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"as long as there's no control over what public keys we encrypt the message with, the statement that Apple or the NSA can't read the messages is a half-truth at

"as long as there's no control over what public keys we encrypt the message with, the statement that Apple or the NSA can't read the messages is a half-truth at best." This. That said, it is reasonable to believe the way iMessage is architected would likely make mass surveillance harder in general, just like widespread use of SSL does, so it is not entirely useless either. The bigger problem IMO is that they then upload the message database unencrypted (from server's standpoint) to iCloud in the backup process (which is admittedly optional, but effectively on for most users). That, of course, is easily readable, as the celebrity hack shows.

dogecoinbase 12y ago
make mass surveillance harder in general More specifically, it makes it so that Apple is not forced to conduct mass surveillance by giving up everything when they receive a legal wiretap order, in the vein of Lavabit. If you see someone else running a message system that has no way for the cops to read it, that should be a sign that it's insecure -- not technologically, but architecturally.
- aianus 12y ago
  > If you see someone else running a message system that has no way for the cops to read it, that should be a sign that it's insecure -- not technologically, but architecturally. What's that supposed to mean? What about OTR or TextSecure or PGP over email?
  - dogecoinbase 12y ago
    someone else running
- ejr 12y ago
  I'm unclear as to what you mean by that last sentence. If someone is running a message system that is distributed and keys to encrypt and decrypt are store locally, not on the server, then why wouldn't it be secure? The message system may be anything as simple as an addressing system Ex: Email, which is run by any number of providers, however if an email client is configured to use PGP and access is via POP/IMAP and not webmail, it's still secure as far as we know. A message system that may not be email, but still doesn't store keys on the server, still provides no way for cops to read it. Except perhaps to see some message was sent, not what the message was.

dogecoinbase 12y ago

make mass surveillance harder in general More specifically, it makes it so that Apple is not forced to conduct mass surveillance by giving up everything when they receive a legal wiretap order, in the vein of Lavabit. If you see someone else running a message system that has no way for the cops to read it, that should be a sign that it's insecure -- not technologically, but architecturally.

aianus 12y ago
> If you see someone else running a message system that has no way for the cops to read it, that should be a sign that it's insecure -- not technologically, but architecturally. What's that supposed to mean? What about OTR or TextSecure or PGP over email?
- dogecoinbase 12y ago
  someone else running
ejr 12y ago
I'm unclear as to what you mean by that last sentence. If someone is running a message system that is distributed and keys to encrypt and decrypt are store locally, not on the server, then why wouldn't it be secure? The message system may be anything as simple as an addressing system Ex: Email, which is run by any number of providers, however if an email client is configured to use PGP and access is via POP/IMAP and not webmail, it's still secure as far as we know. A message system that may not be email, but still doesn't store keys on the server, still provides no way for cops to read it. Except perhaps to see some message was sent, not what the message was.