3 ms·
Does this mean anything for Git and other VCSs, which uses SHA1 for identifying commits and other blobs? For non-malicious content, you won't care, but if colli
by eslaught 12y ago
Does this mean anything for Git and other VCSs, which uses SHA1 for identifying commits and other blobs? For non-malicious content, you won't care, but if collision attacks are actually feasible, then Git's security guarantees ("you can fetch from anywhere") might potentially be compromised.
- derekerdmann 12y agoThis is something Linus addressed quite a while ago: http://lwn.net/Articles/132513/ http://lwn.net/Articles/132513/
- eslaught 12y agoThe critical question is "how broken is SHA1?" Linus essentially bets on it being not broken, or at least, the same degree of broken as the alternatives. At the time that was a reasonable argument. But the numbers quoted in the article [1] seem to point to SHA1 collision attacks being practical within 10 years, and that's based purely on expected hardware advances and not on special hardware acceleration or theoretical breakthroughs. So I ask again: do we need to revisit this? Just because Linus was dismissive 9 years ago doesn't mean we should ignore the possibility. [1]: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/10/when_will_we_se.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/10/when_will_we_...