problem: If certificate revocation worked and was reliable this type of setup would not be needed and would actually make you less secure (for the re
by Someone1234 12y ago
Here's the problem: If certificate revocation worked and was reliable this type of setup would not be needed and would actually make you less secure (for the reasons you stated).
However the reality on the ground is that certificate revocation is somewhere between unreliable and damn right broken. Right now the primary way certificates are revoked is via operating system updates or via browser updates (e.g. Chrome has a revocation list they update semi-regularly).
Covered somewhat here:
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/02/05/crlsets.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/02/05/crlsets.html
So while adding an oracle does definitely increase your attack surface, at least you are never dependant on certificate revocation for your ultimate security.
I guess it really boils down to this: What do you trust more, certificate revocation or your own ability to secure the oracle? For me the answer is a no brainer, simply because I distrust certificate revocation so much.
- DEinspanjer 12y agoBeyond the brokenness of certificate revocation, just the simple fact that a financial institution in the US must formally notify the Federal Reserve if any of their private SSL keys are compromised is a huge factor that is better mitigated by this strategy. To me, the biggest question is whether they can keep the oracle highly available even in the face of a DDoS. It still seems like the weakest link, just slightly more difficult for the attacker to target since they don't have a publicly advertised direct connection to it.