4 ms·
Yep! Sounds like a pretty big problem. With 10,000 scanning processes taking 5/sec per IP, it'd take less than a month to scan all IPs. It should be easy for a
by MichaelGG 12y ago
Yep! Sounds like a pretty big problem. With 10,000 scanning processes taking 5/sec per IP, it'd take less than a month to scan all IPs. It should be easy for a powerful adversary to scale this up and finish in a day or two. It'd take more work if all ports need to be scanned, but restricting to just known hosting blocks could shave a bit off. As could eliminating well-known good sites from a first pass.
It would surprise me if the FBI isn't already doing this for all known onion sites, just to have the info around.
At any rate, sounds like a real basic Opsec101 failure on The Silk Road. Not that hidden services are that safe in the first place. The Tor folks have written about how hidden services are quite vulnerable to some attacks. Not something I'd want to rely on to save me from a 30 year sentence.
Edit: If someone had to run a hidden service, it might make sense to setup another onion site (on another Tor instance) and expose that on port 80, as part of misinformation tactic. Reading several incidents, it seems attackers will use circumstancial evidence to help narrow down the possibilities. By intentionally leaking things (like offhand comments about the weather, using reports from another city) one might be able to gain a few more bits of anonymity back. Of course someone doing such a thing wouldn't setup their illegal site on a public IP in the first place.
- dllthomas 12y agoIt's my understanding that most OpSec failures are real basic OpSec 101 failures. Not because, faced with the question, it's hard to get it right - but because faced with so many questions it is hard to get all of them right, and screwing one up is frequently enough.