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Self-signed and no encryption are one in the same. If an attacker is in a position to read unencrypted traffic, they MIGHT be in a position to inject DNS respo
by Someone1234 12y ago
Self-signed and no encryption are one in the same.
If an attacker is in a position to read unencrypted traffic, they MIGHT be in a position to inject DNS responses, or otherwise intercept traffic. If they can do that, they can generate a new self-signed certificate, MITM, which effectively disabled encryption (without making the user aware).
I will say, I feel like it is "unfair" that browsers give you an error page for self-signed but don't for regular HTTP. Why not just show a self-signed HTTPS page identically to how you would show a HTTP page (insecure, no padlock, etc). Also do mixed content warnings as if self-signed is insecure/HTTP.
An alternative which exists, which a lot of people ignore, is instead of doing self-signed generate your own CA and then sign your own certificate. You can install the CA in the root CA store on the OS and then you won't be using a "self-signed" certificate, you will be using a fully signed certificate with all of the security that that comes with (assuming you keep your root CA offline/safe).
PS - It took me many years to come to the realisation that self-signed encryption is effectively no encryption. You just really have to come at it from the "Starbucks insecure WiFi" perspective. Once you think of it like that, self-signed is too trivial to MITM and thus the encryption can be undetectably circumvented.
- tptacek 12y agoA regular HTTP connection declares itself to be insecure, and is. A self-signed HTTPS connection declares itself to be somehow secure, but demonstrably isn't.
- Someone1234 12y agoNeither declares themselves as anything. They're just exposed interfaces. The browser is the one making declarations about a connection's security. So why not declare both equally insecure (which is true)?
- tptacek 12y agoThat's just not true. Internet users are trained to look for HTTPS security indicators. Nobody is trained to distinguish between "marginally improved security" and "actually improved security". But in the former (self-signed) case, nobody, for instance, should be providing credit cards.
- Someone1234 12y agoYour first and second sentences contradict one another. You say it is "just not true" (that browsers declare them secure/insecure) and then go on to say "users are trained to look for HTTP security indicators" (exposed by the browsers). So I'm quite confused about what it is you think I said which is "not true." Since you obviously do agree that browsers declare things secure or not. Your example about credit cards is entirely non sequitur. It doesn't follow what you said before nor make sense in the context. I can only suspect you misread something earlier in this conversation as your replies are quite confusing.
- tptacek 12y agoHTTPS security indicators. An indication that they are on a secure HTTP connection.
- junto 12y agoWe really need an alternative. Somehow we need to make sure that all communications are encrypted. I understand that there needs to be a cost to prove your identity, since the CA needs to invest time in validating the identity of the person or organisation applying. We have a situation currently where encrypted transport is tied to an SSL cert, which in nearly all cases is tied to a cost (because of the CA identity issue). Therefore SSL isn't prevalent enough. I'd like to have SSL on my personal blog and my webmail, but I don't want to pay for a couple of hundred dollars for a wildcard subdomain cert that lasts one year. The NSA stuff shows that we need to switch to a secure transport. It's the only way to hinder the dragnetting.