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> These people may have heard about a rule that it is good to upgrade your system, so their TB and enigmail is upgraded (semi)automagically. This type of user
by Someone1234 12y ago
> These people may have heard about a rule that it is good to upgrade your system, so their TB and enigmail is upgraded (semi)automagically.
This type of user behaviour has been exploited by the security services many-a-time. If that's who you're up against then somewhat counter-intuitively the advice is actually to run "old faithful" encryption suites which have been verified and just keep an eye on the changelog for any actual security issues (ignore feature updates).
If you have automatic updates turned on, there's nothing stopping them from MiTM-ling that and injecting a specially crafted (malware) version which will allow them to decrypt the traffic without you knowing (or just send them the private key(S)).
Now before you say "but the executable is signed!!!" well that's grand, but these guys have a CA in your certificate store. So they can generate fake certificates at a whim.
This logic also extends to any automatic updates on your system (e.g. Mac OSX system-updates have been exploited before in this way). A lot of software will download updates then run the "installer" in ring 0 (root). Even if you trust the source of the updates, do you trust all of the CAs in your CA store? I certainly do not.
- mspecter 12y agoShouldn't the certs related to OS / app updates be self-signed (the root of trust being Microsoft/Apple/pkgmanager*), rather than anyone in your CA? Like, a new Java update should be signed by Oracle, not signed by Joe Schmo's Honest CA. Also, forgive me if I'm wrong, but the original Evilgrade exploit for Apple was completely unencrypted, right? Edit: You use "these guys" to refer to the attacker quite a bit in your statement above, it'd be smart to think about your threat model a bit. For instance, it's likely that some actors can get a root WEB CA, and somewhat unlikely that they've gotten into Apple's chain of trust. These are different targets with different threat models.
- Someone1234 12y agoThat's the way Microsoft do it, yes. They have certificate pinning in the OS for updates (it isn't technically self-signed, but same principle). FinFisher was exploiting insecure updates but they aren't the only game in town. There was, and still is, software around which only validates if the certificate is valid (via the OS) and little more, then will happily install the update as root. As far as I know OS X is no longer vulnerable. I was just using that as an example to show that "anything" could be targeted that has automatic updates.
- __david__ 12y ago> Shouldn't the certs related to OS / app updates be self-signed (the root of trust being Microsoft/Apple/pkgmanager*), rather than anyone in your CA? Yes, this is how Debian works (they use a well known gpg key to sign their list of packages). I believe the popular Mac OS X library Sparkle also works like this—the master public key is shipped with the App so that it only accepts updates that are signed by that particular key (if you use Apple's code signing then it only accepts new updates if they are signed by a key assigned to the developer).
- ossreality 12y ago>If you have automatic updates turned on, there's nothing stopping them from MiTM-ling that What a bunch of stupid, misinformed FUD.