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You're deliberately trying to discredit a person who made available proof that the surveillance machine is out of control. While everyone else is dissecting th

You're deliberately trying to discredit a person who made available proof that the surveillance machine is out of control. While everyone else is dissecting the information and trying to digest it and working on solutions to the surveillance problem; you're obsessed with the messenger. Why?

ogijaoijfawje 12y ago
I do not follow what you mean by discretize, could you elaborate? I'm merely trying to explain it's worthwhile to consider Snowden isn't acting in our best interest. Imagine Snowden's supervisor comes to him and says: "You're going on an extended special mission abroad. Leak these documents to some journalists. Act like you're trying to shed light on what's going on by playing the victim card. The goal is...."? Per the leaks, solutions to the surveillance problem are limited and likely won't become something proliferated through the masses due to cost, availability, usability, or some combination of the three. We're talking about eliminating hardware-level vulnerabilities, not patching software. And even when and if we do fix these vulnerabilities, what's to stop them from doing it again? All it takes is threatening the life of the company or individuals involved in the development process.
- throwaway876876 12y ago
  "discredit" was the right word, of course. I disagree. Solutions can involve broadening technical security awareness and education, not only for experts, but for the great masses. Suddenly, people who wouldn't have done it otherwise, are installing PGP, guided by well-designed step-by-step-instructions which haven't existed before Snowden. This is per se a Good Thing. Awareness leads to more people trying to exploit things previously thought to be at least very improbable to break. Discussions about Crypto-Quines, VM-breakouts, you name it, are suddenly on the rise, at least in my perception (which has since sharpened significantly, and I'm not even in the least involved in security) Better tools are developed to prevent goto fail;s. Other people fork OpenSSL, sunset SHA1, visit security-related conferences or donate money, you name it. This is a slow process, but things are definitively moving forward. But again, you're avoiding to answer the question: What a difference would it make if your scenario would be true? Would it negate that mass surveillance exists? Of course not. But that's what's important here, that's what's being worked on by people. It's one thing to be a classical "we can't win anyway" naysayer, but is's a completely different thing to try to pull an ad hominem derailment, so the question arises: Who are you working for? What if your supervisor came to you telling you "Try to find something about Snowden we can use against him and his findings. A way to discredit him, maybe find someone who went to school with him who can make a fool out of him; maybe try to pull an assange-like sexual assault case on him, anything", what would you do? Wouldn't we find you here?
aliquis 12y ago
Well, I'd agree with you, but the way you phrased it made me feel uneasy. Are you saying that source criticism in journalism is overrated, or that Assange should be an exception to the rules? This is the Internet. Isn't there enough room here for discussions about both the message and the messenger? Or is it that when the message gets strong or important enough, the messenger gets irrelevant in comparison?
- throwaway876876 12y ago
  What has the message to do with the messenger, in this case? Sure we should be skeptical to all sources - media, individuals, government. Isn't this common sense? The presented information, however, stands on its own, no matter who the person who delivered them represents. What exactly would we gain from discussing the messenger? Would that move anything forward? What if we found out Snowden was paid by some russian agency. What exactly would that change? Would the guys at Stellar say "Oh, the russians paid him? Everyone stop changing passwords and re-issuing certificates, guys, everything's fine; he got paid by the russians", and the slides with router passwords would suddenly disappear from the face of earth? I hope it's the language barrier and I'm failing to understand your point.
  - aliquis 12y ago
    You're probably correct that it's the language barrier. The message has very little to do with the messenger, and I can't see who's claimed otherwise. The difference seems to be about whether we SHOULD discuss the messenger. Assange still has the power to decide what to publish, and maybe more importantly when to publish it. Everyone who has a message to convey will wait for the right time to do so. This is true for political statements, for press releases, for when you ask your girlfriend to marry you or for when you tell your parents that you failed an exam. It would be silly not to accept that Assange cares about timing. A discussion about the messenger shouldn't be seen as a dicussion about the truthfulness of the message. For example: The Russian government accused the Ukrainian government of being fascists, and one of their excuses for entering Crimea was that they needed to protect the Crimean Tatars from these fascists. But the Tatars are pro-Ukrainian, and many of them fled when the Russians took control. Those who remained are being harassed, and there are Tatars who were even denied re-entry to Crimea after having traveled to Ukraine. Sure, there are far-right extremists in Ukraine. Of course there are. But the Russians didn't want to admit that the phenomenon is far more prevalent in Russia. Knowledge of the messenger helps us to put all of this into a context. All I'm saying is that we should be generous enough not to censor discussions just because we're not interested in them. In this case, it means discussions about both the message and the messenger. When combined, the outcomes will provide us with even more information. Ad hominem arguments like "you're obsessed with the messenger" are designed to silence one of these discussions.

ogijaoijfawje 12y ago

I do not follow what you mean by discretize, could you elaborate? I'm merely trying to explain it's worthwhile to consider Snowden isn't acting in our best interest. Imagine Snowden's supervisor comes to him and says: "You're going on an extended special mission abroad. Leak these documents to some journalists. Act like you're trying to shed light on what's going on by playing the victim card. The goal is...."? Per the leaks, solutions to the surveillance problem are limited and likely won't become something proliferated through the masses due to cost, availability, usability, or some combination of the three. We're talking about eliminating hardware-level vulnerabilities, not patching software. And even when and if we do fix these vulnerabilities, what's to stop them from doing it again? All it takes is threatening the life of the company or individuals involved in the development process.

throwaway876876 12y ago
"discredit" was the right word, of course. I disagree. Solutions can involve broadening technical security awareness and education, not only for experts, but for the great masses. Suddenly, people who wouldn't have done it otherwise, are installing PGP, guided by well-designed step-by-step-instructions which haven't existed before Snowden. This is per se a Good Thing. Awareness leads to more people trying to exploit things previously thought to be at least very improbable to break. Discussions about Crypto-Quines, VM-breakouts, you name it, are suddenly on the rise, at least in my perception (which has since sharpened significantly, and I'm not even in the least involved in security) Better tools are developed to prevent goto fail;s. Other people fork OpenSSL, sunset SHA1, visit security-related conferences or donate money, you name it. This is a slow process, but things are definitively moving forward. But again, you're avoiding to answer the question: What a difference would it make if your scenario would be true? Would it negate that mass surveillance exists? Of course not. But that's what's important here, that's what's being worked on by people. It's one thing to be a classical "we can't win anyway" naysayer, but is's a completely different thing to try to pull an ad hominem derailment, so the question arises: Who are you working for? What if your supervisor came to you telling you "Try to find something about Snowden we can use against him and his findings. A way to discredit him, maybe find someone who went to school with him who can make a fool out of him; maybe try to pull an assange-like sexual assault case on him, anything", what would you do? Wouldn't we find you here?

aliquis 12y ago

Well, I'd agree with you, but the way you phrased it made me feel uneasy. Are you saying that source criticism in journalism is overrated, or that Assange should be an exception to the rules? This is the Internet. Isn't there enough room here for discussions about both the message and the messenger? Or is it that when the message gets strong or important enough, the messenger gets irrelevant in comparison?

throwaway876876 12y ago
What has the message to do with the messenger, in this case? Sure we should be skeptical to all sources - media, individuals, government. Isn't this common sense? The presented information, however, stands on its own, no matter who the person who delivered them represents. What exactly would we gain from discussing the messenger? Would that move anything forward? What if we found out Snowden was paid by some russian agency. What exactly would that change? Would the guys at Stellar say "Oh, the russians paid him? Everyone stop changing passwords and re-issuing certificates, guys, everything's fine; he got paid by the russians", and the slides with router passwords would suddenly disappear from the face of earth? I hope it's the language barrier and I'm failing to understand your point.
- aliquis 12y ago
  You're probably correct that it's the language barrier. The message has very little to do with the messenger, and I can't see who's claimed otherwise. The difference seems to be about whether we SHOULD discuss the messenger. Assange still has the power to decide what to publish, and maybe more importantly when to publish it. Everyone who has a message to convey will wait for the right time to do so. This is true for political statements, for press releases, for when you ask your girlfriend to marry you or for when you tell your parents that you failed an exam. It would be silly not to accept that Assange cares about timing. A discussion about the messenger shouldn't be seen as a dicussion about the truthfulness of the message. For example: The Russian government accused the Ukrainian government of being fascists, and one of their excuses for entering Crimea was that they needed to protect the Crimean Tatars from these fascists. But the Tatars are pro-Ukrainian, and many of them fled when the Russians took control. Those who remained are being harassed, and there are Tatars who were even denied re-entry to Crimea after having traveled to Ukraine. Sure, there are far-right extremists in Ukraine. Of course there are. But the Russians didn't want to admit that the phenomenon is far more prevalent in Russia. Knowledge of the messenger helps us to put all of this into a context. All I'm saying is that we should be generous enough not to censor discussions just because we're not interested in them. In this case, it means discussions about both the message and the messenger. When combined, the outcomes will provide us with even more information. Ad hominem arguments like "you're obsessed with the messenger" are designed to silence one of these discussions.