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My hesitance to continue this debate is that I find places like HN and reddit to be pretty hostile audiences, and engaging in the conversation occupies more of
by HelloMcFly 12y ago
My hesitance to continue this debate is that I find places like HN and reddit to be pretty hostile audiences, and engaging in the conversation occupies more of my thoughts than I find it should. It's a form a self-regulation to know when I should stop, particularly given the audience.
And I want to make one thing clear about psychology which just never seems to be clear: psychology is way, way bigger than clinical psychology, yet clinical psychology (and stories from it) seem to be the only thing that is ever brought up in these conversations. I can't speak to clinical psychology. There are 50 divisions of the APA, some significantly better than others. My division is #14.
> Among other things, they aren't falsifiable and they don't make predictions about unobserved phenomena, both hallmarks of scientific theories.
Almost all of those theories are falsifiable, elements of them have been falsified, and they make predictions for unobserved circumstances.
> That's the reason the NIMH gave for abandoning the DSM
The DSM is a diagnostic tool from a branch of psychology I know little about. It is not the singular representative of the social sciences, or even halfway related to much work being done in behavioral prediction. It's not theory-based, as I understand it it is not meant to be, and I've no interest or ability to defend it.
> Point to a theory in the class you describe that has been used to conclusively falsify someone else's theory in the same field, a case in which the defender of the falsified theory acknowledges that his theory can been proven false and has no further utility.
The last part of your request is unreasonable - proving that there is no utility whatsoever in old theories is unnecessary. Elements of older theories can have utility. And as for the original theory's proponent abandoning it? I don't see that often, nor see it as a requirement. Journals I read don't publish mea culpas from those who were ultimately proven wrong, they just publish the evidence proving them wrong.
I pointed out one specifically already in my previous comment (edit: my mistake, I took that out just referenced expectancy theories more generally). Victor Vroom introduced the VIE expectancy model for explaining and predicting behavior in 1964. Over 20 years the research indicated that the theory as proposed did not jive with the observed evidence, and the model transition from one based on "psychological force" to "outcome attractiveness" as chronicled by Pinder in 1984. Van Erde and Thiery, in 1996, that the preponderance of evidence on the model, revised or otherwise, demonstrated that even the revised theory was inadequate. The individual elements had predictive power, but as a model it just didn't work. Did Victor Vroom abandon it? Who knows? The field certainly did. But did the field note that nothing in theory had any utility? No, certainly not. Locke and Latham had integrated some of the elements into explaining goal commitment, a critical component of goal-setting theory.
There was also the feedback theory of workplace behavior popularized by Komaki in the 80s and early 90s, and was effectively dismantled as a stand-alone theory both logically and empirically Locke and Latham in the mid-to-late 90s. I have no idea whether Komaki acknowledged they were wrong publicly, but the field moved on. Even something so basic as goal-setting theory has wholesale change in just the past 5 years with the measurement and observation of subconscious goals, and how they don't work with traditional goal-setting theory.
Deci and colleagues outlined and empirically supported Cognitive Evaluation Theory in the 90s and early 00s. Among others, Rynes dismantled the bulk of it in the mid-to-late 00s, and as far as I know it's essentially dead.
Another one is job characteristics theory, which I don't recall the whole story of off the top of my head. It came, it didn't prove to be reliable, it was abandoned. Again elements have found their way to better homes (i.e., links of autonomy to workplace behavior patterns) but on the whole it didn't cut it.
If that is too old, a more modern one is the debate between Social Cognitive Theory in the workplace (from Wood and Bandura, at some point). It's a theory, lots of testable hypothesis, and great empirical support. A pillar of explaining aspects of workplace behavior! A professor named Vancouver out of Michigan State has demonstrated empirically multiple times that the model's predicted outcomes are often at odds with reality. There's been some back-and-forth on this one, and I'm not up to date on it. But it became clear the theory as proposed was not adequate.
> Consider the example of Asperger Syndrome... recovered memory therapy.
They are not my domain of psychology. Psychology, and social science in general, are very broad terms. There are bad examples. I cannot and will not defend those things, but you should not accept those as archetypal representations of all psychological and social science research.
EDIT: One more thing to add. These things tend to have longer timescales than in other harder sciences because of the nature of the subjects. One or two empirical studies may be enough to definitively disprove ideas elsewhere, but because getting large numbers of people across adequate contexts is so onerous, particularly with non-student, non-US samples, the lag-time for debate can be large.
- lutusp 12y ago> ... psychology is way, way bigger than clinical psychology, yet clinical psychology (and stories from it) seem to be the only thing that is ever brought up in these conversations. Yes, and there's a reason. The ground truth about the medical field is what happens in clinics. If clinicians are shaking dried gourds over patients, that tells us about medicine itself, from top to bottom -- the only way something unscientific could happen in a clinical setting is if there's no reliable science anywhere in medicine. In the same way, if someone builds a bridge by guess and by golly, without any consideration of loading and stresses, this calls into question the scientific basis of civil engineering. So when I hear a psychologist complain that clinical psychology isn't representative of the entire field, I have to say that kind of compartmentalizing doesn't work anywhere else -- it suggests that psychology isn't unified by a respect for science, or by reliable, falsifiable theory. >> Consider the example of Asperger Syndrome... recovered memory therapy. > They are not my domain of psychology. This sounds increasingly like one of those joke conversations about which kind of Southern Baptist you are. Religion works that way, science doesn't. In science, evidence and tested theories forge a consensus that unifies all legitimate fields, at least until someone produces a better theory, then the process repeats. Do you suppose that a doctor could say, "I don't care what biologists are doing, it doesn't affect me of my practice"? Do you suppose that a geologist could say, "I don't care what the physicists are doing in Earth Science, that has nothing to do with my work"? This is not realistic, because the example fields are united by a common respect for the primary role of evidence and the scientific method. I say this to remind you how you sound then you try to describe psychology as though it's a bunch of disconnected pieces. Not that that isn't so, but it provides us with a measure of the significance of science in psychology. > ... but you should not accept those as archetypal representations of all psychological and social science research. If that's true, then psychologists lose the right to describe themselves as scientists, or to receive funds earmarked for scientific activities. Taxpayers are willing to contribute to physics because (a) it's a science with an enviable track record, and (b) physicists are on the same page -- they don't say things like, "Don't listen to the particle physicists, they're not the real thing." Only psychologists say things like that. > The last part of your request is unreasonable - proving that there is no utility whatsoever in old theories is unnecessary. Then you do not understand science. When the existence of the ether was disproven, to save limited resources the falsification was accepted by everyone -- opinion played no part. When the Phlogiston theory was disproven, it was disproven for everyone, everywhere. This kind of certainty and consensus is what makes science science.